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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the extent to which it is possible to develop an 
environmental role for the law of tort. To date, the role of tort has been limited in this 
context by procedural and substantive difficulties in establishing liability (known as 
transaction costs). Furthermore, whereas environmental protection is a public interest 
objective, the law of tort is primarily a means of resolving private disputes. The 
common law has traditionally regarded private rights as being divisible from public 
interest issues such as environmental protection. 
The current debate has been prompted by a number of European Union and Council of 
Europe initiatives on the subject which consider developing tort in this manner by the 
introduction of a specialist environmental liability regime. However, much of the 
current debate lacks an appreciation of a fundamental issue, namely purpose of tort in 
contemporary Western society. This research seeks to make a valuable contribution by 
assessing the extent to which it is possible to ground an environmental application of 
tort in a sound conceptual basis. 
The thesis commences with an overview of the main torts which are relevant in an 
environmental context and the difficulties which have been experienced by plaintiffs in 
establishing liability. Given that the main limitation of tort is that it focuses on private 
interests; it is considered whether it is possible to develop a public interest model of tort 
which admits wider issues such as the desirability of environmental protection. This 
involves consideration of a range of issues, including the `philosophy' underpinning 
tort, the economics of tort, property law and insurability of environmental liability. It is 
concluded that it is possible, both in conceptual and practical terms, to develop a public 
interest model of tort and that, furthermore, there are potential benefits with such an 
approach. The principal advantage of tort is that it allows private individuals to 
participate in the policing of the environment. An analysis of EC policy on this subject 
demonstrates that this may provide the rationale for EC intervention in this field. 
In the light of these theoretical and policy objectives, the EC proposals, alluded to 
above, are discussed in depth. These initiatives are compared with solutions adopted by 
individual Member States which have already implemented their own environmental 
liability regimes. Conclusions are drawn regarding the extent to which such 
developments may succeed in increasing the efficacy of tort as a means of 
environmental protection and the wider implications of such an approach. It is 
concluded that a specialist environmental liability regime may be instrumental in 
developing a concept of `stewardship', in which proprietary interests in natural 
resources entail both rights and responsibilities. 
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1 
Introduction 
1. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH 
During the latter part of the 20th Century environmental damage, resulting from 
industrialization, has become an important political issue. Attention has been focused 
on the extent to which law may provide a solution to the problem. This has given rise 
to the development of environmental law. 1 Although environmental law has only 
become a discreet area of study in recent years its origins may be traced back several 
centuries. 2 However, until the nineteenth century attempts to deal with pollution by 
regulation were rare. 3 Thus, in cases where pollution caused loss or discomfort to an 
individual, it was necessary to have recourse to the common law. The common law 
proved ineffectual in the face of the industrial revolution with the result that, during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there has been a systematic attempt to control 
pollution by means of regulation. 4 This has led to the marginalization of tort in this 
context. 5 
In the light of these developments the issue which this research addresses is whether 
tort has the potential to fulfil an important role as part of an overall system of 
environmental regulation. The current debate has been prompted by a number of 
European Union and Council of Europe initiatives proposing the introduction of 
measures designed to adapt tort as a means of environmental protection. Thus, as will 
be seen below, various means have been suggested of overcoming, by way of statutory 
intervention, the particular difficulties which face a plaintiff when attempting to 
establish liability for environmental damage. 
'However, 
environmental law is not a self-contained branch of law comprising unique principles. Rather, 
it is a banner under which those areas of law, which may be used to control environmentally harmful 
activities, are loosely grouped. See Ball, S., and Bell, S. (1994) Environmental Law (2nd edn. ), 
Blackstone, ch. 1. 
2 Garner refers to the now celebrated incident in 1584 in which William Shakespeare's father was 
prosecuted by the town council for allowing a dung heap to accumulate outside his house in Henley 
Street. He also refers to an ordinance issued in 1610 by James I which prohibited the burning of sea coal 
within a mile of "our city of Westminster"; See Garner, J. F. "Environmental Law -a Real Subject? " 
1992), 142(6580) New Law Journal 1718. 
This is due to the fact that until the nineteenth century there was not a regulatory machine in place 
capable of assimilating data and drafting an administrative response to problems such as pollution. See 
Atiyah, P. S. (1979) The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, Clarendon Press, ch. 5. 
4 The developments which allowed this to take place, such as the evolution of a new professional class, 
are reviewed by Atiyah, op. cit., ch. 5. 5 Consequently some doubt whether the common law any longer has a useful role to fulfil as a means of 
formulating responses to new problems. See Calabresi, G. (1982), A Common Law for the Age of 
Statutes, Harvard University Press, at p. 163, "It is unrealistic to expect that courts will be able to play 
the kind of law making role they once played. For there will be too many situations in which, for 
example, the writing of a new law will simply be beyond the capacity of a court and in which, 
nonetheless, a new law must be promulgated all at once. " 
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The research considers those factors which have limited the efficacy of tort as a 
means of environmental protection in the past and critically analyses various proposals 
designed to overcome those difficulties. However, this is set against consideration of a 
much wider issue, namely, the purpose of tort in this context. Traditionally, the law of 
tort has been primarily concerned with the protection of private interests, 6 whereas, 
environmental protection constitutes a public interest objective.? The main problem 
which has to be overcome concerns the extent to which the focus of tortious liability 
can be shifted from the protection of private interests to the protection of public 
interests. To this end it is necessary to determine whether it is practically and 
conceptually possible to develop tort in this manner and, furthermore, whether such 
an approach would augment the regulatory responses which are already in place. Much 
of the current debate lacks an appreciation of these issues. By considering the 
European proposals in the light of the wider theoretical perspectives regarding the 
function of tort, it is hoped that this research will make an original and constructive 
contribution to the debate. 
Before proceeding to a more detailed overview of the main issues addressed and the 
structure of the research, it is necessary to place the subject in context by identifying 
the reasons for the ecological crisis and the role of environmental law in general. 
2. THE NEED FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
2.1 Growing Awareness of Environmental Damage 
As stated above, the latter part of the twentieth century has seen a dramatic increase in 
public concern regarding environmental damage. Two hundred years of 
industrialization has left indelible scars on landscapes and resulted in the release of 
billions of tonnes of noxious substances into the environment8. 
6 Tort affords individuals a degree of private `space' from which others can be excluded. Thus, both real 
and personal property can be protected from exploitation by others. In addition, `bodily space' is 
protected by restrictions on the ability of others to cause personal injury or restrict freedom of movement. 
See Street, H. (1976), The Law of Torts, Butterworths, ch 1. 
7 In this case the focus is on the collective interests of society rather than the private interests of any 
individuals concerned. The same act, such as theft, may simultaneously cause loss to an individual and 
threaten a societal interest. However, the law has traditionally considered public interests as being 
divisible from private interests and has protected them through separate mechanisms, such as the criminal 
law. Thus, in the case of theft, the victim must protect his property through the tort of trespass to 
chattels, whereas, the state may seek to protect the public from anti-social behaviour through the criminal 
law. In due course it will become apparent that it is difficult to draw rigid demarcations between the 
realms of public and private law. 8 See Berry, T. (1990), The Dream of the Earth, Sierra Club Books, at p. xiii, "we have changed the very 
chemistry of the planet, we have altered the biosystems, we have changed the topography and even the 
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Until comparatively recent times there appeared to be a belief that man was in some 
sense distanced from the environment9. Thus, the environment could be used as a form 
of receptacle for the harmful by-products of his industrial activities. However, there 
has been an increasing realization that man is part of the environmentl0 and that, by 
releasing noxious substances, he is thereby inflicting harm upon himself. For example, 
modern scientific advances have established possible links between exposure to 
radiation in the vicinities of nuclear facilities and certain forms of cancerl1. Other 
studies suggest that those living in close proximity to high voltage power lines may 
l2. also be subjected to an increased risk of developing cancer 
On a global scale, there is a possibility that anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions 
may marginally increase climatic temperatures and hence sea levels through thermal 
expansion of the oceans and melting of the ice caps 13. Claims that such changes may 
threaten the long time survival prospects of our species may appear somewhat 
far-fetched14. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that even a marginal increase in sea 
levels would cause incalculable damage. 15 
2.2 The Source of the Environmental Problem 
The root of the environmental problem lies in the manner in which natural resources 
are utilised. If the parties competing for the use of a resource fail to cooperate the 
geological structure of the planet, structures and functions that have taken hundreds of millions and even 
billions of years to bring into existence. " 9 This may in part be due to the anthropocentric nature of Judeo-Christian dogma which places man at 
the centre of the universe. According to White, this promoted the belief that "no item in the physical 
creation had any purpose save to serve man's purposes. And although man's body is made of clay, he is 
not simply part of nature: he is made in God's image. " See White Jr., L., "The Historical Roots of Our 
Ecological Crisis" (1988) Sanctuary 3, at p. 4. 
10 See McDonagh, H. (1986), To Care for the Earth: A Call to a New Theology, Cassell Ltd., at p. 102: 
"To pretend that we have no organic connection with the rest of creation is to overlook the greater part 
of 20 billion years of the story of the universe. " 11 See, for example, Health and Safety Executive (1993), HSE Investigation of Leukaemia and other 
Cancers in the Children of Male Workers at Sellafield, HMSO. 
12 See Daily Telegraph, "Childhood leukaemia linked to power lines", 9 June 1994. 
13 For a review of the key research findings in the area see Pickering, K. T., and Owen, L. A. (1997), An 
Introduction to Global Environmental Issues, Routledge, ch. 3. 
14 See Lovelock, J. E. (1979), Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth, Oxford University Press. At the risk 
of over-simplification the theory can be summarised as follows. Lovelock proposes that Earth should be 
regarded as a single ecological entity of which homo sapiens are only one component. Furthermore, the 
system has the ability to regulate its climate so as to rid itself of any species which threatens the long term 
survival of the eco-system as a whole. Thus, although the planet may allow us to destroy the habitat 
which humans need to survive, it will ensure that other forms of life may continue; thus, Lovelock states 
at p. 132, "[a] system as experienced as Gaia is unlikely to be easily disturbed. " 
15 The insurance industry has estimated that damage could amount to trillions of dollars. See Weever, P., 
"The Greening of Industry - The environment is at the top of the agenda in Britain's boardrooms", 
Sunday Telegraph, 19 June, 1994. 
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resource will eventually be destroyed. In order to demonstrate this problem, in his 
notable article entitled The Tragedy of the Commons16, Hardin uses the example of the 
overgrazing of common pastures in the Western United States. Before deciding to 
increase the size of his herd, a herdsman must conduct a simple cost - benefit analysis. 
The herdsman knows that, when the time comes to sell the additional cattle, he will 
receive all the proceeds of the sale. The costs relate to the additional burden which the 
extra cattle will place on the common pastures. However, the herdsman also knows 
that these costs will be shared amongst all those who have access to the commons. 
Thus, the fact that the herdsman will only have to bear a small percentage of these 
costs means that they will only amount to a fraction of the potential benefits. This 
leads the herdsman to the inevitable conclusion that he should acquire the additional 
cattle. However, this conclusion will also have been reached by every other herdsman 
with access to the commons with the result that herds will increase in size until the 
commons can no longer sustain them, thus: 
"Each man is locked in to a system that compels him to increase his 
herd without limit - in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination 
toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a 
society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a 
commons brings ruin to all. "17 
Hardin argues that this analysis can also be applied to the problem of pollution; the 
only difference is that, rather than taking something from the commons (i. e. the 
environments 8), man is putting something into the commons. The result is the same in 
that the commons will ultimately be damaged or rendered useless for certain activities 
such as agriculture. The cost - benefit analysis which a person may perform 
before 
deciding to discharge wastes into the environment, as opposed to purifying them or 
recycling them, is essentially the same as that performed by the herdsmen, thus: 
"The rational man finds that his share of the cost of the wastes he 
discharges into the commons is less than the cost of purifying his 
wastes before releasing them. Since this is true for everyone, we are 
locked into a system of `fouling our own nest', so long as we behave 
only as independent, rational, free-enterprisers. "19 
16 Hardin, G., "The Tragedy of the Commons" (1988) Sanctuary 7. 
17 Ibid. 
18 The environment may be equated with the `commons' in that everyone 
has access to it 
19 Hardin, op. cit., at p. 8. 
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2.3 The Purpose of Environmental Law 
Hardin continues that the tragedy of the commons analogy, "as a food basket" is 
averted by private property. This enables a person to ring-fence an area of land and 
protect it from exploitation by others. However, as regards the pollution application of 
the analogy, property rules are not always conducive to environmental protection. One 
problem is that pollution does not respect property boundaries; as Hardin points out, 
"the air and waters surrounding us cannot readily be fenced. "20 A more fundamental 
difficulty is that the same rules which prevent others from damaging a resource may 
enable the owner to damage the resource himself: 
"Indeed, our particular concept of private property, which deters us 
from exhausting the positive resources of the earth, favors [sic] 
pollution. The owner of a factory on the bank of a stream - whose 
`property' extends to the middle of the stream - often has difficulty 
seeing why it is not his natural "right" to muddy the waters flowing past 
his door. The law, always behind the times, requires elaborate stitching 
and fitting to mold [sic] it to this newly perceived aspect of the 
commons. "21 
Accordingly, it has been necessary to develop a range of coercive laws or taxing 
measures the purpose of which is to render it more expensive to discharge pollutants 
into the environment as opposed to treating them first. Such measures have given rise 
to the body of law which is now loosely termed `environmental law'. 
Given the fact that, according to Hardin's analysis, private law may actually be 
antipathetic to environmental protection it is not immediately apparent whether tort 
has any useful role to fulfil in this context. This returns us to the central issue, to use 
Hardin's phraseology, to what extent is it possible to stitch and fit tort so as to mould 
it to this new objective? 
3. THE LAW OF TORT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
At this point it would be useful to clarify what is meant by tort. As will become 
apparent in due course it is impossible to arrive at an all encompassing explanation 
which defines all its attributes and functions. 
22 Thus, it is more profitable to 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 See Rogers, W. V. H. (1989), Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, Sweet & Maxwell, at p. 1: "It is not 
possible to assign any one aim to the law of tort, which is not surprising when one considers that the 
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concentrate on the purpose and functions of tort. 23 The function of tort varies, 
according to the particular tort and the circumstances of the case, however, as Rogers 
explains: "At a very general level... we may say that tort is concerned with the 
allocation or prevention of losses, which are bound to occur in our society". 24 Clearly, 
not every loss is actionable; a tort is an act or omission which constitutes a breach of 
duty fixed by law. The reasons why certain acts and omissions are deemed actionable 
may be founded on an idea of justice or the need to allocate losses in a certain manner. 
This is an issue which is discussed in more detail below in the context of the 
philosophy of tort. 
Historically, tort has served as a means of private dispute resolution; in this respect it 
has not been expressly concerned with securing third party objectives such as 
environmental protection. Nevertheless, it is recognized that tort has an environmental 
dimension. For example, a private assertion of property rights under nuisance may 
result in some collateral environmental benefit. This would be the case if a 
householder, troubled by noxious fumes, succeeded in enjoining the responsible 
activity. This has given rise to the so-called `toxic tort' which is defined by Pugh and 
Day as follows: 
"The term `toxic tort' is a shorthand phrase... for any claim that has, at 
its base, the prospect that an individual has suffered damage to person, 
property or to the quiet enjoyment of his/her property, or there has been 
damage caused to the local environment as a result of environmental 
pollution. The term therefore covers damage resulting from industrial 
waste pumped into the environment, whether into the air, the sea, the 
rivers... It covers chemical and radioactive waste. It also covers claims 
for nuisance resulting from noise, dust etc. Finally it covers damage to 
the environment itself "25 
Other torts are also relevant in an environmental context. Certain hazardous substances 
which are solid and tangible, such as sheets of asbestos, could constitute a trespass to 
land if left on another person's property. Where the polluter is culpable and there has 
been property damage or personal injury it may be possible to establish liability under 
subject comprehends situations as disparate as A carelessly running B down in the street and C calling D 
a thief, or E giving bad investment advice to F and G selling H's car when he has no authority to do so. " 23 See Street, op. cit., at p. 3: "Much ink has been spilt in unsuccessful attempts to define a tort ... It 
is the 
function and purpose of the law of torts that are of greater import, and these are matters which can be 
explained in comparatively simple terms. " 24 Ibid. 
25 Pugh, C., and Day, M., Toxic Torts (1992) 
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negligence. Emissions from certain installations may constitute a breach of statutory 
duty. 
However, the role of tort , 
in this context, has been limited by factors which are 
succinctly summarized by Hughs as follows: 
"[A]ctions at common law are time-consuming and expensive, fraught 
with complex technicalities and, in general, only on an individual, 
rather than a class, basis. A person cannot be the plaintiff in an action at 
common law unless he has a vested interest in the subject matter of the 
action; so in an action in tort the plaintiff must be the person injured by 
the wrongdoer. "26 
This encapsulates the main issues addressed in subsequent chapters. The technical 
difficulties, to which Hughs refers, have limited the role of tort as a means of 
environmental protection in the past. As will be seen below, they include such matters 
as the need to establish a causal link between environmental damage and a certain 
activity. However, the latter difficulties highlighted by Hughs touch on a much wider 
issue, namely, the purpose of tort. The fact that the plaintiff must have a vested interest 
in the subject matter of the action highlights the fact that tort is primarily concerned 
with the resolution of private disputes. As stated above, one of the most important 
issues which has to be addressed concerns the extent to which the focus of tort can be 
moved from the interests of the parties to the interests of the environment. Ultimately, 
this may require a reassessment of what constitutes a `vested interest in the subject 
matter of the action'. These wider issues must be addressed before dealing with the 
detail of specific proposals designed to increase the role of tort in this context. 
4. STRUCTURE OF RESEARCH 
The subject of civil liability for environmental damage involves several areas of law 
and raises a multitude of issues. In order to clarify the main arguments, the material 
has been marshalled into the following structure which leads one through the issues in 
a logical manner. The operation of tort in an environmental context and the main 
difficulties which face a plaintiff, when attempting to establish liability for 
environmental damage, are dealt with in chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 4 then considers 
whether it is conceptually and practically possible to adapt tort so as to render it more 
effective in this context and, furthermore, whether such a development would serve a 
useful purpose. As most initiatives on the subject stem from EU proposals, chapter 5 is 
26 Hughs, D., Environmental Law (3rd edn. 1989) Butterworths, at p. 37. 
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devoted to an overview of EU environmental policy and how civil liability might be 
accommodated by its overall environmental strategy. Chapter 6 considers specific 
proposals on civil liability, designed to overcome the difficulties described in chapter 
3, in the light of the theoretical perspectives and EU objectives. The conclusion 
outlines the extent to which it may be possible to develop a workable model of tort 
based environmental liability and the wider ramifications of such an approach. This 
gives rise to the following issues. 
4.1 Current Limitations of Tort 
The general difficulties of establishing liability in tort for environmental damage have 
already been outlined above. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the main torts which 
are of relevance in an environmental context and how they have been applied in this 
field. Chapter 3 analyses in detail those factors which have limited the use of tort as a 
means of environmental protection. These include technical difficulties associated 
with establishing fault and causation. Furthermore, it is noted that, as tort has been 
principally concerned with the protection of private interests, there is a limited notion 
of standing in civil matters. Related to this problem is the fact that remedies awarded 
by the courts tend to reflect the loss incurred by the individual rather than the damage 
sustained by the environment. 
4.2 The Role of Tort in an Environmental Context 
Chapter 4 addresses the fundamental issue of the role of tort. As stated above, much of 
the current debate lacks an appreciation of the theory of tort and its role in a modern 
society. Unless these issues are addressed it is difficult to justify the use of tort as a 
means of environmental protection or to define how it should operate. The object of 
the chapter is to ascertain whether there is a sound theoretical basis which justifies the 
use of tort as a specific means of environmental protection. To this end the chapter 
considers the following issues. 
4.2.1 The Philosophy of Tort 
In order to understand the fundamental objectives of tort it is necessary to consider the 
theoretical basis of tort and its role in a modem society. In this respect the 
`philosophy' of tort can be used to clarify those objectives and suggest means by which 
they may be achieved. 27 There are two main schools of thought. The economic view, 
27 See Owen, D. G. (1995), "Why Philosophy Matters to Tort Law", in D. G. Owen (ed), Philosophical 
Foundations of Tort Law, Clarendon Press, at pp. 13-14: "The subject of tort might fairly be said to 
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of which one of the main proponents in recent years has been Posner, 28 proposes that 
the purpose of tort should be to ensure an efficient allocation of resources. The more 
traditional view, which finds favour amongst most legal scholars, is that tort is 
founded upon justice and the need to restore the status quo ante where one party has 
been wronged by another. 
The economic view argues that the courts should bear in mind the respective economic 
values of competing land uses when, for example, deciding whether to grant an 
injunction in favour of a person who has suffered a nuisance. This approach is 
considered but ultimately rejected as a sound basis for a public interest model of tort. 
The main problem with the economic analysis that it takes a very narrow view of the 
value of natural resources. The value of a resource is priced in monetary terms in 
accordance with economic criteria; this includes the value of the potential use of the 
property. The monetary value of commercial uses is always likely to outweigh the 
value of conservatory uses. The ecological value of a natural resource cannot be 
quantified in this manner, indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that even Posner is 
coming to this view. The ecological value of conserving natural resources must be 
made in accordance with wider social and political preferences. 
Thus, the chapter goes on to consider the extent to which a public interest model of 
tort can be founded upon notions of justice. At this point a distinction between the 
concepts of `corrective' and `distributive' justice has to be considered. 29 Whereas 
corrective justice focuses entirely on the respective rights of the individuals in a 
dispute, distributive justice admits societal preferences regarding who should bear the 
loss. The proponents of the latter approach argue that tort is now inextricably linked 
with distributional issues. They point to the fact that strict liability and insurance are 
realities which affect the decision of the court to apportion liability on a certain 
party. 30 However, a system based wholly upon distributive principles is problematic in 
that it operates as a blunt means of loss allocation which is not related in any way to 
the conduct of the defendant. 31 There is a place for such systems in certain 
involve the nature and extent of an actor's legal responsibility to a victim for causing harm. If so, then 
one important preliminary question for tort law must be how responsibility for causing harm should be 
defined and limited. Should it rest upon the actor's moral desert, limited by notions of blameworthiness 
for acting upon choices that are by some measures bad, as viewed ex ante? Or should the concept of tort 
responsibility be widened to embrace the harmful consequences of the actor's conduct, including victim 
needs ex post? " 
28 See, for example, Posner, R. A. (1986), Economic Analysis of Law, Little, Brown & Co. 
29See, for example, Englard, I. (1993), The Philosophy of Tort Law, Dartmouth Publishing Co. Ltd, ch. 
2. 
30 Ibid. 
31 An example of such a system would include a no fault social security fund financed by general taxation 
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circumstances, however, they should not entirely replace tort. 32 One of the potential 
strengths of tort is that, by defining a standard of conduct to which the defendant 
should adhere, the system provides an incentive to reduce the costs of his activity. 
However, a system which is entirely founded on corrective principles is also 
problematic in that it requires the plaintiff to establish fault and imposes a heavy 
burden of proof on causation. Furthermore, a corrective model of tort examines the 
dispute purely from the perspective of the individuals concerned and precludes 
consideration of public interest issues such as the desirability of environmental 
protection. Thus, the chapter concludes that the modern law of tort should seek to 
attain a balance between corrective and distributive justice. Furthermore, it is argued 
that there is a philosophical basis which can support such an approach. 33 
4.2.2 The Role of Tort in an Environmental Context 
The specific role of tort as a means of environmental protection is considered in the 
light of this philosophical background. The fact that a public interest model of tort is 
possible in conceptual terms does not mean that a specialist environmental liability 
regime would necessarily augment traditional regulatory responses. Thus it is 
necessary to identify a gap in the enforcement of environmental law which tort may be 
capable of reducing. 
The main potential benefit of tort is that it affords private individuals and bodies a 
means of participating in the enforcement of environmental standards. An individual, 
who has been affected by pollution, may be motivated to pursue the matter in cases 
where a regulatory authority has chosen not to act. In this sense tort has the potential to 
increase the penetration of environmental law. 
Related to this issue of private enforcement is the matter of whether tort may provide 
an effective incentive for risk management. When considering incentives there is a 
temptation to make direct comparisons with the criminal law. On the face of it, 
criminal penalties may appear to provide a superior incentive for risk management in 
that they seek to punish breaches of regulations. Provided such regulations are 
adequately enforced, the stigma and adverse publicity associated with a prosecution 
or a special tax on a specific sector. The New Zealand Government introduced a scheme of this type 
under the Accident Compensation Act 1972, as amended Accident Compensation Act 1982. 
32 A case in point concerns contaminated land. This matter is discussed in ch. 4. 
33A particularly elegant explanation, which shall be discussed in ch. 4 is provided by Englard, I. (1995) 
"The Idea of Complementarity as a Philosophical Basis for Pluralism in Tort Law". In D. G. Owen (ed. ) 
Philosophical Foundations of Tort. Oxford/Clarendon Press 
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may pray on the corporate mind of image conscious enterprises. 34 Furthermore, 
directors and senior officers, who may incur personal criminal liability35, have a 
personal interest in ensuring that regulations are observed. This may lead to the 
conclusion that an effective tort regime would not add to the incentives which are 
already provided by regulatory penalties. However, direct comparisons of this type are 
misleading. Provided that it is accompanied by effective remedies, the prospect of civil 
liability may provide equally effective incentives for risk management, although, the 
manner in which they influence the corporate mind is entirely different. Rather than 
punishing a breach of duty, tort may require the polluter to pay for the actual costs of 
clean up. Furthermore, by the use of injunctive relief, it can be used prospectively to 
prevent the continuance of pollution. This provides an economic incentive for risk 
management. Rather than appealing to the conscience of the organization, tort 
converts pollution into a cost of production which the business will seek to reduce 
much like any other cost. Thus, in cold business terms, tort has the capacity to make it 
more expensive not to take abatement measures. By providing a different form of 
incentive, tort has the potential to augment regulatory penalties in pursuit of the 
common goal of environmental protection. 
The possible use of tort as a means of privately enforcing environmental standards is 
linked with a wider theme, namely, the possible development of a concept of 
`environmental rights'. This necessitates consideration of property law and the extent 
to which a private interest in land entitles one to disregard the effects of that land use 
on others. To a large extent, the environment has become inextricably linked with the 
private interests which vest in it. Thus, unless an individual suffers personal injury or 
property damage, the right to be free from noxious vapours, for example, is contingent 
upon that individual having a sufficient interest in property. Certain academics have 
argued in favour of widening the concept of property so as to afford private individuals 
a form of equitable proprietary interest in the `goods of life'36; this can include the 
environment. 37 Such an approach would separate the environment from the private 
interests which vest in it and designate it as a form of public space in which the public 
are afforded an interest. Chapter 4 considers whether a civil liability regime could 
provide the practical means of enforcing that interest. 
34 For an analysis of the efficacy of criminal penalties see, for example, Cohen, M. A. (1992), "Criminal 
Penalties", in T. H. Tietenberg (ed. ), Innovation in Environmental Policy, Edward Elgar. 
5 See, for example, section 157 Environmental Protection Act 1990. 
36 Reich, C. A., "The New Property", (1964) 73(5) Yale Law Journal 733; Macpherson, C. B., "Human 
Ri hrts as Property Rights", (1977) 24 Dissent 72 
3? See Gray, K., "Equitable Property", (1994) Current Legal Problems 157. 
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4.2.3 The Effect of Insurance on the Role of Tort 
The role of tort can not be considered in isolation from the effect of insurance. As 
noted above, the growth in insurance since the nineteenth century has increased the 
distributional component in tort in that it has a bearing on which party is in the best 
position to bear the loss. Although few judges have used the existence of insurance as 
a specific ground for allocating the loss to the insured party38, insurance has 
undoubtedly influenced the manner in which tort has developed. 
Thus the decision to proceed with a specialist environmental liability regime must take 
into account the insurance implications of extending liability in this manner. 
Environmental impairment has caused particular difficulties for insurers due to the 
fact that it is difficult to calculate risk. A polluting incident may cause long term 
contamination, the full effects of which, may not manifest themselves for several years 
(long tail risks). This may expose an insurer to costs which are far in excess of those 
contemplated when the policy was originally drafted. In the past, this has led insurers 
to withdraw cover for pollution, however, the industry has begun to develop policies 
capable of absorbing this type of liability. As a result, the chapter concludes with an 
assessment of the insurability of environmental damage and how this might affect the 
development of tort. 
It is also considered whether the availability of insurance would undermine the 
incentives provided by tort to reduce the risks of activities by absolving polluters from 
financial responsibility. 
4.3 EU Initiatives 
As stated above, the current debate regarding the use of tort as a means of 
environmental protection has been generated by various EU and Council of Europe 
initiatives. Although the EU has been active in the field of environmental protection 
since the publication of its First Action Programme in 197339, it is only in the last ten 
years that it has contemplated intervention in the field of civil liability for 
environmental damage. 
38 An exception is Lord Denning who sometimes expressly referred to the existence of insurance as 
being a material consideration when apportioning liability. See, for example Nettleship v. Weston [1971] 
2 Q. B. 691. 
39 OJ No C 112/1 (1973) 
13 
Introduction 
In 198940 a draft directive on civil liability for damage caused by waste was 
introduced; this was subsequently amended in 199141. However, these proposals were 
superseded by the publication of a Green Paper42 which discussed the merits of a 
general environmental liability regime covering a wider range of activities. This was 
followed by consultations with industry and environmental interest groups. At the time 
of writing the publication of a White Paper on the subject is imminent. In 1993 the 
Council of Europe introduced its `Convention on Civil Liability for Damage resulting 
from Activities Dangerous to the Environment' (the Lugano Convention). 
Furthermore, certain Member States of the EU have already introduced their own 
specialist environmental liability regimes. 
Chapter 5 considers these initiatives with a view to determining the rationale for EU 
intervention in this field and how this may relate to the theoretical perspectives 
discussed in chapter 4. The most significant finding is that there is increasing evidence 
to support the view that the EU views civil liability as a possible means of 
underpinning and enforcing environmental standards. This continues the discussion in 
chapter 4 regarding the possible role of tort as a means of private enforcement of 
environmental interests. In this respect it is considered whether civil liability may 
provide the means of concretizing a nascent concept of `environmental rights' which is 
beginning to emerge in EU environmental policy. 
4.4 Specific Proposals for Increasing the Role of Tort as a Means of 
Environmental Protection. 
Chapter 6 considers specific proposals designed to harness tort as a means of 
environmental protection. The chapter has two main objectives which are dealt with 
simultaneously. The first objective is to consider whether these proposals are 
consistent with the philosophical rationale for an environmental application of tort as 
discussed in chapter 4. The second objective is to consider whether the proposals 
provide practical solutions to the problems of establishing civil liability discussed in 
chapter 3. 
Certain EU Member States have already implemented civil liability regimes for 
environmental damage. Clearly, these systems provide a rich source of experience 
40 OJ No C 251/4 (1989) 
41 OJ No C 192/6 (1992) 
42 Communication from the Commission to the Council and Parliament on Environmental Liability, 
COM(93) 47 final. 
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from which the EU may draw in drafting its own legislation. EU and Council of 
Europe proposals are contrasted with principles which have already been adopted 
under these regimes. This invites a comparative approach in analysing the solutions 
adopted under these regimes and certain jurisdictions outside the EU. 
Comparative law43 serves a number of purposes in this context. Zweigert and Kötz44 
argue that the primary of function comparative law is knowledge. The process of 
attempting to find a legal solution to a particular problem is a scientific endeavour. 
When viewed in these terms it appears folly to ignore solutions adopted in other 
jurisdictions simply because they are foreign; as Zweigert and Kötz point out, "no 
study deserves the name of a science if it limits itself to phenomena arising within 
national boundaries. "45 Thus: 
"If one accepts that legal science includes not only the techniques of 
interpreting the texts, principles, rules, and standards of a national 
system, but also the discovery of models for preventing or resolving 
social conflicts, then it is clear that the method of comparative law can 
provide a much richer range of model solutions than a legal science 
devoted to a single nation, simply because the different systems of the 
world can offer a greater variety of solutions than could be thought up 
in a lifetime by even the most imaginative jurist who was corralled in 
his own system. Comparative law is an `ecole de verite' which extends 
and enriches the `supply of solutions' and offers the scholar of critical 
capacity the opportunity of finding the `better solution' for his time and 
place. "46 
As such comparative law provides an invaluable tool for legislators when attempting 
to formulate a legal response to a particular problem. 47 Indeed, the English courts are 
now beginning to look beyond the common law to find solutions to new problems. 48 
43 Comparative law must be distinguished from `private international law' (or `conflict of laws'). The 
latter applies in international disputes and is used to determine which of several systems should be used to 
resolve the matter. Comparative law merely compares those systems without any specific dispute in mind; 
the object is a purely scientific exercise designed to contrast approaches to solving a particular problem. 
See Zweigert K., and Kötz, H. (1987), An Introduction to Comparative Law (2nd ed. ), (translated by T. 
Weir), Clarendon Press, at p. 6. 
44 ibid., at p. 15. 
45 Ibid., at p. 14. 
46 Ibid., at p. 15. 
Ibid., at pp. 15-17. 
48 For example in Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd. [1997] W. L. R. 684, one of the issues which fell to be 
determined concerned whether an interference with television reception was a sufficiently serious 
inconvenience to constitute a nuisance. Lord Goff, at p. 690, referred to a German decision (G. v. City 
of Hamburg, 21 October 1983; Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court in Civil Matters, vol 88, p. 344) 
in which such an interference was deemed actionable. 
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Such an approach is adopted in chapter 6. For example, when considering means of 
easing the burden of proof on causation, the solution adopted under the German 
Environmental Liability Act 1991 (UmweltHG) is examined. As regards the issue of 
affording standing to environmental pressure groups to pursue actions in tort, 
developments in the Netherlands are investigated. 
Chapter 6 draws together the themes which emerge in the preceding chapters. Means 
of increasing the role of tort are considered in the light of the philosophical 
perspectives set out in chapter 4 and the objectives of the EU identified in chapter 5. 
4.5 Concluding Chapter 
Chapter 7 consolidates the issues and ideas developed above and draws conclusions 
regarding whether it is possible to devise a workable model of tort for use as a means 
of environmental protection. The chapter closes with consideration of the wider 
implications of a civil liability regime, namely, the extent to which it may serve to 
promote the idea of the environment as a `public good' capable of protection through 
the institutions of private law. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The subject of civil liability for environmental damage is fascinating, albeit extremely 
complex, due to the fact that it raises a multitude of issues and several seemingly 
disparate areas of law. From the above it will be apparent that these include the 
philosophy of law, economics of law, property law, insurance law, public law, 
comparative law, and EU law. To some extent this has led to the compartmentalization 
of the debate and has, perhaps, made it difficult to `see the wood for the trees'. The 
aim of this research has been to draw these disparate areas together and to ascertain 
how they might interrelate so as to provide a solid foundation for an environmental 
application of tort. This is the first time that such an exercise has been attempted and 
in this respect it is hoped that the work will make a useful contribution to the debate. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the main torts which are relevant in an 
environmental context and to ascertain in what circumstances a plaintiff may establish 
a prima facie cause of action. Procedural difficulties in bringing such claims are dealt 
with in the next chapter. 
Save for comparatively recent torts, such as breach of statutory duty, English common 
law derives from the medieval forms of action 1. These were early procedures which 
could be invoked by a plaintiff in order to restore some right of which he had been 
wrongfully disseised. Each procedure was instigated by a different writ according to 
the nature of dispute. Use of an incorrect procedure would prove fatal to a claim; the 
common law emerged as the substantives rules for determining which writ should be 
used. 2 The forms of action have long since been dissolved3, however, to some extent, 
the common law remains moulded in their image like a "petrified forest"4. The most 
obvious legacy of the forms of action is that direct incursions of tangible matter are 
actionable under trespass whereas indirect incursions by intangible phenomena, such 
as noise or fumes, are actionable under nuisance. 
2. TRESPASS TO LAND 
2.1 Type of harm 
Trespass has its origins in a form of action designed to provide redress for forcible and 
direct incursions upon a persons property, namely, the writ of trespass vi et armis (with 
force and arms)5. Originally, the writ also encompassed aggravating incidents which 
were often associated with a trespass to land, namely, assaults on the person and 
apportation of chattels. During the course of the thirteenth century these ancillary 
incidents evolved into distinct heads of trespass which became actionable, in their own 
right, irrespective of whether they had been associated with a trespass to land6. 
1 See Maitland, F. W., The Forms of Action at Common Law: A Course of Lectures (1936 edn. ), in A. H. 
Clayton and W. J. Whittaker (eds. ), Cambridge University Press. 
2 "So great is the ascendancy of the law of actions in the infancy of the courts of justice, that substantive 
law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure. ", Maine, Early Law 
and Custom, at p. 389. 3 The Common Law Procedure Act 1852, superseded by the Judicature Act 1872, replaced the old writs 
with a single writ which is applicable in all circumstances. 5 Hepple and Williams (1976), Foundations of the Law of Tort, Butterworths, at p. 33. 
See Fifoot (1949), History and Sources of the Common Law, Stevens and Sons Ltd., chapter 3. 
6 In Lombe v. Clopton (1276) S. S. Vol. 55, p. 30, Lombe successfully brought a writ 
in trespass against 
five defendants who seriously assaulted him at the fair of St. Ives although the assault was not carried out 
in connection with any trespass to land. 
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Such incursions were treated seriously by the courts due to their inflammatory nature. 
The need to establish force was eventually dispensed with, 7 however, it is still 
necessary to show that an entry upon land was direct in order to found an action in 
trespass. This denotes a physical incursion be it in person8, by wandering animals9, or 
the placing of some object on landlO. It is also necessary to show that the incursion 
was the inevitable result of the defendant's actions whether such actions constitute an 
immediate and deliberate entry, or, the setting in motion of a chain of events which 
must inevitably lead to an unauthorized entry upon the plaintiff's property. Thus, a 
strong and direct causal link must be established between the plaintiff's actions and 
the trespass. It is this requirement which limits the use of trespass in an environmental 
context. Many forms of pollution lack a substantial physical presence and take the 
form of fumes, smoke, heat or noise. In addition such forms of pollution are subject to 
the effect of wind and currents; therefore, any intrusion upon neighbouring property 
cannot be said to be the inevitable consequence of the defendant's conduct. These 
limitations can be demonstrated by reference to the few cases in the area. 
In Jones v. Llanrwst Urban District Council11, the defendants were responsible for a 
sewerage outfall which discharged raw sewage into a stream which flowed past fields 
owned by the plaintiff. This resulted in the accumulation of faecal matter on the banks 
of the stream abutting the fields. It was held that the plaintiff could sustain an action 
in trespass. Parker J. stated: 
"I am of the opinion that anyone who turns faecal matter or allows 
faecal matter collected by him or under his control to escape into a river 
in such a manner or under such conditions that it is carried, whether by 
current or the wind, on to his neighbours land is guilty of a trespass". 
12 
A more restrictive interpretation of direct entry was applied by the Court of Appeal in 
Southport Corporation v. Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. 13 In this case, a small tanker, the 
S. S. Inverpool, had been attempting to negotiate a narrow channel, in heavy seas, on 
7 In two anonymous cases reported in 32 and 33 Ed. 1 (R. S. ) at pp. 258-9 
Chief Justice Bereford 
declared that the words were vi et armis were superfluous and mere formalities. In the 
first case the jury 
had originally found in favour of the defendants on the grounds that although they 
had taken and 
imprisoned the plaintiff, they had not beaten or wounded him. In the second case the 
jury found that 
although the defendants had entered upon the plaintiffs 
land and chopped down trees, they had not done 
so with force and arms. See Fifoot, op. cit., ch. 3. 
8 See, for example, Davis v. Lisle [1939] 3 All E. R. 213. 
9 See, for example, League Against Cruel Sports v. Scott [1986] Q. B. 240. 
10 See, for example, Holmes v. Wilson (1839) 10 A. & E. 503. 
11 [1908-1910] All E. R. 922. 
2 Ibid. at p. 926 E-F. 
13 [1954] 2 Q. B. 182. 
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her approach to Preston. Unbeknown to the master and crew, the steering mechanism 
had failed. At one point the vessel veered sharply off course and grounded across a 
revetment wall. This placed her in danger of breaking her back and put the lives of the 
crew in jeopardy. No attempt could be made to reverse the vessel as the propeller had 
become fouled. The master decided that the only option was to discharge some of the 
cargo in order to lighten the vessel thereby preventing her from being broken across 
the wall. The discharged oil was carried by the action of the wind and tides onto 
foreshore owned by Southport Corporation who claimed in public and private 
nuisance, trespass and negligence. As regards trespass, Denning L. J. stated that: 
"In order to support an action for trespass to land the act done by the 
defendant must be a physical act done by him directly onto the 
plaintiff s land". 14 
He then went onto to state that this distinguished trespass from the old action of 
case15 where the interference was the consequential result of an activity carried out on 
the defendant's land. The distinction was set out in the Prior of Southwark's case. 16 
Applying this to the facts of the present case, Denning L. J. was of the opinion that the 
discharge was remote from the foreshore and, had it not been for the action of the 
wind and tide, the oil may never have come ashore at that location. Thus the pollution 
was consequential as opposed to the direct result of the master's actions: 
"Applying this distinction, I am clearly of opinion that the Southport 
Corporation cannot here sue in trespass. This discharge of oil was not 
done directly onto their foreshore, but outside in the estuary. It was 
carried by the tide on to their land, but that was only consequential, not 
direct. Trespass, therefore does not lie". 17 
On appeal this approach was approved by the House of Lords18. The assertion by 
Parker J. in Jones v. Llanwrst Urban District Council that the action of wind and 
14 Ibid. at p. 195. 
15 The form of action from which negligence derives; this is explained in more detail below. 
16 (1498) Y. B. 13 Hen. 7, f. 26, pl. 4. In this case the defendant was a glover and had dug a lime pit for 
the purpose of preserving calf skins. The pit polluted a nearby stream which led to the pollution of the 
plaintiffs property. It was held that if the lime pit had been dug in the plaintiffs soil, trespass would be 
the appropriate form of action. If, however, the pit had been dug on the defendant's land, case would 
have been the appropriate form of action. 
17 [1954] 2 Q. B. 182, at p. 196. 
Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Southport Corporation Ltd. [1956] A. C. 218, at p. 242, "Certainly I do 
not regard such decisions as Jones v. Llanwrst and Smith v. Great Western Railway Co. as having any 
real bearing on the circumstances of this case in which the oil was jettisoned at sea, committed to the 
action of wind and wave, with no certainty, so far as appears, how, when or under what conditions it 
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currents would not break the direct link between the original emission and the trespass 
was not accepted. Parker J. 's comments were obiter in that the intervention of such 
factors had not been an issue in this case. The fact that the sewage had been directly 
discharged into a narrow stream running past the plaintiff's property meant that it was 
inevitable that some of the solid matter would accumulate on the banks of the stream. 
2.2 Trespass and Fault 
Trespass to chattels and trespass to the person were assimilated with negligence19 as 
they overlapped in most areas where they were applicable20; thus it is necessary to 
establish fault on the part of the defendant in respect of trespass claims for personal 
injuries21 and damage to personal property22. Liability for trespass to land remains 
strict in that the purpose of the tort is to protect ones right to exclusive possession23. 
However, liability cannot be described as absolute24 since a person will have a 
defence if the incursion was involuntary25 or if he acted out of necessity26 
3. NUISANCE 
3.1 Type of harm 
Nuisance derives from a form of action known as the assize of nuisance and was 
designed to restore ancillary rights, associated with land ownership, without which the 
freehold would be sterile27. As Professor Newark explains, this encompassed 
interference with rights derived from agreements (ab homine) , such as easements and 
profits, and natural rights which were conferred by law (ajure)28. The latter category 
included the right to wholesome air and unpolluted water. The origins of these rights 
might come to shore. " per Lord Radcliffe. 
19 The essence of negligence is discussed below. 
20 A particularly pronounced overlap occurred in cases involving accidents on the highway and collisions 
at sea. At one time the courts had to draw fine distinctions between acts which were wilful and direct and 
acts which were unintentional. The former sounded in trespass, whereas, the latter sounded in Case (or 
later negligence). See Prichard, M. J., "Trespass, Case and The Rule in Williams v. Holland", [1964] 
Cambridge Law Journal 234. 
21 Stanley v. Powell [1891] 1 Q. B. 86. 
22 N. C. B. v. Evans[ 1951]2AllE. R. 310. 
23 Thus in League Against Cruel Sports v. Scott [1986] 1 Q. B. 240 the plaintiffs obtained a declaration 
that the straying of hounds, taking part in a stag hunt, into sanctuaries which they operated constituted a 
trespass and an injunction to prevent future incursions. 
24 See Winfield, P. H., "The Myth of Absolute Liability", (1926) 42 Law Quarterly Review 37. 
25 Smith v. Stone (1647) Style 65. 
26 Handcock v. Baker (1800) 2 Bos &P 260. 
27 See Fifoot, op. cit., ch. 1. 
28 Newark, F. H., "The Boundaries of Nuisance", [1949] Law Quarterly Review 480, at p. 482. 
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are lost in custom and appear to have been recognized in the earliest days of common 
law. In Aldred's Case, Wray C. J. equated the right to wholesome air with the Biblical 
right to light29. Interference with these rights was actionable on the grounds that it 
impaired the ability of the land holder to use his property in the ordinary way. This 
constituted a total or partial disseisin of a right associated with land-holding. In 
Stephen's Commentaries it was stated: 
"If a person keeps his hogs or other noisome animals so near the house 
of another, previously built and inhabited, that the stench of them 
incommodes him, and makes the air unwholesome, this is a nuisance, 
as it tends to deprive him of the use and benefit of his house". 30 
In modem parlance this would be termed an interference with the right to use and 
enjoyment of one's property although the meaning is essentially the same. Forms of 
action served to restore such rights to the plaintiff; these rights became generic and 
were eventually hardened into the sic utere tuo ut al ienum non laedus maxim (so use 
your property as not to injure your neighbour's). The types of land use amounting to 
rights, which may be protected from interference, do not comprise a closed category 
and may be added to in accordance with changing social conditions and 
expectations. 31 
Nuisance actions resulting from pollution considerably pre-date the onset of the 
industrial revolution. For example, actions were brought in respect of corruption of the 
wholesome air resulting from the emissions of lime kilns32, dye houses33, tallow 
furnaces34, and smiths' forges35. As regards the torts to land, nuisance has continued 
to be more widely used than trespass, in this context, in that most forms of pollution 
consist of vapours, gases, heat, particles or diffuse chemicals. These elements lack the 
physical presence needed for a trespass. 
29 (1611) 9 Coke Rep. f. 57b. Wray C. J. quoted Solomom in Ecclesiast. 11.7, "Dulce lumen est et 
delectable oculis videre solem... " See Fifoot, op. cit., at p. 101. 
30 4th edn., vol. 3, pp. 491,492. 
31 For example, in Bridlington Relay Ltd v. Yorkshire Electricity Board [1965] Ch. 436, Buckley J. did 
not consider that the ability to receive television signals was of sufficient importance to justify an action 
in nuisance in respect of any activity which interfered with reception. However, in Hunter v. Canary 
Wharf Ltd [1997] 2 W. L. R. 684, at p. 688F-G, Lord Goff stated that, for many people, television now 
"transcends the function of mere entertainment" and that reception is now of sufficient importance to 
warrant protection at common law. 
32 Aldred's Case, supra. 
33 Jones v. Powell, Hutton, 136, Palmer, 539 
34 Morley v. Pragnell, Cro. Car. 510. 
34 Bradley v. Gill, 1Lutw. 69 
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It is also important to remember that the essence of private nuisance is that the activity 
must emanate from a neighbouring parcel of land. From its earliest origins the purpose 
of nuisance has been to settle disputes between neighbours. This point was reiterated 
in the case of Southport Corporation v. Esso Petroleum in which Denning L. J. stated 
that no action could be founded in private nuisance because the discharge of oil 
resulted from the use of a ship at sea and not neighbouring land. 36 
3.2 The Locality Doctrine 
Prior to the industrial revolution, courts were clearly of the opinion that any adverse 
interference with natural rights would give rise to an action in nuisance; this approach 
was characterised by the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, referred to above. 
After the industrial revolution, the courts were faced with the issue of whether it was 
proper to continue asserting natural rights in such an uncompromising manner37. 
The industrial revolution resulted in new challenges for the common law in that the 
creation of large industrial towns created a conflict between industrial and 
conservatory land uses. The common law judges were undoubtedly aware of the 
economic arguments in favour of allowing industrial at the expense of conservatory 
uses of land. The courts did not operate in a vacuum and were aware that rigidly 
asserting natural rights in the face of large scale developments would have 
ramifications for the new industrial economy. As McLaren states: 
"An appreciation of political and social philosophy and economics was 
part of the `intellectual baggage' of educated people of that age, 
including the judges". 38 
In St. Helens Smelting v. Tipping39 the House of Lords set about arriving at a solution 
which would facilitate the economic benefits of industrialization yet limit externalities 
to acceptable levels. The nuisance in this case was caused by the defendant's copper 
36 [1954] 2 Q. B. 182, at p. 196. Devlin J., had stated, obiter, that it was not necessary to show that the 
pollution stemmed from land owned or occupied by the defendant. Although Lord Denning clearly 
rejected this view, it has been followed in Canada. See, for example, Bridges Bros. Ltd. v. Forest 
Protection (1976) 72 D. L. R. (3d) 335., which concerned crop damage caused by drifting insecticide 
sprayed by an aircraft, "... it matters not whether there is any relationship between an aircraft which a 
nuisance emanates from and the owner of the land beneath the air space where the nuisance originates. A 
nuisance is created by the discharge of a deleterious substance from an aircraft if that substance is 
wrongfully caused or allowed to escape on to the land of another. " 
37 See Mclaren, J. P. S., "Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution: Some Lessons from Social 
History", (1983) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 155, at pp. 169-190. 
38 Ibid., at p. 192. 
38 (1865) 11 H. L. C. 642. 
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smelting plant, fumes from which killed off trees in the plaintiff's orchard. It was held 
that for an activity to result in an actionable nuisance, it must visibly diminish the 
value of the property and the use and enjoyment of it40. In ascertaining whether the 
utility of the property had been visibly diminished, regard must be had to all the 
circumstances of the case including the nature of the locality and its utility to the 
community as a whole41. This shows that it was recognised that the character of large 
areas of land had been changed forever with the result that there was no alternative but 
to re-define natural rights in accordance with changing circumstances. However, the 
traditional approach was not entirely abandoned; Lord Westbury added an important 
proviso to the effect that tangible damage could never be reasonable and would 
continue to be actionable per se42. 
An important recent development is that a planning consent has been held to alter the 
character of the neighbourhood43. The fact that the reasonableness of activities may 
now be judged by reference to "the aspirations of planners"44 rather than the "situation 
on the ground"45 represents a radical departure from previous authority46. The 
motivations of the courts in reaching this conclusion will be examined in chapter 4 in 
the context of the role of tort. 
3.3 Nuisance and Fault 
One of the most complex issues in nuisance concerns the extent to which it is 
necessary to establish culpability on the part of the defendant. At one time there was 
no doubt that private nuisance was of strict liability in that it was concerned with the 
protection of an interest in land, namely, the right to the undisturbed use and 
enjoyment of one's property. The matter is now less certain47, the reasons for this state 
of affairs have been examined by Professor Newark48. 
40 Ibid., at pp. 650-653. 
Ibid. 
42 Ibid., per Lord Westbury at p. 651-652. 
43 Gillingham Borough Council v. Medway (Chatam) Dock Co Lid [1992] 3 All E. R. 923. 
44 Waite, A., "The Gillingham Case: the Abolition of Nuisance by Planning Controls? ", (1992) 4 Land 
Management and Environmental Law Report 119. 
45 Ibid. 
47 R. v. Exeter City Council ex parte J. L. Thomas & Co Ltd [ 1990] 1 All E. R. 413. 
The uncertainty which emerged is demonstrated by two cases which were decided at a similar time. In 
Hole v. Barlow (1858) 4 CB (NS) 334; 140 ER 1113, Willes J. appeared to equate nuisance with 
negligence where he stated that, apart from consideration of nature of the locality, it was legitimate to ask 
whether the plant had been operated in a reasonable manner. However in Stockport Waterworks v. Potter 
(1861) 7H&N 160; 158 ER 433, Martin B. doubted whether reasonable conduct could have any 
bearing on liability. See Mclaren (1983), op. cit., at pp. 174-175. 
48 op. cit. 
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Public nuisance was created by analogy with private nuisance in that the blocking of a 
public highway was seen as analogous to the blocking of an easement across a private 
tenement. As the matter affected a class of His Majesty's subjects the act was 
criminalized, nevertheless, it was accepted that private and public nuisance were 
unrelated. However, in an anonymous decision of 153549 Baldwin C. J. linked the two, 
mistakenly according to Professor Newark, by stating that the only reason why a 
private individual could not bring a private action in respect of a public nuisance was 
that to do so would result in a "multitude of claims". Nevertheless, he went on to state 
that any individual who suffered individual loss in excess of the general inconvenience 
suffered by the population as a whole would be able to recover damages by reason of 
that "special hurt". This assertion eventually led to a proliferation of private nuisance 
claims in respect of loss caused by obstructions on the highway. Consequently, a clear 
overlap between private nuisance actions (brought in respect of public nuisances) and 
negligence emerged50 with the result that the courts introduced the need to establish 
fault in respect of private nuisance claims brought pursuant to public nuisances51 
Henceforth, defendants were only expected to guard against nuisances which were 
reasonably foreseeable. 
Despite the assimilation of private and public nuisance in clear cases of overlap, 
private nuisance (or `nuisance proper' as Professor Newark terms it) remained 
untainted by notions of fault based liability in its traditional sphere of operation. This 
was until the judgment of the House of Lords in the Wagon Mound (No. 2)52 the facts 
of which are too well known to require repetition here. Lord Reid cited the highways 
cases in which public nuisance had been assimilated with negligence as authority for 
the proposition that fault was an established component of nuisance53. However, he 
went on to state that, although nuisance had grown to encompass a wide range of 
activities, it could not be right to discriminate between different types of nuisance so 
as to make fault an issue in certain cases but not in others54. Lord Reid's reasoning can 
be criticized on this point in that it is in fact logical to draw such a distinction if one 
49 Anon, Y. B. 27 Hen. 6, Trin. pl. 10 
50 In more recent times this has given rise to difficult moot points. For, example, the courts have been 
faced with the issue of whether a poorly parked car should result in an action in nuisance, on the grounds 
that it is an obstruction, or negligence on the grounds that it has been parked carelessly. See Ware v. 
Garston Haulage Co. [ 1944] K. B. 30 and Maitland v. Raisbek [ 1944] 1 K. B. 689. 
51 See, for example, Sharp v. Powell (1872) L. R. 7 C. P. 253, where the defendant had caused water to 
be deposited on the highway which later froze and formed sheet ice; it was held, "the defendant could not 
reasonably have been expected to foresee that the water would accumulate and freeze at the spot where 
the accident happened. " per Bovill C. J. 52 Overseas Tankship (U. K) Ltd. v. The Miller Steamship Co. Pty. (The Wagon Mound) No. 2) [1967] 
A. C. 617. 
53 Ibid. 637D-E. 
54 Ibid., at p. 640B-D. 
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accepts the differing origins of public and private nuisance. Instead, his Lordship 
attempted to maintain some distinction between nuisance and negligence by stating 
that fault in nuisance has a broader meaning than the specific and narrower meaning of 
the tort of negligence55. This left the way open for applying a stricter standard of 
liability in other cases since negligence entails establishing more than foreseeability. 
Although a risk of a certain type of damage may be foreseeable, in negligence, it is 
still necessary to show that all reasonable steps were taken to reduce the risk of the 
damage occurring to acceptable levels. In Lord Reid's formulation of fault in nuisance 
he stated: 
"the fault is in failing to abate the nuisance the existence of which the 
defendant is or ought to be aware as likely to cause damage to his 
neighbour. «56 
This suggests that, where the harm is foreseeable, liability will automatically follow if 
the nuisance is not abated. No mention is made of a need to establish that the 
defendant did not take reasonable steps to abate the nuisance. 
The Wagon Mound (No. 2) decision is particularly important from an environmental 
perspective in that the House of Lords chose to apply it in Cambridge Water v. Eastern 
Counties Leather57. This is now one of the most important decisions as regards the 
common law and the environment. 
The plaintiff water company began abstracting drinking water from a bore-hole at 
Sawston Mill in 1976. In 1980 the Council of the European Community issued a 
Directive on water quality (80/778/EEC) which required Member States to ensure that 
levels of perchloroethene (PCE) were reduced by 1985. As a result, water undertakers 
were required to commence monitoring for this substance. Cambridge Water 
discovered that levels of PCE in drinking water abstracted from its bore-hole at 
Sawston Mill were far in excess of both the guide limit set by the EC and the actual 
limit set by the department of the Environment. As a result Cambridge Water was 
unable to continue abstracting water at Sawston Mill and was required to re-locate its 
pumping station at a cost of £1 million. The source of the contamination was traced to 
a tannery operated by Eastern Counties Leather where PCE had been used in the 
de-greasing of pelts. Over time, spillages of the substance permeated the porous layers 
5 Ibid., at p. 639C-D. 56 Ibid., at p. 639F. 
57 [1994] 2 A. C. 264. 
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of chalk beneath the works and contaminated the subterranean water source; it was 
then carried down stream to the plaintiff's bore-hole. 
The Court of Appeal did not feel bound by Lord Reid's judgment in the Wagon Mound 
to find that foreseeability was an essential ingredient of nuisance. Mann L. J., citing 
Lord Wilberforce in Goldman v. Hargreaves58, emphasised the point that the tort of 
nuisance is "uncertain in its boundaries"59 and that negligence only plays a part in 
some cases. On the basis of the decision in Ballard v. Tomlinson60, which also 
concerned contamination of an underground water source, Mann L. J. concluded that 
the present case was one in which liability was strict. 61 
On appeal to the House of Lords, Lord Goff rejected the claim in nuisance and, 
contrary to the Court of Appeal, considered that Lord Reid's judgment in the Wagon 
Mound was decisive on the issue of foreseeability in nuisance: 
"It is widely accepted that this conclusion, although not essential to the 
decision of the particular case, has nevertheless settled the law, to the 
effect that foreseeability of harm is indeed a pre-requisite of the 
recovery of damages in private nuisance, as in the case of public 
nuisance". 62 
In reaching this conclusion the House of Lords was heavily influenced by policy 
considerations. Lord Goff noted that pools of PCE were still present under Eastern 
Counties Leather's works and were continuing to cause contamination63. Thus, now 
the hazardous nature of PCE has been established, applying strict liability without any 
foreseeability requirement would render ECL liable for pollution which was now 
beyond their control and was caused prior to the identification of PCE as a hazardous 
substance. This would amount to retroactive liability for `historic pollution'. It seems 
that, had his Lordship been unable to find authority for holding that foreseeability is a 
prerequisite of liability, he would have declined to hold ECL liable on policy grounds. 
This is confirmed by his Lordship's closing comments on the issue of fault in 
nuisance: 
"I wish to add that the present case may be regarded as one of what is 
nowadays called historic pollution, in the sense that the relevant 
58 [1967] 1 A. C. 645, at p. 657. 
58 Ibid. 
60 (1885) 29 Ch. D. 115. 
[1994] 2 A. C. 264, at p. 275F-G. 
62 Ibid., at p. 301C. 
63 Ibid., at pp. 306H-307A-B. 
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occurrence (the seepage of PCE through the floor of ECL's premises) 
took place before the relevant legislation came into force; and it 
appears that , under the current philosophy, it is not envisaged that 
statutory liability should be imposed for historic pollution (see, e. g. the 
Council of Europe's Draft Convention on Civil Liability for Damage 
resulting from Activities Dangerous to the environment (Strasbourg 26 
January 1993) article 5.1, and paragraph 48 of the Explanatory Report). 
If so, it would be strange if liability for such pollution were to arise 
under a principle of common law. "64 
The issue of whether the courts and the legislature are right to exercise such caution 
regarding the issue of civil liability for historic pollution will be returned to in later 
chapters. 
Nevertheless, Lord Goff emphasised the fact that the standard of liability in nuisance 
still differs from the standard of liability in negligence: 
"It is still the law that the fact that the defendant has taken all 
reasonable care will not of itself exonerate him from liability, the 
relevant control mechanism being found in the concept of reasonable 
user. "65 
This suggests that, once it has been established that it was foreseeable that an activity 
would give rise to a nuisance, it is no defence to show that all reasonable steps were 
taken to abate the nuisance. This appears to be the interpretation adopted by the High 
Court in Graham and Graham v. Re-Chem International66. The case concerned an 
allegation by the owners of a dairy farm that their cattle had been poisoned as a result 
of grazing on land contaminated by emissions containing dioxins and furans stemming 
from the defendant's hazardous waste incinerator at Roughmute. 
Although the decision ultimately turned on the issue of causation67 the court also had 
the opportunity to consider the meaning of foreseeability in nuisance in the light of the 
Cambridge Water decision. The defendant argued that, at the time the incinerator was 
in operation, between 1974 and 1984, it was unknown that such a facility could give 
rise to the emission of dioxins and furans. It was not until 1985 that a scientific paper 
was presented at a conference which demonstrated that the offending chemicals could 
be produced by a hitherto unknown chemical reaction (referred to as a de novo 
64 Ibid., at p. 307C-D. 
65 Ibid., at p. 300 E-F. 
66 [1996] Env. L. R. 158 
67 See Chapter 3. 
28 
Overview of Main Torts of Relevance in an Environmental Context 
synthesis) which occurs whilst the exhaust gases are cooling in the post combustion 
zone, after, having passed through the gas cleaning scrubbers. However, Forbes J. 
found ample scientific evidence to show that, although there had been considerable 
uncertainty regarding how these compounds were formed, at the material time it was 
known that such facilities produced dioxins and furans. Thus, given the state of 
scientific knowledge at the time the incinerator was in operation, the judge was 
satisfied that: 
"[A]t all material times, Re-Chem would have been aware that the 
operation of a commercial incinerator, such as Roughmute could result 
in the emission of dioxins and furans in fly ash and flue gases and that 
some of these compounds were very toxic. "68 
He went on to state that, once it has been established that it was foreseeable that an 
activity gives rise to a nuisance, it is unnecessary to show that the defendant was 
aware of precisely how his activity caused the nuisance: 
"For the purposes of liability in nuisance in cases such as the present, it 
does not seem to me that actual knowledge of the precise chemical 
processes, whereby the toxic compounds in question are created, is a 
necessary ingredient. "69 
This illustrates how fault in nuisance now differs from fault in negligence. As Forbes 
J. went on to point out, knowledge of the means by which the activity gave rise to the 
harm would be relevant in deciding whether there had been any breach of the common 
law duty of care thereby giving rise to a cause of action in negligence: 
"Of course, Re-Chem's knowledge at the relevant time as to how, when 
and where dioxins and furans might be formed in a waste incinerator 
during its operation would be clearly material to any determination as 
to what Re-Chem then knew and understood about the full nature of the 
chemical processes involved in the activity being carried out on the 
Roughmute site. In certain circumstances, such a determination might 
be of considerable importance in deciding whether the emission of such 
substances constituted a breach of a common law duty of care. 
However, in my opinion, Re-Chem's state of knowledge as to the fine 
detail of such matters is irrelevant in deciding whether the activity in 
question was potentially a nuisance, i. e. a nuisance, subject to proof of 
foreseeable damage to a neighbouring occupier of land [however]... such 
68 [1996] Env. L. R. 158, at p. 167. 
Ibid., at p. 168. 
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a consideration might have been material in deciding whether a breach 
of duty had occurred in negligence. "70 
Thus, in negligence, it might have been possible for the defendant to argue that, given 
the state of scientific knowledge at the material time, there were no reasonable steps 
which he could have taken in order to prevent the harm. 
3.4 General Restrictions on Liability in Nuisance 
The foregoing indicates that a cause of action in nuisance will now only be available in 
respect of foreseeable harm; furthermore, it seems that liability may be excluded on 
policy grounds in the case of historic pollution. In addition, there are certain other 
restrictions which may preclude the use of the tort in certain circumstances including a 
number of defences which are specific to the tort. 
3.4.1 The Defence of Prescription 
Although the fact that the plaintiff has `come to the nuisance' is generally no 
defence71, the defence of prescription provides that no cause of action will lie in 
respect of an activity which has been continued for at least 20 years72. However, it is 
necessary to show that the activity was exercised lawfully, openly, continuously and 
was not dependent upon the express grant or permission of a neighbour. 73 
3.4.2 The Defence of Statutory Authority 
The defence of statutory authority may defeat an action against a body which has 
statutory authority to pursue the activity of which complaint is made. Certain statutes 
impose duties, usually on authorities, which may inevitably cause some discomfort to 
neighbours; if the duties are particularly onerous, the authority may be powerless to 
suspend the activity in order to abate the nuisance. For example, in Smeaton v. Ilford 
Corporation74 sewers became overloaded due to the fact that many new houses were 
70 Ibid., at p. 169. 
See for example Bliss v. Hall (1839) 4 Bing. N. C. 183 in which the defendant had established a 
tallow-chandlery which emitted: "divers noisome, noxious, and offensive vapours, fumes, smells and 
stenches" to the discomfort of the plaintiff. It was no defence that the business had been established for 
three years by the time the plaintiff arrived since he "came to the house. . . with all the rights which the 
common law affords, and one of them is a right to wholesome air. " per Tindal C. J. at p. 186. 72 Sturges v. Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch. D. 852. 
73 For the purposes of private nuisance, a neighbour is a person who has suffered an interference with an 
interest in land as a result of another's use of their land. See Read v. Lyons & Co. Ltd. [1947] A. C. 156, 
per Lord Simmonds, at p. 183: "He alone has a lawful claim who has suffered an invasion of some 
proprietary or other interest in land". Standing requirements in tort are dealt with more fully in chapter 3, 
below. 
74 [1954] 1 Ch 450. 
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being connected to the existing system. Upjohn J. held that the Corporation could rely 
on the defence of statutory authority in that the local authority had no power to refuse 
the connection of more houses to the sewer system and had no means of restricting the 
flow. Even in circumstances where the statute merely serves as a permission to pursue 
a commercial activity, the defence will be available if the nuisance of which complaint 
is made is the inevitable consequence of the activity authorised by the statute. In Allen 
v. Gulf Oil Refining Limited75 the defendants were empowered to acquire land for the 
purpose of constructing an oil refinery by a private Act of Parliament. Neighbours later 
complained of smells, noise and vibration emanating from the facility and argued that, 
as the 1965 Act merely empowered Gulf Oil to acquire the land and, as it was silent on 
the issue of how the refinery should be operated, there could be no statutory authority 
for the nuisances. The House of Lords held that, the fact that the statute had 
authorised the activity to be pursued at the location in question, meant that it must 
have conferred an implicit immunity in respect of disturbances inevitably flowing 
from the construction of the refinery. 
3.4.3 The Hypersensitive Plaintiff. 
Provided an activity is reasonable according to the locality doctrine, a person who is 
pursuing an exceptionally delicate trade or activity may be unable to sustain an action 
in nuisance against his neighbour. Thus, the courts are reluctant to curtail an ordinary, 
lawful use of a persons property in the interests of an activity which may be unusual 
and unduly susceptible to everyday occurrences. 
In Robinson v. Kilvert76 Lopes L. J. stated: 
"A man who carries on an exceptionally delicate trade cannot complain 
because it is injured by his neighbour doing something lawful on his 
property, if it is something which would not injure anything but an 
exceptionally delicate trade. " 
The law clearly places the onus on the person conducting the activity to move himself 
out of harms way or take preventative measures, otherwise, he must endure the 
consequences of pursuing an activity which is out of keeping with the character of the 
neighbourhood. However, if the activity of which complaint is made is unreasonable, 
the defence cannot be used on the grounds that the sensitive nature of the plaintiff's 
activity meant that he incurred a greater loss than that which would have been incurred 
by a person not engaged in that particular activity. For example, in the Canadian case 
75 [1981] 1 All E. R. 353. 
76 (1889) 41 Ch. D. 88 at p. 97. 
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of McKinnon Industries Ltd v. Walker77 the plaintiff grew orchids on a commercial 
basis; his stock was killed by poisonous gas emissions emanating from the defendants 
motor car production plant. The plaintiff brought an action in nuisance; it was argued 
on behalf of the defence that the plaintiff's activity was hypersensitive and that 
accordingly the emissions did not constitute an unreasonable use of land. It was held 
that the issue of reasonableness was entirely separate from the issue of 
hypersensitivity; once it has been established that an activity is unreasonable, the 
defendant will be liable for the consequences of his activity notwithstanding the fact 
that the nature of the plaintiff's activity renders him particularly sensitive to the 
consequences of the activity. This is clearly in accordance with the "egg-shell" skull 
principle by which the defendant must take his victim as he finds him78. 
4. THE RULE IN RYLANDS V. FLETCHER 
The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, which has already been touched on above, stems from 
the judgment of Blackburn J. in the eponymous case. In short, the rule establishes 
strict liability for any escapes resulting from an unnatural use of land: 
"We think that the rule of law is, that the person who for his own 
purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything 
likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he 
does not do so, is prima facie answer able for all the damage which is 
the natural consequence of its escape. "79 
Until recently the view prevailed that liability could be established by causation 
alone. 80 However, in Cambridge Water v. Eastern Counties Leather, Lord Goff, citing 
the work of Professor Newark, 81 explained that the rule originated as a species of 
nuisance. 82 Blackburn J. was merely seeking to clarify the circumstances 
in which a 
landowner could be held liable in respect of isolated escapes as opposed to an 
on-going state of affairs. It is only in subsequent years that the rule 
has developed into 
a free standing principle which is not always contingent upon the plaintiff 
having an 
77 [1951] 3 D. L. R. 577. 
78 See Dulieu v. White [1901] 2 K. B. 669,679, "if a man is negligently run over or otherwise 
negligently injured in his body, it is no defence to the sufferer's claim 
for damages that he would have 
suffered less injury-if he had not had an unusually thin skull or an unusually weak 
heart. ", per Kennedy 
J. 
79 (1866) L. R. 1 Ex. 265, at pp. 279-280. 
80 See, for example, British Celanese Ltd. v. A. H. Hunt 
Ltd. [1969] 1 W. L. R. 959, per Lawton J., at p. 
964. 
81 Op. cit. 
82 [1994] 2 A. C. 264, at pp. 297-306. 
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interest in property. 83 Thus, Lord Goff held that, as foreseeability of harm was a 
pre-requisite of nuisance, it should also be a pre-requisite of Rylands v. Fletcher 
liability. 
The assimilation of Rylands v. Fletcher with nuisance has led some to doubt whether 
the rule can continue to offer any advantage over other torts. In fact, notwithstanding 
the decision in Rylands v. Fletcher, the rule retains two major benefits over nuisance. 
As explained above, despite the inclusion of a foreseeability of harm test, nuisance still 
imposes a stricter duty than negligence. The advantage of Rylands v. Fletcher is that, 
in circumstances where it applies, the plaintiff may rely upon this stricter standard 
without the need to demonstrate an interest in land. 84 Secondly, it may circumvent the 
character of the neighbourhood test. This is because, according to Lord Goff, the issue 
of whether or not an activity constitutes an unnatural use of land should be judged by 
reference to the activity itself, not the predominant land use in the area. 85 Thus, where 
the defendant is engaged in a hazardous activity in an industrial area, a plaintiff, who 
might otherwise be defeated under the character of the neighbourhood test, may 
succeed under Rylands v. Fletcher. However, this must be set against the fact that the 
list of uses deemed `unnatural' has been continually eroded as once novel activities 
become well established. 86 As Rogers points out, ultimately the decision to impose 
strict liability in respect of an activity is based upon policy considerations. 87 
5. PUBLIC NUISANCE 
As has been explained above, the creation of the crime of public nuisance resulted 
from a misleading analogy made between obstruction of the public highway and 
obstruction of an easement such as a right of access. It was then established that a 
person who has suffered harm in excess of the general inconvenience suffered by the 
83 Over the years there has been considerable judicial disagreement on this point. Some judges have 
maintained that, due to its historical links with nuisance, the rule is only open to those who have an 
interest in land: see, for example, the dissenting judgment of Lord Macmillan in Read v. Lyons [1947] 
A. C. 167, at p. 173; Perry v. Kendricks Transport Ltd. [1956] 1 W. L. R. 85, at p. 92; Weller v. Foot and 
Mouth Disease Research Institute [ 1966[ 1 Q. B. 569, at p. Widgery J., at p. 588. Nevertheless, in several 
cases the rule has been successfully used in personal injuries claims, not least of which is Read v. Lyons, 
notwithstanding the dissenting judgment of Lord Macmillan. Rogers, op. cit., at p. 427, suggests that the 
overall trend is in favour of this approach. 
84 Ibid. 
85 [1994] 2 A. C. 264, at p. 309B-F. 
See, for example, British Celanese Ltd. v. A. H. Hunt [[1969] 1 W. L. R. 959: "The manufacturing of 
electrical and electronic components in the year 1964... cannot be judged to be a special use nor can the 
bringing and storing on the premises of metal foil be a special use in itself-The metal foil was there for 
use in the manufacture of goods of a common type which at all material times were needed for the 
general benefit of the community", per Lawton J., at p. 963. 
87 Op. cit., at p. 441. 
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population as a whole would be able to pursue a civil claim by reason of that `special 
hurt'. Hence a private action in respect of a public nuisance has never been a 
proprietary remedy. However, the association of public nuisance with private nuisance 
has resulted in its expanding to encompass those activities which have normally been 
the preserve of private nuisance, namely, interferences emanating from a neighbouring 
land use. This has resulted in a distinction being made between nuisances affecting a 
limited number of persons and those which affect enough landholders to constitute a 
class of Her Majesty's subjects88. In Attorney General v. PYA Quarries89 which 
concerned noise and vibration caused by blasting at the defendant's quarry, Denning 
L. J. formulated the following test for determining whether an activity constituted a 
public or private nuisance: 
"I prefer to look to the reason of the thing and to say that a public 
nuisance is a nuisance which is so widespread in its range or so 
indiscriminate in its effect that it would not be reasonable to expect one 
person to take proceedings on his own responsibility to put a stop to it, 
but that it should be taken on the responsibility of the community at 
large. " 
Thus, public nuisance is of interest in an environmental context in that many pollutants 
can disperse quickly and affect large numbers of people living some distance from the 
source of the escape. Those who suffer special or particular loss, over and above the 
general inconvenience suffered by the public at large, may pursue private claims in 
respect of that loss. For example, in Camelford in 1988, a contractor delivering 
aluminium sulphate to a water treatment works operated by South West Water 
Services Ltd. deposited 20 tonnes of the chemical into the wrong tank with the result 
that it was released into the public water supply. South West Water services were 
convicted of creating a public nuisance and 180 residents, who had suffered ill health 
effects as a result of drinking or washing with contaminated water, pursued private 
claims in respect of their particular losses9o 
Due to the fact that public nuisance first arose in highways cases where there was a 
pronounced overlap with case, public nuisance has always been susceptible to the 
application of a fault based standard of liability. Some of the main authorities on this 
point have already been discussed in relation to the Wagon Mound above. In the Court 
88 Courts are reluctant to specify how many persons constitute a class. In R. v. Lloyd (1802) 4 Esp. 200 
it was held that three guests at an inn was clearly insufficient to constitute a class. 
89 [1957] 2 Q. B. 169. 
90 South West Water admitted liability; reported litigation focused on the issue of the quantum of 
damages. See Chapter 3 below. 
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of Appeal in Southport Corporation v. Esso Petroleum , 
Denning L. J. considered that 
both public and private nuisance was analogous to trespass to land and liability should 
therefore be strict subject to the defences of necessity and inevitable accident91. This 
approach appreciates the proprietary base of private nuisance and trespass to land but 
does not distinguish the separate origins of private and public nuisance; the latter has 
never been associated with restoration of an interest in land. In any case, this argument 
was ignored by the House of Lords who considered that the matter turned on 
negligence. 
6. NEGLIGENCE 
6.1 Key Elements of the Tort 
The tort of negligence arose from the form of action known as action on the case (or 
simply case) and was designed to provide redress for harm resulting from a careless as 
opposed to a deliberate and forceful act92. This type of claim could not be brought 
under trespass since it concerned indirect and consequential harm93. The earliest writs 
could only be used in cases where the defendant had made some `prior undertaking' to 
carry out a service for the plaintiff94. The `prior undertaking' test was eventually 
expanded into an implied undertaking to conduct activities in a manner which would 
not cause loss to neighbours, meaning all those who are foreseeable victims of 
carelessness95. At first, the term `negligence' was merely one of a series of adverbs 
used to describe the concept of fault. As negligence hardened into a specific cause of 
action with its own principles other terms fell into disuse. 
In the field of personal injuries and damage to personal property, the standards of 
liability in negligence and trespass have been assimilated with the result that it is now 
possible to bring a claim in negligence in respect of a deliberate or intentional act96 
91 [1954] 2 Q. B. 182, at pp. 196-197. 
92 One of the earliest successful applications of the writ, found by Fifoot, concerns the case of Waldon v. 
Marshall (1367) Y. B. 43 Ed. 3, f. 33, p1.38, in which a horse died at the hands of a negligent veterinary 
surgeon. See Fifoot, op. cit., at p. 75. 93 Ibid. Thus in Waldon v. Marshall the defendant's argument that the plaintiff should have brought the 
action under common trespass was rejected on the grounds that "the horse was not killed by force, but by 
default if his cure. " 
94 See Fifoot, op. cit., at p. 156. 
95 This development appears to have occurred during the course of a series of seventeenth century cases 
concerning running down on the highway and collisions at sea: these include Mitchil v. Alestree (1676) 1 
Vent. 295 and Mustart v. Harden (1680) T. Raym. 390. See Prichard, op. cit.; Fifoot, op. cit., at pp. 
164-166. 
96 See Williams v. Humphry (1975), Times, 12th February. The act of deliberately pushing a man into a 
swimming pool submitted him to a foreseeable risk of injury and hence gave rise to liability in negligence. 
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However, negligence still differs significantly from trespass to land and private 
nuisance in that fault is the actual cause of action, whereas, in the latter torts, fault 
may be a factor in establishing liability. 
The basic elements of the tort were identified as early as the 18th Century where 
Buller-97 offered a definition which subsists in essence to this day. Since Buller, the 
definition has been refined through case law and can now be said to consist of three 
elements, namely a duty to take care, a breach of that duty, and loss sustained by 
another person as a result of the breach of duty. A duty of care is owed to those 
persons who are at potential risk from an activity; in other words they must be 
foreseeable victims of any misfeasance. In Donoghue v. Stevenson, Lord Atkin 
formulated his famous proximity test to assist with determining foreseeable victims: 
"You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you 
can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, 
then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be - persons who 
are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to 
have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing 
my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question". 98 
As regards conduct which gives rise to a breach of the duty, Alderson B. proposed an 
objective test in Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. which is still followed today: 
"Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, 
guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct 
of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and 
reasonable man would not do". 99 
Whether the defendant's conduct was reasonable has to be judged by reference to the 
circumstances of the case including, for example, industry standards 100, the magnitude 
of the risk 101 and generally `what the reasonable man would have in 
contemplation' 102. This latter requirement means that the reasonable man should be in 
a position to foresee that damage would be caused by his failure to act with due care. 
97 Buller, Trials at Nisi Prius, (6th edn. ), p. 25: "Every man ought to take reasonable care that he does 
not injure his neighbour; therefore, where-ever a man receives any hurt through the default of another, 
though the same were not wilful, yet it be so occasioned by negligence or folly, the law gives him an 
action to recover damages for the injury so sustained 98 [1932] A. C. 562 at p. 580. 
98 (1856) 11 Ex. 781 at p. 784. 
100 Wilsher v. Wessex Area Health Authority [1987] Q. B. 730. 
101 Bolton v. Stone [1951] A. C. 850; Paris v. Stepney Borough Council [1951] A. C. 367. 
102 Glasgow Corporation v. Muir [1943] A. C. 448, at p. 457, per Lord Macmillan. 
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The rationale for this is that one cannot conduct activities with a view to avoiding 
unforeseeable harm. 103 
6.2 Negligence and the Environment 
Trespass and nuisance have featured most prominently in litigation arising from 
pollution. This is because most recognized forms of pollution have interfered with 
neighbouring property. It has been usual to plead negligence in addition to the torts to 
land, however, a land owner generally has a far greater chance of success under the 
latter. The main reason for this is that, despite the decision in Cambridge Water, it 
seems that liability in trespass and nuisance is still stricter than in negligence. 
It is often extremely difficult to establish fault on the part of the defendant. 
Negligence was alleged in Esso Petroleum v. Southport Corporation104, in addition to 
the claims in trespass and nuisance, on the grounds that the master of the vessel 
should not have proceeded to navigate a narrow channel knowing that the steering 
mechanism had developed a fault. However, this cause of action also failed; weather 
conditions were worsening and any attempt to turn or weigh anchor would have been 
hazardous. The master had weighed up the risks before opting to head for sheltered 
water. In reaching this decision he had not shown any want of care or skill 
The issue of negligence was quickly dispensed with in Cambridge Water v. Eastern 
Counties Leather. Since PCE in relatively small concentrations was not recognized as 
being harmful at the material time, Eastern Counties Leather were not expected to 
have taken steps to prevent any spillages from occurring. 
There was also an attempt to establish negligence on the part of the defendants in 
Graham and Graham v. Re-Chem International. It was alleged that the incinerator was 
operated in a manner which failed to sustain the temperature, recommended by EPA 
and IIVIIPI regulations, needed for destroying PCBs (1050 - 1100°C). The main 
argument put forward on behalf of the plaintiffs on this point was that the doors to the 
furnaces were frequently left open thereby allowing the temperature to fall. Evidence 
produced by the manufacturers of the incineration equipment referred to the fact that 
the waste materials were in fact passed through five separate chambers (termed 'cells') 
each of which contained burners. The temperature in the final cell was crucial in that it 
operated as the `safety net' and was designed to destroy any PCB molecules not 
103 Roe v. Minister of Health [1954] 2 Q. B. 66. 104 [1956] A. C. 218, at p. 240. 
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already destroyed by the burners in the other four cells. Forbes J. found, as a matter of 
fact, that the doors to the first cell were only open for relatively short periods for 
loading or ashing out and, although the door was often left slightly ajar, this would not 
be sufficient to affect the temperature in the fifth cell 105 In any event, further 
scientific evidence, produced by the United States EPA, was accepted which showed 
that PCBs were destroyed at temperatures falling considerably below these levels and 
that the recommended temperature included a considerable built in safety margins 06 
In addition the Roughmute incinerator subjected the waste materials to a longer than 
usual burn time which would offset slight drops in the recommended temperature. 
The issue of negligence was not of crucial importance in this case in that, as stated 
above, the matter was settled on the basis of causation. However, it provides further 
evidence to suggest that, despite the Cambridge Water decision, it is still more 
difficult to establish liability in negligence than in nuisance due to the need to 
establish breach of the duty of care in addition to foreseeability of damage. As noted 
above, as regards the claim in nuisance, there was no need to examine the manner in 
which the plant was operated, the sole issue concerned whether it was known that the 
facility was emitting pollutants which had in fact caused damage. 
Nevertheless, on occasion successful actions have been brought in negligence in 
respect of environmentally harmful activities. A clear example is provided by the case 
of Tutton v. A. D. Walter Ltd. 107 The defendant was a farmer who grew rape seed in 
West Sussex. One summers day, he sprayed his crop with an insecticide called 
Hostathion which was known to be harmful to bees. As a result, a large number of the 
plaintiffs bees, which had been foraging in the field, were killed. The plaintiffs 
brought an action in negligence on the grounds that the chemical had been used in a 
manner which contravened advice issued by the Agricultural and Advisory Service 
(A. D. A. S. ) and the manufacturer's instructions issued with the product. The advice 
and instructions recommended that in order to reduce the risk of harming bees, the 
chemical should be used on cool days or at dusk and never when the crop was in 
bloom. 
In the High Court, Denis Henry Q. C. applied Lord Reid's proximity test in order to 
determine whether the plaintiffs were foreseeable victims of the misuse of the 
chemical. The presence of the bee-keepers was well known to the defendant due to the 
105 [1996] Env. L. R. 158, at pp. 186-189. 
106 Ibid., at pp. 180-181. 
107 [1985] 3 W. L. R. 797. 
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fact that they had exchanged correspondence regarding a spraying incident the 
previous year. The harmful nature of the chemical was also well known to the 
defendant who had the benefit of the A. D. A. S. advice and the instructions on the 
drums which contained the chemical. Given these facts it was held that the defendant 
ought reasonably to have had the plaintiffs in contemplation whilst spraying his crops. 
The judge then turned to the issue of whether this duty had been broken. The advice 
and instructions pertaining to the use of the chemical could not be said to have 
imposed onerous requirements when balanced against the potential threat to the bees, 
thus a failure to observe the instructions was clearly a breach of the duty of care owed 
to the bee-keepers. 
Negligence is the only available course of action where loss is unrelated to any 
interference with interests in land. In this respect the tort is becoming of increasing 
importance in an environmental context. Scientific advances have begun to establish 
links between illnesses and certain pollutants, hence, there is likely to be an increase in 
personal injury litigation arising from pollution. For example, in Margereson v. J. W. 
Roberts Ltd., 108 the plaintiffs had developed mesothelioma as a result of exposure to 
asbestos dust from the defendant's factory during childhood when they used to play in 
the factory loading bay. JWR was found liable on the grounds that the risks of asbestos 
had been known since 1925 and, since the children were allowed to play in the 
immediate vicinity of the factory, it was foreseeable that they would be exposed to the 
risk of pulmonary disease. The case is significant in that it is the first such claim in 
which the duty of care has been extended, beyond factory employees, so as to 
encompass those immediately outside the factory walls. However, as will be seen in 
the next chapter, it is often extremely difficult to establish liability where the pollutant 
is dispersed into the wider environment. 
7. BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY 
Many industries and authorities are regulated by statutes which set out duties and 
impose criminal or regulatory sanctions for breach of those duties. Although the 
primary purpose of these statutes is not to provide redress for an individual who has 
suffered loss, as a result of any breach of the duties imposed, certain statutes give rise 
to a private cause of action. This is known as the tort of breach of statutory duty; it is 
important to note that it is an independent tort which has given rise to its own body of 
108 Joined cases: Hancock v. J. W. Roberts Ltd; Hancock v. T. &. N. Plc [ 1996] Env. L. R. (4)304. See 
Steele, J., and Wikely, N., "Margereson v. J. W. Roberts Ltd", (1997) 60(2) Modern Law Review 265. 
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case law109 Thus, issues such as the applicable standard of liability must be 
determined by reference to the Act creating the duty rather than comparison with other 
110 torts such as negligence 
A limited number of statutes make specific provision for private tort claims following 
a breach of duty, conversely certain statutes expressly preclude private compensation 
claims for breach of duty. In such circumstances the breach of duty may nevertheless 
provide evidence of a breach of the common law duty of care in a separate action in 
negligence I 11. Where a private right of action is neither expressly included or 
excluded the courts have developed a number of tests for determining whether an 
intention to facilitate private actions can be impliedl12 
As the tort is governed, to a large extent, by the statute under which it arises there are 
few common principles. However, from the case law it is possible to discern certain 
key elements which the plaintiff must establish. In short, the duty must be owed to the 
plaintiff113; the injury must be of the kind which the statute is intended to prevents 14; 
the defendant must be in breach of an obligation which falls within the scope of the 
Act115; and, the breach of duty must have caused the damage 116 
In an environmental context, an important example of a statutory provision which 
gives rise to a cause of action for breach of statutory duty concerns section 12 of the 
Nuclear Installations Act 1965. This provides that any person who suffers injury or 
damage, as a result of a breach of any of the duties set out in sections 7 to 10 of the 
109 This differs from the situation in certain States of the US and Canada where it merely serves as 
compelling evidence of a breach of the duty of care or "concretises" the duty of care. See Winfield and 
Jolowicz, op. cit., pp. 170-171. 
110 See L. P. T. B v. Upson [1949] A. C. 155, "A claim for damages for breach of a statutory duty 
intended to protect a person in the position of the particular plaintiff is a specific common law right which 
is not to be confused in essence with a claim in negligence ... 
I have desired before I deal specifically with 
the regulations to make it clear how in my judgment they should be approached, and also to make it clear 
that a claim for their breach may stand or fall independently of negligence. There is always a danger if the 
claim is not sufficiently specific that the due consideration of the claim for breach of statutory duty may 
be prejudiced if it is confused with the claim in negligence. " per Lord Wright at 168-169. 11 See, for example, Lochgelly Iron & Coal Co. v. MMullan [1934] A. C. 1. 112 There is little consistency in the case law regarding the circumstances in which the tort should be 
implied. In general, it has been stated that Acts which are designed to protect a class of individuals are 
capable of giving rise to a private cause of action: Lonrho Ltd v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd. (No. 2) [1982] 
A. C. 173. In such circumstances, the existence of separate enforcement measures in the Act such as 
criminal penalties does not necessarily preclude the existence of a private cause of action: Groves v. 
Wimborne [ 1898] 2 Q. B. 402. 
113 
114 
Hartley V. Mayoh & Co. [1954] 1 Q. B. 383. 
Gorris v. Scott (1874) L. R. 9 Exch. 125 
115 
116 
Chipchase v. Titan Products Co. [1956] 1 Q. B. 545 
Ginty v. Belmont Building Supplies Ltd. [1959] 1 All E. R. 414. 
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Act, shall have a right to compensation. Section 7 of the Act simply imposes a duty on 
the licensees of nuclear installations to prevent occurrences at the site causing 
property damage or injury to any persons, other than the licensee, by the release of any 
substances having radioactive, toxic, explosive or other hazardous properties. Sections 
8 to 10 impose similar duties to prevent occurrences leading to the above results on the 
Regulatory Authority, the Crown and certain foreign operators respectively. As will be 
seen in the next chapter, there have been various attempts to found civil claims on 
section 12 in respect of alleged releases of ionising radiation from nuclear 
installations. 
Another key example of relevance in an environmental context concerns section 73(6) 
of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. This provides that anyone who deposits 
controlled waste in contravention of the licensing requirements, imposed by sections 
33(l) and 63(2), shall be liable to pay damages in respect of any personal injury or 
damage to property caused by the deposit. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
The earliest torts, namely trespass and nuisance, arose in the context of the protection 
of private interests in land. Negligence evolved later as an implied obligation to 
conduct activities with due care. Negligence has continued to grow in importance and 
has succeeded in infiltrating other areas of tort where there is a clear overlap. The 
most pronounced overlap between the torts occurs where there has been tangible 
damage. Thus, whereas a householder, who suffers health effects as a result of noxious 
emissions, may have a cause of action in both negligence and nuisance, a family 
member living in the same property, with no proprietary interest in the house 117, 
would be confined to negligence 118 As a result of such anomalies, it has been argued 
that, where there has been tangible damage, the time has come to establish a uniform 
negligence based standard of liability119. This would limit nuisance, based upon strict 
liability, to circumstances in which there has been no physical loss and the dispute is 
purely proprietary in nature120. Such an approach has long since been adopted in 
Germany 121 
1117 18 
Standing requirements for actions in tort are discussed in chapter 3. 
See Newark, op. cit., at p. 489, "A sulphurous chimney in a residential area is not a nuisance because 
it makes householders cough and splutter but because it prevents them from taking their ease in their 
gardens. " 
I 19 See Gearty, C., "The Place of Private Nuisance in a Modern Law of Torts" [ 1989] Cambridge Law 
Journal 214. 
120 See Law Commission Report No. 32, Civil Liability for Dangerous Things and Activities, p. 25. In 
cases where the defendant is seeking an injunction to prevent an on-going nuisance, "consideration of the 
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However, it is difficult to secure public interest objectives, such as environmental 
protection, by means of a system which focuses on the private rights and the conduct 
of the individuals in a dispute. As will be seen in the next chapter, such an approach 
severely limits the use of tort as a means of environmental protection. 
strictness of the duty is than out of place - all the court is concerned with is the question, `should the 
plaintiff be told to stop this interference with the plaintiffs rights? ' Whether or not the defendant knew of 
the smell or noise or the like when it first began to annoy the plaintiff does not matter; he becomes aware 
of it at the latest when the plaintiff brings his claim before the court. " 121 Under paragraph 906 of the Civil Code (Das Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch: BGB), nuisance actions may 
only be brought in respect of interferences from `unweighable particles'. These include gases, vapours, 
smells, smoke, soot, heat, noises and shocks. According to the decision in the `Smelting Oven' 
(Kupolofen) case, BGHZ 92,143 (1985), any actions in respect of physical damage to property or 
personal injury must be brought under the all embracing duty to take care, set out in paragraph 823 BGB. 
See Markesinis, B. S. (1994), The German Law of Torts (3rd edn. ), Clarendon Press, at pp. 880-881. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Establishing civil liability for environmental damage in an environmental context is 
subject to certain difficulties which currently limit its role in environmental protection. 
In many cases concerning pollution the plaintiff faces exceedingly high procedural 
costs, known as `transaction costs', which represent legal costs associated with 
establishing liability on the part of the defendant. Transaction costs are increased by 
factors such as the need to establish fault and causation; as will be seen below, these 
costs may be particularly acute in many cases concerning environmental damage. 
The use of civil liability in an environmental context is also limited by the fact that, as 
stated towards the end of the previous chapter, torts are concerned with the protection 
of private interests. This creates two problems, firstly, the loss suffered by an 
individual may not reflect the full costs of the damage caused to the environment; thus 
compensation awarded to a plaintiff may not be sufficient to fund, for example, clean 
up costs. Secondly, as torts are closely tied to the protection of individual rights and 
interests, there is a limited notion of standing. As a result, in the absence of an 
individual victim, organizations concerned with environmental protection are 
generally not in a position to pursue civil claims on behalf of the environment in its 
own right. 
2. THE NEED TO ESTABLISH FAULT 
The extent to which it is necessary to establish fault on the part of the defendant has 
already been explored in some detail in the previous Chapter. To reiterate, negligence 
is the only tort in which fault forms the actual basis of the cause of action. However, as 
a result of cross-contamination between the old forms of action, aspects of fault based 
liability have now entered other torts such as nuisance. Towards the end of the 
previous chapter it was noted that there is increasing support for the view that, in cases 
of personal injury or tangible damage to real or personal property, negligence should 
be adopted as a uniform basis of liability; this is already the position in Germany. 
Taking this step would certainly clarify the law and remove anomalies. However, from 
an environmental perspective, the need to establish fault in all cases would place a 
heavy burden on the plaintiff. To recap, in nuisance, it suffices to show that the 
defendant knew that his activity was causing, for example, the emission of noxious 
substances. However, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to establish that the defendant 
was at fault in failing to abate the pollution. Thus, in Graham and Graham v. Re-Chem 
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Internationals, had the Grahams been able to establish causation, they would have 
succeeded in their nuisance claim in that there was ample evidence that Re-Chem 
knew that PAHs were being released from their facility. Thus, the fact that, at the 
material time, science had yet to isolate the chemical processes which led to the 
harmful emissions had no bearing on the issue of nuisance; knowledge of the 
emissions would have been sufficient to establish liability. However, in negligence, in 
addition to establishing that the defendant knew of the emissions, it is necessary to 
show that he failed to take adequate steps to abate them. For example, in Graham and 
Graham, in order to succeed in negligence, it would have been necessary to 
demonstrate that Re-Chem was in a position to prevent the emissions and failed to do 
so. This would entail establishing that Re-Chem was aware of the chemical processes 
which led to the pollution; clearly, it is impossible to introduce abatement technology 
without knowing how the pollution is caused. 
Due to the scientific complexity of many processes which cause pollution, it may be 
extremely difficult for the plaintiff to establish that, given the current state of scientific 
knowledge, the pollution was preventable. 
3. CAUSATION 
3.1 Difficulties in Establishing Causation for Environmental Damage 
Damage arising from nuisances or negligent acts constitutes a form of indirect 
consequential harm. Thus the causal link between the act complained of and the 
alleged consequential damage is susceptible to being broken, or at least cast into 
doubt, by intervening factors or other possible causes. The industrial revolution led to 
a rapid increase in development with the result that it became increasingly difficult for 
a land-holder to determine which of his neighbours was responsible for a nuisance. 
Whereas before, there would probably only have been one possible candidate for the 
source of the pollution, post-industrial revolution, a landholder would have found 
himself surrounded by belching chimneys. In giving testimony to a Select Committee 
on Noxious Vapours, Robert Gerard stated: 
"I might explain that the reason why I have not myself brought actions 
against the alkali manufacturers at St. Helens has been simply this: I am 
assured by my solicitor that it is impossible to bring an action with any 
chance of success unless I can put my finger upon the right man. I 
I [1996] Env. L, R, 158. 
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cannot put my finger upon the right man, with all the assistance I can 
get, when there are a dozen or 20 works all emitting vapours at the 
same time". 2 
The problem was compounded when there were a number of different industries in the 
area, each producing different substances which mixed together. Scientific knowledge 
was not usually capable of isolating the individual elements and tracing them to their 
respective sources. In giving evidence to the same committee Michael Garvey, a 
barrister, stated that it was almost impossible to establish liability on the grounds of 
"The difficulty of selecting any one of those effluvia and tracing it up to 
its source, so as to bring it home to the manufacturer by legal evidence. 
We have always been defeated on this point". 3 
Scientific techniques for tracing pollutants to source have undoubtedly improved, 
however, it is still often extremely difficult to establish causation. In the last century, 
claims were usually only brought in respect of self-evident pollution such as smoke, 
fumes and waste products. As scientific knowledge has progressed, increasingly 
complex links between latent toxins and various types of harm have been discovered. 
However, it is one thing to discover a potential link, it is quite another to provide 
sufficient proof of the link for the purposes of establishing liability. Negligence claims 
for personal injuries are likely to increase as advances in scientific knowledge begin to 
establish possible links between health problems and environmentally harmful 
activities. This creates difficult causation problems in that a toxin is often only one of 
a number of possible causes for a particular illness. Nevertheless, even a small dose of 
a certain toxin may increase the incidence of certain illnesses; this is referred to as the 
`stochastic effect'. As will be seen below, such developments are already beginning to 
strain existing legal tests for establishing causation. 
3.2 Legal Tests for Establishing Causation 
As regards the issue of causation in general, the courts usually apply a `but for' test 
which entails establishing whether the harm would have occurred in the absence of the 
defendant's actions4. Thus, it is necessary for the plaintiff to show that, on a balance of 
2 Select Committee on Noxious Vapours (1862), Minutes of Evidence 23, Q 238. 
3 Ibid., 189, Q 2027. 
4 "Subject to the question of remoteness, causation is a question of fact. If the damage would not have 
happened but for a particular fault, then that fault is the cause of the damage; if it would have happened 
just the same, fault or no fault, the fault is not the cause of the damage. It is to be decided by the ordinary 
plain common sense of the business": Cork v. Kirby MacClean Ltd. [1952] 2 All E. R. 402, at pp. 
406-407. 
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probabilities, the defendant's conduct was the main cause of the harm. Where there are 
competing causes this may be a difficult evidential burden to discharge. 
The emergence of the `material contribution' test suggested that, in certain 
circumstances, it would suffice to show that, although the defendant's conduct may 
not have been the main cause of the harm, it nevertheless made a material contribution 
to the plaintiff's misfortune. The test first emerged in the case of Bonnington Castings 
v. Wardlaw5 where Lord Reid formulated it in the following terms: 
"[H]e [the plaintiff] must make it appear at least on a balance of 
probabilities the breach of duty caused or materially contributed to his 
injury 
... 
What is a material contribution is a question of degree. A 
contribution which comes within the exception de minimus non curat 
lex is not material, but I think any contribution which does not fall 
within that exception must be material. -6 
In McGhee v. N. C. B. 7 Lord Reid took the opportunity to refine his earlier formulation 
and referred to the fact that it would suffice to show that the activity materially 
increased the risk of the harm occurring: 
"But it has often been said that the legal concept of causation is not 
based on logic or philosophy. It is based on the practical way in which 
the ordinary man's mind works in the everyday affairs of life. From a 
broad and practical viewpoint I can see no substantial difference 
between saying that what the defender did materially increased the risk 
of injury to the pursuer and saying that what the defender did made 
material contribution to his injury. "8 
This elaboration of the material contribution test appeared to suggest that, provided the 
plaintiff could show that the defendant's acts or omissions subjected him to an 
unacceptable level of risk, there would be no need for him to establish that the act 
complained of was in fact the cause of the harm in his particular case. However, there 
was some doubt as to whether this was intended to become a general principle of 
causation or whether it was limited to the facts of the case. 
The matter was clarified some years later when the House of Lords returned to the 
issue of causation in Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Authority9 which concerned an 
5 [1956] A. C. 613. 
6 Ibid., at 620-621. 
g [1973] 1 W. L. R. 1. 
Ibid., at p. 5. 9 [1988] 1 A. C. 1074 
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allegation of medical negligence. The case centred on the issue of whether a premature 
baby had suffered eye damage as a result of medical staff negligently administering 
too much oxygen. However, the facts of this case differed from McGhee and Wardlaw 
in that there were four alternative explanations for the harm which were unrelated to 
any actions carried out by the medical staff. In his leading judgment Lord Bridge did 
not consider that Lord Reid's material increase in risk test should be applied in such 
circumstances. In McGhee there was no doubt that the illness was caused by brick dust 
and that the plaintiff was only exposed to brick dust at his place of work. Thus, as the 
employer must have contributed in some way to the harm, it was reasonable to assume 
that any failings which materially increased the risk of the injury did in fact materially 
contribute to the harm. Lord Bridge stated that such an approach was appropriate in 
the light of the particular facts of McGhee: 
"Adopting a robust and pragmatic approach to the undisputed primary 
facts of the case, the majority concluded that it was a legitimate 
inference of fact that the defender's negligence had materially 
contributed to the defender's injury. "10 
However, in Wilsher, there was a strong possibility that the harm was in no way 
connected with the actions taken by the medical staff. Lord Bridge stated that he could 
not find fault with the dissenting judgment of Sir Nicolas Brown-Wilkinson V. -C. in 
the Court of Appeal decision in the same case where the distinction between the 
circumstances of McGhee and the present case was made in the following terms: 
"The position, to my mind, is wholly different from that in the McGhee 
[1973] 1 W. L. R. 1, case where there was only one candidate (brick 
dust) which could have caused the dermatitis, and the failure to take a 
precaution against brick dust causing dermatitis was followed by 
dermatitis caused by brick dust. In such a case, I can see the common 
sense, if not the logic, of holding that, in the absence of any other 
evidence, the failure to take the precaution caused or contributed to the 
dermatitis. To the extent that certain members of the House of Lords 
decided the question on inferences from evidence or presumptions, I do 
not consider that the present case falls within their reasoning. A failure 
to take preventative measures against one out of five possible causes is 
no evidence as to which of those five caused the injury. "11 
Thus it now seems well established that, where there is more than one possible causal 
agent, the court should not infer that any acts or omissions on the part of the 
10 Ibid., at 1090D. 
11 [1987] Q. B. 730, at p. 779. 
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defendant, which are capable of increasing the risk of harm, did in fact contribute to 
the harm 12. 
3.3 Establishing Causation for Environmental Damage 
Extrapolating the House of Lords authorities on causation to an environmental context 
it seems that, in applying the material contribution test, it must be demonstrated that a 
polluting activity actually contributed to the plaintiffs loss. As a general rule it will 
not suffice to show that the activity materially increased the risk of the harm occurring, 
unless, there is no doubt regarding the nature of the substance which caused the harm 
and its source. It is only in recent years that a number of cases concerning 
environmental damage have been decided which address the issue of causation. 
Meeran13 anticipated that Lord Bridge's restrictive interpretation of the material 
contribution test would render it extremely difficult to establish causation in cases 
concerning environmental damage. In the light of these decisions it seems that 
Meeran's concerns have proved to be well founded. If the pollution occurs in high 
concentrations in the immediate vicinity of a plant, the plaintiff should not be 
presented with major difficulties in establishing causation. However, once in the 
environment, a pollutant may merge with other substances already present in the 
environment with the result that the damage pathways become obscured; it may not be 
possible to disentangle the effects of the pollutant from the effects of other possible 
causal agents. In such circumstances it may be impossible to establish causation to the 
satisfaction of the court due to the need to establish that the activity of which 
complaint is made actually contributed, as a matter of fact, to the harm in a particular 
case. 
3.3.1 Cases Where There is Only One Known Cause 
As noted above, where the identity and source of the polluting substance is not in 
doubt, the plaintiff is not presented with major difficulties in establishing causation. 
This has recently been demonstrated by the case of Margereson v. J. W. Roberts Ltd. 14 
12 The decision is in line with Lord Bridge's judgment in Hotson v. East Berkshire AHA [1987] 2 All 
E. R. 909. Here it was found that there was a 25% chance that the plaintiff's disease was caused by a 
misdiagnosis by a hospital doctor and a 75% chance that the disease would have developed in any case. 
This was found to be insufficient to discharge the burden of proof. Had a material increase in risk 
approach been adopted there is a possibility that the misdiagnosis would have been construed as making 
more than a de minimus contribution to the illness. The decision also confirms the conclusion reached in 
the Scottish case of Kay's tutor v. Ayrshire and Arran Health Board [1987] S. L. T. 577 where an 
attempt to develop the decision in McGhee was also rejected. 
13 Meeran, R., "Problems of Causation in Environmental Personal Injury", (1992) 136, Solicitors 
Journal, 32,804-806. 
14 [1996] Env. L. R. (4) 304. 
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in which two women, who had lived in the vicinity of an asbestos plant, successfully 
claimed damages in negligence having developed the cancer mesothelioma of which 
the only known cause is exposure to asbestos dust. Residents in the immediate vicinity 
of the plant had been exposed to extremely high concentrations of asbestos dust during 
the 1930s. In winter, children used to gather for warmth outside the extraction ducts 
and were coated with dust. Furniture in houses in the area was described as having 
been coated with dust to the extent that it was possible to write in it. The trial judge 
commented that, "I cannot sensibly distinguish the conditions at 13 Aviary Road from 
those in the factory... the defendants knew or ought to have known that their dust 
emissions created such conditions"15. However, the judge also stated that: 
"what I reject is the proposition that all exposure outside this category 
could be categorised as `environmental', something contrasting with, 
and markedly less potentially hazardous than, exposure within the 
factory. I have no doubt but that, in the immediate vicinity of the 
defendants' premises, factory conditions in terms of dust emission were 
at various points effectively replicated so as to give rise to like foresight 
of potential injury to those exposed for prolonged periods". 16 
However, difficulties in establishing causation increase significantly where the 
pollution can in fact be referred to as 'environmental'. As stated above, once a 
pollutant has been dispersed into the environment over a wide area, the number of 
alternative causes are multiplied. 
3.3.2 Cases Where There is More than One Possible Cause 
In Graham and Graham v. Re-Chem Internationals7 the plaintiffs faced additional 
difficulties in establishing causation in that there was more than one possible 
explanation for their loss. It will be recalled that the case concerned an allegation by 
the Grahams that their dairy cattle had been poisoned by emissions emanating from the 
defendant's toxic waste incinerator at Roughmute. It was the plaintiffs' contention that 
the symptoms displayed by the cattle were consistent with a condition known as 
PHAH toxicosis which could have been caused by ingestion of grass contaminated 
with dioxins and furans. Re-Chem argued that the symptoms in fact bore a closer 
resemblance to those displayed by cattle suffering from an entirely unrelated condition 
known by the inelegant title of Fat Cow Syndrome (FCS) and certain other ancillary 
causes. 
15 240 Health & Safety Bulletin 3. 
16 Ibid. 
17 [1996] Env. L. R. 158. 
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Forbes J. stated that, where there was more than one possible cause for the harm, it 
would suffice to show that the defendant's conduct caused or materially contributed to 
the plaintiff's loss18. The judge also referred to the judgment of Lord Reid in McGhee 
where his Lordship stated that it would suffice to show that the activity materially 
increased the risk of the harm occurring19. As regards the effect of the House of Lords 
decision in Wilsher, Forbes J. concluded that Lord Reid's risk formulation of the 
material contribution test was re-affirmed20. The only part of the decision which was 
rejected, in his view, concerned comments made by Lord Wilberforce which appeared 
to suggest that, in certain circumstances, the effect of the material contribution test as 
formulated by Lord Reid would be to reverse the burden of proofs 1. Thus, it seems that 
Forbes J. would have been content for the plaintiff to establish that the emissions from 
the incinerator materially increased the risk of damaging the health of the cattle. It is 
respectfully suggested that the judge erred on this point of law in that he did not refer 
to the distinction made by Lord Bridge in Wilsher between the facts of that case and 
McGhee. The facts in the Graham and Graham case are more closely related to 
Wilsher than McGhee in that the alternative cause was unrelated to the operation of the 
incinerator. However, in the event this issue had no effect on the outcome of the case 
as the plaintiffs could not satisfy even this liberal interpretation of the material 
contribution test. 
Having reviewed the evidence, Forbes J. was satisfied that the symptoms were more 
typical of FCS than PHAH toxicosis. In particular, he referred to the existence of 
intercellular fat deposits which are indicative of the onset of FCS and are in no way 
associated with PHAH toxicosis. Furthermore, many symptoms were closely 
associated with a reduction in the immune response of the cattle which is also 
indicative of FCS. Especially damning to the Grahams' case was the fact that FCS had 
been diagnosed by veterinary surgeons when the cattle first began to fall ill in 1984. A 
course of treatment was prescribed, involving a change of diet, to which the cattle 
responded. The Grahams failed to continue the treatment as they were convinced that 
the toxic waste incinerator was the true cause of the harm. It was stated that Mr. 
Graham was "blind to any signs of improvement and quickly gave up any hope of 
saving his herd"22. This led Forbes J. to conclude that "the proper welfare of the 
Grahams' cattle was sacrificed on the altar of Mr Graham's obsessive belief in 
18 Ibid., at pp. 171-172. 
1 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 See below. 
22 Ibid., at p. 176. 
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Re-Chem's responsibility for his problems"23. In addition, the FCS symptoms could 
have been compounded by a number of ancillary causes also unrelated to the operation 
of the incinerator. For example, it was found that the cattle suffered from copper and 
selenium deficiency; this was probably due to the fact that the land upon which the 
cattle grazed was naturally deficient in these elements. Furthermore, it was found that 
the cattle suffered from vitamin A and E deficiency, a condition which was also 
entirely inconsistent with PHAH toxicosis. 
3.3.3 Toxic Micro pollutants 
The Graham and Graham decision did not provide a particularly rigorous test for the 
main methods of establishing causation, in that the evidence against the hypothesis 
that the harm was due to emissions from the incinerator was over-overwhelming. 
However, a greater challenge for established legal reasoning is presented by toxic 
micro-pollutants. The effects of these elements are extremely difficult to quantify due 
to the fact that they interact with the receiving media in a complex manner. As a result 
it may be impossible to disentangle the effects of the pollutant from other elements in 
the environment for the purposes of estimating the extent to which they contributed to 
the loss suffered by the plaintiff. Thus it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
establish a definite biological link between the pollutant and the harm in an individual 
case. An illustration of the difficulties associated with establishing causation in these 
circumstances is provided by litigation arising out of claims for loss alleged to have 
been caused by radiation from nuclear facilities. 
The case of Merlin v. British Nuclear Fuels PLC24 concerned an alleged breach of 
statutory duty under the Nuclear Installations Act 1965. The plaintiffs lived in the 
vicinity of the Sellafield Nuclear Waste reprocessing plant. They were led to believe 
that their house may have been contaminated by radionuclides emanating from the 
defendant's plant. The likely source of the contamination was traced to a waste pipe 
discharging effluent into the sea. Samples of house dust were sent to various experts 
for analysis. The plaintiffs were greatly concerned by the findings of Professor 
Radford in the United States who claimed to have discovered levels of the alpha 
emitting substances plutonium and americium which were greatly in excess of the 
national average. On the basis of this information the plaintiffs decided to move house 
in order to avoid potential health risks to their children. However, as a result of 
publicity caused by a television documentary, the plaintiffs were unable to sell their 
property and were eventually compelled to sell it for an undervalue at auction. They 
23 Ibid., at p. 177. 
24 [1990] 3 W. L. R. 383. 
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claimed for the difference between the original asking price and the price obtained at 
auction. 
Following a great deal of scientific debate, the High Court came to the conclusion that 
the plutonium and americium detected in the property did not add significantly to 
radiation caused by naturally occurring radon gas. It was accepted that levels of these 
substances in excess of the national average is not necessarily harmful. This is because 
plutonium and americium are man made substances and average levels have only been 
introduced since nuclear weapons testing; this level is in fact exceedingly low and is 
not as significant as naturally occurring radiation which provides a more reliable 
bench mark for monitoring increases in radiation. Gatehouse J. stated: 
"The radionuclides with which this case is concerned - plutonium 
isotopes and americium - are alpha emitters. These cannot do any 
significant damage to persons or property externally, but when inhaled, 
ingested or otherwise enabled to enter the body they may induce 
cancers, but, of course, will not necessarily do so. The presence of 
alpha emitting radionuclides in the human airways or digestive tracts or 
even in the blood stream merely increases the risk of cancer to which 
everyone is exposed from both natural and artificial radioactive sources. 
They do not per se amount to injury". 25 
In order to overcome the difficulties associated with establishing a biological link in 
an individual case an attempt was made to rely upon epidemiological evidence in the 
joined cases of Reay and Hope v. British Nuclear Fuels Plc26. The first plaintiff, 
Elizabeth Reay, claimed that the death of her baby daughter in 1962 from leukaemia 
was attributable to her husband's exposure to radiation whilst employed as a fitter by 
BNFL at Sellafield in the 1950s and early 1960s. She claimed damages under the Fatal 
Accidents Acts 1956-70 and the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Acts 1934-70 
in respect of the death of her daughter. In addition, she claimed damages for injury to 
herself and on behalf of the estate of her late husband for injury caused by the trauma 
of the loss of their daughter. The second plaintiff, Vivien Hope, also claimed that her 
cancer, in this case lymphoma, had been caused by her father's exposure to 
unacceptably high doses of radiation whilst employed by BNFL. Although she had 
largely recovered, she had been left partially disabled and infertile as a result of her 
treatment; damages were claimed in respect of these disabilities plus the pain and 
suffering which she had endured. 
Z5 Ibid. at p. 396 E-G. 
Elizabeth Reay v. British Nuclear Fuels Plc and Vivien Jane Hope v. British Nuclear Fuels Plc 
[1994] Env. L. R. 320. 
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BNFL accepted that they had breached their statutory duty under the Atomic Energy 
Authority Act 1954 which required the operator, 
"... to secure that no ionising radiations from anything on any premises 
occupied by them, or from any waste discharged (in whatever form) on 
or from any premises occupied by them, cause any hurt to any person or 
any damag 27o any property, whether he or it is on any such premises or 
elsewhere. 
The case turned solely on the issue of whether there was a causal link between this 
breach of duty and the losses claimed by the plaintiffs. In both cases the causal 
mechanism, by which the plaintiffs claimed that the fathers' exposure to radiation at 
Sellafield led to their children developing cancer, was extremely complex. The 
evidence was based on a hypothesis proposed by Professor Gardner termed paternal 
pre-conception irradiation (PPI). This proposed that exposure to radiation could lead to 
genetic mutation in fathers' sperm which would result in their off-spring being 
genetically pre-disposed to developing cancer. The exact causal mechanism by which 
this process could take place was unknown although it was argued that a genetic 
pre-disposition to cancer could be passed to children through the germ-line. The main 
evidence for this assertion was that other syndromes by which a person may become 
genetically predisposed to leukaemia such as Down's Syndrome and Bloom's 
syndrome may also be passed to children through the germline. 
In order to overcome the difficulties associated with establishing the exact causal 
mechanism by which this process took place, the Gardner study adduced 
epidemiological evidence to suggest that there was a strong association between PPI 
and cancer in the children of Sellafield workers28. Epidemiology is a statistical 
exercise which relies upon the study of a large number of cases with a view to 
determining whether there is a correlation between the symptoms displayed by a class 
of people and possible causes. 29 If a large percentage of the class were exposed to a 
common element, there is a statistical probability that their symptoms are attributable 
27 The facilities in question, known as `Piles', were opened in 1950 and were designed to produce 
plutonium. It is now widely accepted that their construction was poor; indeed, in giving evidence, one of 
the engineers who was largely responsible for their construction referred to them as "monuments to our 
initial ignorance". See [1994] Env. L. R. 320, p. 328. 
28 Published in two papers in the British Medical Journal, February 1992. 
The House of Lords accepted that such evidence could be used to establish causation in Hotson v. 
East Berkshire Health Authority [1987] 2 All E. R. 909: "In some cases, perhaps particularly medical 
negligence cases, causation may be so shrouded in mystery that the court can only measure statistical 
chances", per Lord Bridge, at p. 913. 
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to the same cause30. The Gardner study established an association between workers at 
Sellafield and the incidence of cancer in their children. 
However, the plaintiffs did not rely entirely upon the Gardner study, this is possibly 
due to the fact that they were aware of certain shortcomings in the report which were 
in fact later identified by the judge. Oncologists believe that cancers, including 
leukaemia and lymphoma, are multifactorial and are triggered by two separate events 
or 'hits'. It was argued on behalf of the plaintiffs that the babies were born genetically 
pre-disposed to cancer and that the second `hit', which actually triggered the cancer, 
may have been caused by exposure to background radiation in the environment. The 
plaintiffs contended that levels of background radiation in the vicinity of Sellafield had 
been enhanced by emissions of uranium oxide into the environment emanating from 
the Sellafield installation. It was alleged that this increased background radiation to 
levels over and above that which was due to other causes for which the defendant was 
not responsible such as atomic weapons testing, Chernobyl and naturally occurring 
radon gas. 
In order to test the reliability of the epidemiological study, French J. applied the 
Bradford-Hill criteria which were drawn up by an eminent professor in the field in 
196531. Two of these criteria proved to be particularly significant in the outcome of 
the case, namely, consistency and biological plausibility. 
French J. considered the study failed the consistency test on the grounds that the 
findings did not accord with other leading epidemiological studies on the children of 
30 A succinct explanation of the subject was provided by one of the expert witnesses, Professor 
MacMahon, and was cited by French J. in his judgment: "In the end it must be recognised that the idea of 
cause is a probabilistic one. Rarely can we be certain that a causal relationship exists, but by assembling 
evidence from many different angles we may build a body of support sufficient to convince most 
reasonable people that it is more prudent to act as though the association were causal than to assume that 
it is not. The point in the accumulation of evidence at which this decision is reached depends in 
considerable part on the consequences of the alternative actions to be taken as a result of the judgment. " 
[1994] Env. L. R. 320, at p. 336. The use of epidemiological evidence has now been accepted by the 
courts. See, for example, Loveday v. Renton, The Times, 31 March 1988. 31 The head note of the judgment usefully summarises the criteria as follows: "(i) The strength of the 
association found by the study; (ii) biological gradient - that is, the consistency of dose with response in 
a dose response relationship; (iii) Temporal Relationships - that is, cause must always precede effect; (iv) 
The consistency of the result of the study with other similar studies concerned with the same subject 
matter; (v) Biological plausibility - that is, the existence of a plausible or reasonable biological pathway 
by which radiation could cause or contribute to a disease; (vi) Coherence; this criterion looks to the 
compatibility of a postulated cause with the known facts; (vii) Experimental evidence -a criterion which 
did not assist in this case because there have been no relevant laboratory experiments on live humans; 
(viii) Analogy - for example, if chemicals were shown to produce a similar result, that would be an 
example of analogy; and (ix) Specificity of the alleged link between the disease of interest and the 
exposure of interest - not very useful in this case because radiation is known to cause a variety of 
diseases. " See [1994] Env. L. R. 320, at p. 323 
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radiation victims. Of particular interest was a detailed study of the offspring of the 
victims of the A-bombs dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. The survey was carried 
out over many years and was described by the judge as, "the largest and most 
thoroughly executed epidemiological study ever carried out. "32 The study followed 
30,000 offspring of over 70,000 parents over a 45 year period. The results of this study 
proved to be entirely inconsistent with the Gardner study in that the genetic mutation 
rate alleged to have been caused by exposure to radiation at Sellafield was "off the 
scale" in comparison with the genetic mutation rates detected in the A-bomb studies33 
and smaller scale animal tests. 34 Furthermore other epidemiological studies into PPI 
did not discover any link between exposure to radiation and cancer in offspring. 35 
These inconsistencies cast doubt on whether the association identified by the Gardner 
Report between Sellafield and the incidence of cancer in children was in fact 
attributable to Sellafield. As a result, attention was focused on the biological 
plausibility test. The reason for this can be explained as follows. If there was a 
scientifically well established and highly plausible damage pathway between Sellafield 
and the victims by way of PPI, it would suggest that, although out of keeping with 
other studies, there was a probability that radiation emanating from Sellafield caused 
or contributed to the high incidence of cancers in the area. In such circumstances, the 
fact that rates of genetic mutation were out of keeping with the other studies would be 
of less significance and it would be reasonable to explain the discrepancies on the 
basis that there was some unique circumstance at Sellafield of which science was not 
yet aware. However, in this case, although it was accepted that the PPI hypothesis was 
not impossible, science had yet to establish a plausible causal mechanism by which 
this process could take place. Although French J. accepted that a causal relationship 
could not be excluded on mechanistic grounds, given the fact that the results of the 
Gardner study were entirely inconsistent with other studies, it would be necessary to 
show that a causal relationship was more than a theoretical possibility: 
"These witnesses command great respect. In my judgment they do 
indeed show that a causal relationship between PPI and leukaemia in 
F. 1 [immediate offspring] should not be excluded on purely 
mechanistic grounds, though, clearly, a great deal more research is 
32 [1994] Env L. R. 320, at p. 351. 
33 Ibid., at p. 365. 
34 Ibid. The Drosophila studies exposed mice to radiation with a view to determining the effect on 
offspring. 35 Ibid., at p. 361-363. These included studies into the children of Canadian uranium miners 
(McLaughlin); Dounreay employees (COMARE, 1988, and Urquhart, 1991); Sellafield employees in 
Gateshead and North Humberside (McKinney, 1991) ; patients exposed to diagnostic radiation 
i. e. 
X-rays (Graham, 1966 and Shu, 1988). 
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necessary. What they do not do in my judgment, is to show that, in the 
light of current knowledge, the Seascale cluster is capable of being 
explained numerically by the biological mechanisms which are the 
subject matter of their research. "36 
The plaintiffs argued that the discrepancies between the findings of the Gardner study 
and the various other studies, in particular the Japanese A-bomb studies, were 
attributable to unique environmental circumstances in the Sellafield area which were 
not replicated elsewhere. In particular, they referred to the fact that the PPI may have 
synergized with radiation from other sources. This would provide the `second hit' 
necessary to trigger the cancer. At an early stage in his judgment, French J. dismissed 
the argument that radiation in the vicinity of Sellafield was augmented significantly by 
emissions of uranium oxide into the atmosphere. The plaintiffs had originally claimed 
that some 400 kilograms of uranium oxide had been released into the atmosphere 
whereas the defendants claimed that only 15-20 kilograms had in fact been released. 
Weighty scientific reports were adduced in support of this conclusion. In the event, the 
plaintiffs elected not to challenge the evidence on scientific grounds in the interests of 
saving time and money. Instead, they sought to cast doubt on the reliability of the 
witnesses produced to support BNFL's estimates regarding uranium dioxide emissions. 
For example, counsel for the plaintiffs suggested that the National Radiological 
Protection Board, which had produced a report which supported BNFL's figures, had 
not acted with impartiality. Based on the impression he had gained of the witnesses 
whilst they were under cross examination, French J. stated that he could find no reason 
to doubt their reliability37. 
The plaintiffs appeared to concede this point. However, they argued that it was 
irrelevant whether the `second hit' was caused by uranium oxide or background 
radiation from other sources. The fact that rates of genetic mutation in the sperm were 
much higher than those detected in other studies indicated that it was reasonable to 
assume that PPI had synergized with some other element which was not present in, for 
example, the A-bomb studies. If this was the case, the material contribution test would 
be satisfied in that it would have been shown that the PPI was instrumental in creating 
the conditions necessary for cancer to develop. However, French J. also rejected this 
argument on the grounds that it was highly speculative and presupposed the 
phenomena which it sought to explain, namely, why the genetic mutation rates 
36 Ibid., at p. 367. 
37 Ibid., at p. 334. 
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indicated by the Gardner study were so much higher than those indicated by other 
studies38. 
In summary, although French J. accepted that the Gardner study fulfilled the first 
Bradford-Hill criterion (strength of the association found by the study) in that it 
indicated "an arithmetically strong prima facie association"39 this was not in itself 
sufficient to discharge the burden of proof. The judge was persuaded by various 
studies which demonstrated that the existence of a cancer cluster was not in itself 
evidence of a common cause40. As a result, it would be necessary to fulfil other 
Bradford-Hill criteria in order to establish causation on a balance of probabilities. In 
this case, the criteria of consistency and biological plausibility proved to be decisive; 
for the reasons set out above the Gardner study was found to fail both these tests. 
French J. has been criticized in this case for placing too much emphasis on the need to 
establish a plausible biological explanation for the harm41. The common sense 
approach would suggest that, once it has been established that there is a strong 
association between the incidence of a disease and the potential source of the harm, it 
is not necessary to identify the precise scientific chain of events between the source of 
the harm and its impact. Holder argues that there is established authority for such a 
common sense approach: 
"A review of the case law suggests that the higher courts have not found 
an absence of a scientific explanation of the causal mechanism 
underlying an association fatal to a plaintiff's claim once the 
association has been prima facie proven. Pugh and Day42 describe this 
as `the use of common sense to fill gaps where scientific understanding 
is incomplete' and consider that the approach `has a perfectly 
respectable legal pedigree. "'43 
Support for this contention is drawn from obiter comments made by Lord Bridge in 
Wilsher where he accepted that it is not necessary to prove causation scientifically, 
38 Ibid., at p. 366. 
Ibid., at p. 361. 
40 Ibid., at pp. 356-359. Cancer clusters can be produced by unusual demographic circumstances and 
population mixing, particularly where a rural community is subject to an influx of people as a result of the 
establishment of an industry in the vicinity. The judge was particularly persuaded 
by the Kinlen study 
which suggested that a leukaemia cluster in the vicinity of the Dounreay nuclear re-processing plant was 
attributable to this phenomena rather than PPI. 
41 See Wilkinson, D., "Reay and Hope v. British Nuclear Fuels Plc. ", (1994) Water Law, 22. 
42 Pugh and Day, (1992) Toxic Torts, p. 52. 
43 Holder, J., "Causation in Environmental Law", (1994) 47(2) Current Legal Problems 287, at p. 299. 
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"... where the layman is told by the doctors that the longer the brick dust 
remains on the body, the greater the risk of dermatitis, although the doctors cannot identify the process of causation scientifically, there 
seems to be nothing irrational in drawing the inference as a matter of 
common sense, that the consecutive periods when brick dust remained 
on the body probably contributed cumulatively to the causation of the dermatitis. I believe that a process of inferential reasoning on these 
general lines underlies the decision of the majority in McGhee. "44 
As an example of the application of this approach in an environmental context Holder 
cites the Irish case of Hanrahan v. Merck Sharp and Dohme45 in which the plaintiffs 
alleged that a chemical factory built just one mile from their farm had injured the 
health of their cattle and had caused crop damage. It was not possible to establish a 
scientific causal link between the chemical plant and the loss sustained by the 
plaintiffs. However, given the fact that the loss occurred within a relatively short time 
of the plant opening and given the fact that there was no other plausible explanation, 
the court was prepared to infer that the harm was due to emissions emanating from the 
plant. Henchy J. stated that to insist upon scientific certainty in establishing causation, 
"... would be to allow scientific theorising to dethrone fact to dispose of 
this claim by saying. . that there was `virtually no evidence in this case 
of injury to human beings or animals which has been scientifically 
linked to any chemicals emanating from the defendant's factory'... the 
most credible explanation offered for the ailments and abnormalities in 
the cattle was the toxic emissions from the factory. "46 
However, these cases concerned instances where the identity of the causal agent was 
not in doubt. Thus the courts were prepared to infer that there was a causal link 
between the actions of the defendant and the harm suffered by the plaintiff. As 
explained above, the Wilsher decision arrested the development of a general principle, 
whereby, it would suffice to show that the defendant's actions materially increased the 
risk; this was limited to the circumstances of McGhee. In the Reay and Hope case 
there was more than one possible source of radiation. According to the approach 
demanded by the Wilsher decision, where there is more than one possible causal agent, 
attention is inevitably focused on establishing whether there is a viable scientific 
explanation for the mechanism by which a harmful substance reaches and affects the 
receiving media. The reason for this can be explained as follows. Where there is no 
44 [1988] W. L. R. 557, at p. 567. 
45 [1988] I. R. 629. 
46 Ibid., at p. 645. 
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viable alternative causal agent involved, it is unnecessary to establish the precise 
causal mechanism between the source of the harm and the point of impact. Although 
possible explanations cannot be proved or may even seem improbable in the light of 
current scientific knowledge, the fact that there is a strong association between the 
harm and the defendant's activities would suggest that this was in fact the damage 
pathway which the substance actually followed. However, where there is more than 
one possible causal agent involved, it is necessary to enquire more closely into 
possible causal mechanisms in order to ascertain which of the potential causal agents 
could have led most easily to the harn in question. 
To sum up, although the defendant's activity may have increased the risk of the harm 
occurring, it may be impossible to ascertain whether it actually contributed to the 
harm in a particular case. Since Lord Bridge in Wilsher separated the concept of 
materially increasing risk from material contribution and limited the former to 
circumstances in which the identity of the causal agent is not in doubt, it seems that it 
will not suffice to show that an activity materially increased the risk for the purpose of 
discharging the burden of causation. Thus, as Wilkinson47 notes, according to the law 
as it stands, it would not have been appropriate for the judge in Reay and Hope to infer 
that there must have been a causal link between PPI and cancer on the basis of the 
Sellafield clusters. Holder counters that it is possible to distinguish Reay and Hope 
from Wilsher on the basis that the alternative causes in Wilsher were capable of 
causing the harn independently whereas in Reay and Hope it was likely that the 
alternative causes would act cumulatively or synergistically48. Thus, it would be 
reasonable to infer that the defendant's activity must have contributed in some way to 
the harm. 
The problem with this argument is that substances which are capable of acting in 
synergy with other substances may also be capable of acting independently. In Reay 
and Hope French J. could not see any reason why the cancers may not have been 
entirely due to the alternative causes which the plaintiffs postulated synergized with 
PPI in a manner which triggered the development of the cancers: 
"It [the synergy theory] does not demonstrate the necessity for an 
underlying radiation induced mutation transmitted by fathers with 
which `factor X' can synergise or co-operate to induce leukaemia in 
children; why should factor X not operate on its own? "49 
487 Op. cit. 
4 
48 Op. cit., at p. 302. 
[1994] Env. L. R. 320 at p. 366. 
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3.4 Main Issues Associated With Establishing Causation for Environmental 
Damage 
Cases such as Reay and Hope demonstrate that it can be extremely difficult to 
establish causation in cases involving environmental damage. The cases referred to 
above suggest that these difficulties are mainly attributable to the House of Lords' 
narrow interpretation of the material contribution test and the burden of proof placed 
on the defendant. 
3.4.1 Limitations of the Material Contribution Test. 
From an environmental perspective it is unfortunate that the House of Lords chose not 
to extend the principle, first suggested by Lord Reid in Wardlaw, that it would suffice 
to show that an activity materially increased the risk of the harm occurring. As noted 
above, Forbes J. in Graham and Graham applied the risk formulation of the test, 
however, it seems that the judge may have erred in law on this point. Had the Grahams 
won, it is likely that the case would have been appealed on this issue. Thus, where 
there is more than one possible causal agent for the harm, the material contribution 
test may still place a heavy evidential burden on the plaintiff. In the case of a pollutant 
such as radiation, it may be possible to do no more than to establish that an activity 
increased the risk of the harm occurring. This is because it is impossible to distinguish 
radiation emanating from a nuclear facility from background radiation. 
Price50 points out that, although the House of Lords have precluded establishing 
causation on the basis of a material increase in risk in cases where it is well 
established that the alternative cause is capable of causing the harm in its own right, it 
has not closed the door on the use of purely statistical evidence where this may be the 
only means of establishing a causal link. In Hotson v. East Berkshire Area Health 
Authority Lord Bridge said: 
"In some cases, perhaps particularly medical negligence cases, 
causation may be so shrouded in mystery that the court can only 
measure statistical chances. But that was not so here. On the evidence 
there was a clear conflict as to what had caused the avascular 
necrosis. "51 
50 Price, D. P. T., "Causation - the Lords' lost chance? ", (1989), 38 (4) International Comparative 
. 
Law Quarterly 735, at p. 753. 
[1987] 2 All E. R. 9009, at p. 913. 
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In Wilsher Lord Bridge did not pursue this theme or attempt to clarify the 
circumstances in which a plaintiff would be able to rely on purely statistical evidence 
capable of establishing an increase in risk. Thus, as Price52 argues, in the Wilsher 
decision the House of Lords missed an opportunity to expand the material contribution 
test so as to enable it to accommodate modern scientific techniques for establishing 
causation. 
The law of causation is governed by policy as much as by logic; Clerk and Lindsell 
states, "[t]he `but for' test is only a rough guide, since policy and common sense 
sometimes dictate departures from it. "53 The decision of the House of Lords in 
McGhee to relax the burden of causation so as to enable the employee to recover 
damages on the basis of an increase in risk may have been motivated by policy 
considerations rather than logic. In that case, Lord Wilberforce described the inference 
which Lord Reid drew to bridge the evidential gap as "something of a fiction"54 in that 
"it was expressly this inference which the medical expert declined to make. "55 
Furthermore, it will be recalled that in his dissenting judgment in the Court of Appeal 
decision in Wilsher, Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V. -C. referred to the fact that he 
could "see the common sense, if not the logic"56 of the approach adopted by the 
majority in McGhee. Nevertheless, Lord Wilberforce was clearly of the opinion that 
there were powerful policy reasons for finding in favour of the plaintiff in McGhee: 
"[I]f one asks which of the parties, the workman or the employers, 
should suffer from this inherent evidential difficulty, the answer as a 
matter of policy or justice should be that it is the creator of the risk 
who, ex hypothesi, must be taken to have foreseen the possibility of 
damage, who should bear its consequences. "57 
Holder is of the opinion that the Reay and Hope decision must be viewed in the 
general context of energy policy. She considers that it is particularly significant that 
Thorp's licence of operation at Sellafield was granted just weeks after the judgment: 
"[A]rguably, success for the plaintiffs on grounds that radiation 
emissions from Sellafield had caused, or materially contributed to, 
53 0p. cit. 
Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (15th ed., 1982), chap. 11, para. 11-41. 
54 [1972] 3 All E. R. 1008, at p. 1013. 
5 Ibid. 
56 [1987] Q. B. 730, at p. 779. 
57 [1972] 3 All E. R. 1008, at 1012. 
62 
The Current Limitations of Tort as a Means of Environmental Protection 
childhood cancers in the surrounding villages would have rendered 
Thorp politically untenable"58. 
Adjusting the standard of proof on a case by case basis in order to accommodate policy 
considerations can lead to a great deal of uncertainty. This is clearly demonstrated by 
the confusion to which the material contribution test has given rise. It is possibly for 
this reason that Lord Wilberforce appears to have been favour of a more systematic 
approach to relieving the burden of proof on causation. As will be seen below, his 
Lordship was of the view that the burden should be effectively reversed in certain 
circumstances. 
3.4.2 The Burden of Proof 
The demands of establishing causation in a case as complex as Reay and Hope places 
a heavy evidential burden on the plaintiff. In the light of the Wilsher decision, 
Meeran59 expressed concern that the courts would call for scientific certainty of a 
causal link rather than deciding the matter on the basis of a balance of probabilities. 
The two standards are incompatible in that scientific proof demands 95% certainty 
whereas the balance of probabilities test only requires the court to be more than 50% 
sure that the defendant is liable. However, this is somewhat of an over simplification 
of the problem. 
The principal function of the court is to make a determination, on a balance of 
probabilities, on the issue of whether the defendant was responsible for the harm. 
However, in making this determination the court must assume that certain processes 
are possible as a matter of scientific fact and in making these assumptions the court 
must be guided by scientific evidence. In certain cases there may be a scientific 
consensus that A is capable of causing B; for example, in McGhee there was no doubt 
that prolonged contact with brick dust could cause dermatitis. Where there is scientific 
disagreement matters are rather more complex, however, the court is not the 
appropriate forum for settling theoretical scientific disputes. Thus, when confronted 
with two conflicting theories the court must decide which it prefers. In making this 
determination it would be folly for the court to attempt to reach a definitive conclusion 
as to which theory is correct. Instead it must apply general criteria such as the weight 
of support attached to one theory, the scale of the study and so forth. In this respect, 
the court relies very heavily on expert testimony regarding whether a theory satisfies 
the scientific burden of proof. Thus, in this sense Meeran is correct when he argues 
58 Op. cit., at pp. 308-309. 
58 Op. cit. 
63 
The Current Limitations of Tort as a Means of Environmental Protection 
that the courts are concerned with scientific certainty rather than a balance of 
probabilities. However, once the court has accepted that a phenomenon is possible as a 
matter of scientific fact, it must then decide whether the phenomenon was responsible 
in an individual case. The court must make this latter determination in accordance 
with the balance of probabilities test. 
The problem with this approach is that, as the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, where 
scientific arguments are finely balanced the court will usually give the benefit of the 
doubt to the defendant. As Holder notes60, the judge in Reay and Hope was 
remarkably uncritical of evidence adduced by BNFL regarding levels of uranium 
dioxide emitted from its Sellafield installations. This is despite the fact that estimates 
have been revised upwards on a regular basis by relatively large amounts61. As noted 
above, the plaintiffs gave way on this point by electing not to produce detailed 
scientific evidence in support of their own estimates62. A clearer example, noted by 
Holder, of the judge erring in favour of the defence where scientific arguments were 
finely balanced concerns the issue of whether or not leukaemia and lymphoma should 
be treated as the same diseases. In making this determination the judge stated: 
"The evidence on either side [whether lymphoma and leukaemia are to 
be treated as the same disease] ... was so evenly 
balanced that the 
question remains an open question. It may well be that advances in 
scientific knowledge will enable a definite answer to be given in the 
future..., but, as matters stand, I can only say that I am not satisfied that 
leukaemia and lymphoma are properly to be regarded as a single 
disease for the purposes of this case. "63 
This cast doubt on the methodology of the Gardner study in that it undermined the 
numerical association established between Sellafield workers and the cancers suffered 
by their offspring; this dealt a severe blow to the plaintiffs' case: 
60 Op. cit., at p. 292-293. 
Ibid. Estimates were increased from 100 grammes to 15-20 kilogrammes over a ten year period 
preceding the case. 
o2 Counsel for the plaintiffs (Mr. Hytner) appeared to be of the opinion that to pursue this issue in this 
case would overburden the court and draw the case out unduly. As the issue was ancillary in this matter 
it 
was left on one side. However, towards the end of his judgment French J. referred to the fact that 
Mr. 
Hytner had not conceded the figures and might pursue the issue again in cases pending. See [1994]Env. 
L. R. 320, at p. 370. 
63 [1994] Env. L. R. 320 at 369. 
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"If NHL [lymphoma] be considered on its own there is virtually no 
evidence to suggest, let alone prove, an association, certainly not a 
causal association between PPI and [lymphoma]. "64 
Had French J. found that the phenomenon of PPI was prevalent in the Seascale area 
and that lymphoma and leukaemia could be regarded as the same he would have been 
faced with the task of deciding whether the plaintiffs in this particular case were 
victims of PPI. It seems clear that he would have made this determination on the basis 
of a balance of probabilities. For example, the judge would have been prepared to find 
that Vivien Hope's lymphoma was due to PPI on the basis that she was part of the 
excess of cases detected in the Seascale area: 
"... had I been satisfied that NHL was properly to be considered as a 
form of leukaemia and had I been satisfied that PPI did cause or 
contribute to the Seascale excess, including NHL, I would have found 
that Vivien Hope was part of that excess and her claim, on those 
hypotheses, would have succeeded. "65 
In the light of the precautionary principle, which shall be encountered in subsequent 
chapters, it may be inappropriate to place such a heavy evidential burden on the 
plaintiff. Reversal of the burden of causation in such matters would, perhaps, persuade 
the court to give the benefit of the doubt to the plaintiff in cases where scientific 
arguments are finely balanced. At common law it is only possible to reverse the burden 
of proof under res ipsa loquitur where there is no doubt that the defendant was 
responsible for the harm and the only issue concerns whether he was at fault66 
Judicial attempts to reverse the burden of proof in cases where causation has been an 
issue have failed. For example, in Vyner v. Waldenberg Bros. 67 Scott L. J. proposed 
that, where there had been a breach of statutory duty, the defendant would have the 
burden of establishing that the breach of duty did not contribute to the plaintiff's loss. 
However, this approach was declared to be erroneous by the House of Lords in 
Wardlaw. In McGhee, Lord Wilberforce attempted to resurrect the principle and 
argued that, 
"... it is sound principle that where a person has, by breach of duty of 
care, created a risk, and injury occurs within the area of risk, the loss 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., at p. 370. 
It is an essential requirement that the harm resulted from a happening which was under the control of 
the defendant. See, for example, Easson v. L. N. E. Ry. [1944] 2 K. B. 421. If there is doubt regarding the 
cause of the harm res ipsa loquitur cannot apply in that there is no certainty that the harm resulted from a 
matter over which the defendant had control. 67 [1946] K. B. 50. 
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should be borne by him unless he shows that it had some other 
cause. "68 
Once again, this approach was rejected by the House of Lords in Wilsher where Lord 
Reid dismissed Lord Wilberforce's comments as a minority view for which he could 
find no support in the judgments of the majority69. For the moment at least, it seems 
there is no prospect of the common law developing any new rules to relieve the burden 
of causation placed on the defendant in cases where there is more than one possible 
causal agent. 
4. STANDING 
Locus standi to pursue an action in tort is limited to those who have suffered some 
form of loss such as property damage and personal injury, or, an interference with the 
rights and benefits which flow from an interest in land. Thus, in negligence, damages 
may only be recovered by the individual or legal person who has sustained the loss or, 
in the case of fatal accidents, dependants. 
As regards nuisance, it is well established that a person must have an interest in 
land70; whilst this encompasses freehold estates and tenancies it does not encompass 
bare licences or a mere permission to reside in a certain property. The usual case cited 
in support of this proposition is Malone v. Lasky in which the plaintiffs occupied a 
house as licensees of the husband's employers who owned the property. The wife was 
injured when vibrations emanating from an engine operated in the defendant's 
property dislodged a bracket which struck her on the head. Sir Gorell Barnes stated 
that: 
"Many cases were cited in the course of the argument in which it had 
been held that actions for nuisance could be maintained where a 
person's rights of property had been affected by the nuisance, but no 
authority was cited, nor in my opinion can any principle of law be 
formulated, to the effect that a person who has no interest in property, 
no right of occupation in the proper sense of the term, can maintain an 
action for nuisance arising from the vibration caused by the working of 
an engine in an adjoining house. On that point, therefore, I think that 
68 [1972] 3 All E. R. 1008, at p. 1012. 
69 [1988] 1 A. C. 1074 at p. 1087F-G. 
70 See, for example, Read v. Lyons & Co. Ltd [1947] A. C. 156, "He alone has a lawful claim who has 
suffered an invasion of some proprietary or other interest in land", per Lord Simonds at p. 183. 
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the plaintiff fails, and that she has no cause of action in respect of the 
alleged nuisance. "71 
The only known exceptions to this general principle concern certain cases in which the 
plaintiff enjoys exclusive possession of the property although he may not be able to 
prove title to the land72. The House of Lords reaffirmed this interpretation of the law 
in the recent case of Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd73 which concerned actions in 
nuisance relating to interferences with television signals and dust and noise caused by 
the construction of the Canary Wharf building. As many of the plaintiffs had no 
interest in the houses affected other than the householders' permission to reside in the 
properties, one of the issues which fell to be determined concerned whether their 
interest in the matter would suffice to sustain an action in nuisance. Lord Goff74 was 
impressed by Professor Newark's seminal article on the origins of nuisance75 in which 
it was emphasised that nuisance arose as a means of protecting certain rights flowing 
from proprietary interests in land. Professor Newark's historical analysis led him to 
the conclusion that, in order to found an action in nuisance, it is necessary to establish 
an interference with a right which flows from a legal interest in the property: 
"In true cases of nuisance the interest of the plaintiff which is invaded 
is not the interest of bodily security but the interest of liberty to exercise 
rights over land in the amplest manner. A sulphurous chimney in a 
residential area is not a nuisance because it makes householders cough 
and splutter but because it prevents them taking their ease in their 
gardens. It is for this reason that the plaintiff in an action for nuisance 
must show some title to realty. "76 
Lord Goff noted that various courts, both in the UK and the Commonwealth, had 
attempted at various times to relax this standing requirement in order to allow those 
with lesser interests in property to pursue actions in nuisance77. These authorities led 
71 [1907] 2 K. B. 141, at p. 151. 
72 This is because jus tertii is no defence to an action in nuisance. See Foster v. Warblington Urban 
District Council [1906] 1 K. B. 648. 
73 [1997] 2 W. L. R. 684, at p. 693B-C, per Lord Goff. 
74 Ibid., at p. 691D-H. 
75 Newark, "The Boundaries of Nuisance" (1949) 65 Law Quarterly Review 480. See Chapter 1, above. 
76 Ibid., at pp. 488-89. 77 See Motherwell v. Motherwell (1976) 73 D. L. R (3d) 62 and Khorasandjian v. Bush [1993] Q. B. 727. 
In both these cases family members sought injunctions in order to prohibit the continuance of harassing 
telephone calls. The judgments cited the case of Foster v. Warblington Urban District Council, above,, 
which provided that it would suffice to show `occupancy of a substantial nature' as authority for the 
proposition that close family members with no title to the realty would be in a position to obtain 
injunctive relief. Lord Goff dismissed this approach on the grounds that it misconstrued the Foster 
decision (presumably on the grounds that the case was solely concerned with the issue of jus tertii and 
should not be treated as a general proposition) and constituted an attempt to establish a tort of 
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the Court of Appeal, below78, to conclude that it would suffice to show that an 
individual enjoyed a `substantial interest' in property. However, his Lordship 
emphatically rejected this approach on the grounds that it would effectively sever 
nuisance from the law of property and could conceivably lead to a situation in which, 
for example, employees could sustain actions in nuisance in respect of discomforts 
endured at their place of work. This would eviscerate the rationale of the tort and 
would: 
"[T]ransform it from a tort to land into a tort to the person, in which 
damages could be recovered in respect of something less serious than 
personal injury and the criteria for liability were founded not upon 
negligence but upon striking a balance between the interests of 
neighbours in the use of their land. "79 
Trespass to land also constitutes a tort which is concerned with the protection of 
rights in property, namely exclusive possession. Generally speaking, the person who 
enjoys exclusive possession of a parcel of land may rely upon the tort in order to 
exclude others80. This is not necessarily the owner of the property, where there is a 
tenancy agreement (as opposed to a licence) the right to exclusive possession will vest 
in the tenant for the duration of the agreements 1. In common with nuisance, a person 
who cannot prove that he has title to the property may nevertheless rely upon the tort 
until another person can establish a better title82. 
Thus, from an environmental perspective, a major draw-back of tort is that it cannot be 
used in order to protect the environment in its own right, liability is contingent upon 
damage coinciding with loss suffered by an individual. Of course, even where 
environmental damage does coincide with such loss, there is no guarantee that the 
individual concerned would choose to pursue the matter. For example, where an area 
of waste land is owned by a distant property developer, he may have no interest in the 
property until the time comes to develop it; this could be a matter of years. In the mean 
time the site could become an unofficial waste dump which would render it vulnerable 
to contamination by all manner of polluting substances; in order to deal with 
harassment "via the back door". There was no need to develop the law in this way following the 
enactment of the Harassment Act 1997. See Lord Goff, [1997] 2 W. L. R. 684, at pp. 693-695. 
78 Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd. [1996] 1 All E. R. 482 (C. A. ), at pp. 494-498. 
79 [1997] 2 W. L. R. 684, at p. 696F-G. 
80 See, for example, Radaich v. Smith (1959) 101 C. L. R. 209, at p. 222, per Windeyer J. 
81 The issue of whether an agreement constitutes a licence or a tenancy must be determined by reference 
to the substance of the agreement, not merely the label attached to it. See Street v. Mountford [1985] 
A. C. 809. 
82 Jones v. Chapman (1849) 2 Exch. 803. 
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situations such as this it has been necessary to develop regulatory responses83. 
Alternatively, the individual concerned may be willing to institute civil proceedings 
but may lack the necessary resources. 
Unless non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as environmental pressure 
groups, are afforded standing to act on behalf of the environment as a separate entity 
from the various private interests which vest in it, the role of tort in an environmental 
context will continue to be extremely limited. However, at present, there does not 
appear to be any prospect of the courts extending standing in this manner. As Jocob 
states: 
"It should perhaps be emphasised that at present there is no perceptible 
move in England for enlarging the representative or class action e. g.,, to 
cover consumer claims, to enforce civil rights, or to obtain protection 
against environmental pollution. Access to justice in these areas must 
await a dramatic change of climate in civil procedural law in 
England. "84 
This contrasts with developments in the field of public law where NGOs have made 
significant progress in establishing locus standi in judicial review proceedings. In R v. 
Pollution Inspectorate ex parte Greenpeace (No 2)85 Greenpeace sought to challenge 
a decision by the regulatory authority to vary authorisations relating to the operation of 
the Thorp nuclear re-processing plant so as to enable British Nuclear Fuels plc to test a 
new facility at the site prior to the granting of new authorisations. BNFL argued that 
Greenpeace did not have a sufficient interest in the matter to be afforded locus standi 
to challenge the decision86. Otton J. stated that the issue of locus standi in judicial 
review proceedings was primarily a matter for the discretion of the court to be 
determined on a case by case basis87. Thus it was necessary to consider the nature of 
83 Local authorities are granted certain powers to carry out remediation works in default and to recover 
costs from the polluter or owner or occupier of the site. See, for example, Environmental Protection Act 
ss. 79-80; Town and Country Planning Act s. 215; Water Resources Act s. 161. 84 Jacob, I. H., "Access to Justice in England" in Mauro Capelletti and Bryant Garth, eds., Access to 
Justice -A World Survey, vol. I, book I, 1978, Alphen aan den Rhijn/Milan, at pp. 417,471. 85 [1994] 4 All E. R. 329. 
6 Section 31(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 provides: "No application for judicial review shall be 
made unless the leave of the High Court has been obtained in accordance with rules of court; and the 
court shall not grant leave to make such an application unless it considers that the applicant has a 
sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates. " RSC Ord 53, r3 (7) provides: The 
court shall not grant leave unless it considers that the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to 
which the application relates. 87 [1994] 4 All E. R. 329, at p. 349h. 
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the organisation and the extent of its interest in the matter; Otton J. was satisfied that 
Greenpeace met these criteria: 
"BNFL rightly acknowledges the national and international standing of 
Greenpeace and its integrity. So must I. I have not the slightest 
reservation that Greenpeace is an entirely responsible and respected 
body with a genuine concern for the environment. That concern 
naturally leads to a bona fide interest in the activities carried on by 
BNFL at Sellafield and in particular the discharge and disposal of 
radioactive waste from its premises and to which the respondent's 
decision to vary relates. The fact that there are 400,000 supporters in 
the United Kingdom carries less weight than the fact that 2,500 of them 
come from the Cumbria region. I would be ignoring the blindingly 
obvious if I were to disregard the fact that those persons are inevitably 
concerned about (and have a genuine perception that there is) a danger 
to their health and safety from any additional discharge of radioactive 
waste even from testing. I have no doubt that the issues raised by this 
application are serious and worthy of determination by this court. "88 
However, further comments by Otton J. suggest that a general interest in the 
environment will not suffice89; it is necessary to establish a special and long standing 
interest in the matter90. Furthermore, it seems that the applicant must have played an 
active role in the specific matter to which the application relates. This is illustrated by 
the case of R. v. Poole Borough Council ex parte Beebee91 in which the applicants 
sought to challenge the decision of a local authority to grant itself planning permission 
in respect of an area of heath land which had been designated as a site of special 
scientific interest (SSSI). The applicants represented the British Herpetological Society 
(BHS) and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). Schiemann J. had no doubt that BHS had 
a sufficient interest in the matter due to conservation work it had carried out at the site 
over many years. Of particular significance was the fact that the local authority had 
included a condition in the consent which required BHS to be given one year's notice 
of the commencement of any development works in order to enable them to relocate 
rare species known to inhabit the site92. Despite the fact that WWF had been involved 
in conservation work at the site for fifteen years and had made several grants to BHS 
88 Ibid., at p. 350b-d. 
Ibid., at p. 351f. 90 Ibid., at p. 351g-h. It was on this basis that Otton J. distinguished the case of R v. Secretary of State 
for the Environment ex parte Rose Theatre Trust Co [1990] 1 All E. R. 754 in which the named charity 
was denied standing to challenge the grant of a planning consent in respect of a historic site which it was 
hoping to save from development. The charity had been formed for the sole purpose of saving the site 
and could not, therefore, be said to have had a long standing interest in the matter. 
92 [1991] 2 P. L. R. 27. 
Ibid., at p. 29E-G. 
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Schiemann J. considered that it would not have enjoyed standing in its own right. This 
was because it had not been sufficiently involved in the specific planning decision 
which formed the basis of the application and had only joined in the proceedings at a 
late stage upon giving an undertaking to pay the respondent's costs in the event of the 
applicants being required to do so93 
To date, this distinction between standing requirements in the respective realms of 
public and private law has been explicable on the basis that, in judicial review 
proceedings, there is usually a clear public interest issue at stake. Thus it is logical to 
afford standing to those groups which are concerned with the protection of such 
interests. The law of tort, on the other hand, is preoccupied with the protection of 
private interests. However, in an environmental context, this distinction between the 
realms of public and private law is somewhat of a fiction, as Betlem explains: 
"[M]ost legal systems purport to allocate general interests to the field of 
public law and limit private law to concrete, individual interests. 
However, this distinction breaks down in environmental law in that 
diffuse environmental damage is closely related to individual health 
interests, which are, of course, typical concrete private interests. 
Accordingly, private law remedies should be available alongside public 
law remedies such as judicial review. "94 
As will be seen in Chapter 4 there has been an attempt to blend public and private 
interests in this manner in the Netherlands where standing has in fact been extended to 
NGOs in respect of private actions in tort arising out of pollution. 
5. COMMON LAW REMEDIES 
A plaintiff will only go to the trouble of establishing a cause of action if he considers 
that an appropriate remedy is available. Common law remedies seek to compensate for 
any loss sustained, prevent future infringements of proprietary interests or rectify 
damage which has already occurred as a result of such infringements. This is achieved 
by means of the award of damages, the granting of various types of injunction, or the 
award of damages in lieu of an injunction. From an environmental perspective it is 
necessary to consider the extent to which these remedies coincide with environmental 
protection. 
93 Ibid., at p. 30B-C. 
94 Betlem, G., "Standing for Ecosystems - Going Dutch" [1995] Cambridge Law Journal 153, at p. 154. 
71 
The Current Limitations of Tort as a Means of Environmental Protection 
5.1 Damages 
The guiding principle for the measure of damages is restitutio integrum which means 
that, 
"Where an injury is to be compensated by damages, in settling the sum 
of money to be given for reparation of damages you should nearly as 
possible get at that sum of money which will put the party who has been 
injured, or who has suffered, in the same position as he would have 
been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting 
his compensation or reparation". 95 
Thus, in Marquis of Granby v. Bakewell U. D. C. 96, where the operator of a gas works 
had discharged poisonous effluent into a river over which the plaintiff had fishing 
rights, the compensation received equalled the cost of restocking the river in addition 
to an amount for the loss of food supply for other stocks. 
However, in many cases concerning damage to land or buildings, the cost of restoring 
the property to its exact former state may be out of all proportion to the diminution in 
market value of the property caused by the harm. In this case damages will be 
calculated on the basis of the diminution in market value. 97 In an environmental 
context this means that whilst damages may compensate for the financial loss suffered 
by the plaintiff, they may not reflect the full costs of cleaning up pollution. This 
problem is examined in more detail below. 
5.1.1 Exemplary Damages 
These are an exception to the restitutio in integrum maxim and allow for an award 
over and above the normal quantum of damages where the defendant's conduct was 
calculated to make a profit which would exceed any damages payable, or, where there 
has been oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by servants of the 
government. 98 
In Gibbons v. South West Water Services Ltd 99 the plaintiffs had successfully brought 
an action in public nuisance, negligence, Rylands v. Fletcher and breach of statutory 
duty following an incident where the plaintiff's contractor deposited 20 tonnes of 
95 Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co. (1880) 5 App. Cas. 25, at p. 39, per Lord Blackburn. 
96 (1923) 87 J. P. 105. 
97 Jones v. Gooday (1841) 8 M. & W. 
98 Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A. C. 1129. 
99 [1992] 4 All E. R. 574. 
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aluminium sulphate into the public water supply. The plaintiffs sought exemplary 
damages on the grounds that the defendants had attempted to conceal the incident. 
However, the Court of Appeal did not consider that this was part of a calculated 
attempt to gain some financial advantage by deliberately perpetuating the nuisance. 
The plaintiffs also attempted to justify the award of exemplary damages under the 
second limb of the exception, namely oppressive conduct by a government servant. 
This argument was also rejected on the grounds that a statutory undertaker is not part 
of the government. 100 
It seems that the courts intend to take a restrictive view of the grounds on which 
exemplary damages can be awarded. In the Gibbons case the Court of Appeal accepted 
that the defendant's conduct had been high handed but were not prepared to extend the 
restitutio exception so as to penalize this type of behaviour. 
5.1.2 Pure Economic Loss 
As a general rule, damages may only be recovered in respect of loss which flows 
directly from physical harm101 In the absence of a special relationship between the 
parties, pure economic loss is not recoverable102. Thus it is necessary to establish a 
high degree of proximity, usually brought about by some prior undertaking between 
the parties103, before damages for pure economic loss can be recovered. However, if 
this relationship is established by contract, the courts will not usually interfere with the 
apportionment of liability agreed between the parties as this would undermine the 
freedom to contract. 104 
The issue of economic loss is important in an environmental context in that the 
market value of property may be adversely affected by contamination, or even the 
possibility of contamination, by a pollutant. Diminution in market value will be 
classed as economic loss and hence irrecoverable unless it flows from actual physical 
damage to the property. This distinction is illustrated by two cases concerning claims 
for diminution in the market value of land alleged to have been caused by radioactive 
contamination. 
100 As Macrory, in "Damages in Nuisance", (1992) 214 ENDS Report 43 points out, the European 
Court of Justice would undoubtedly have classed the defendant as an emanation of the state as the 
incident occurred prior to privatisation. The status of privatised utilities is still not entirely clear. 
101 Sparton Steels and & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd. [1973] Q. B. 27. 
102 Hedley, Byrne v. Heller [1964] A. C. 465; Muirhead v. Industrial Tank Specialists [1986] Q. B. 507. 
103 Somewhat analogous to the prior undertaking which had to be established before a negligence based 
action in case could be brought in Medieval times. 
104 Simaan General Contracting Co. v. Pilkington Glass Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] Q. B. 758; Greater 
Nottingham Cooperative Ltd v. Cementation Piling and Foundations Ltd- [1989] Q. B. 71. 
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It will be recalled that in the aforementioned-mentioned case of Merlin v. BNFL the 
market value of the plaintiffs' property was dramatically reduced following publicity 
concerning levels of radiation in the immediate vicinity of the defendant's nuclear 
installation at Sellafield. It was alleged that there had been an escape of radionuclides 
from the installation in breach of the absolute duty imposed by section 7(1) of the 
Nuclear Installations Act 1965. Even if the plaintiffs had succeeded in establishing that 
emissions from Sellafield had increased levels of radiation in their property, it seems 
that the damages claimed would have been classed as economic and thus 
irrecoverable. The loss in market value claimed did not flow from any physical 
damage to the property itself; it had been the plaintiffs' contention that the alleged 
increased levels of radiation in the property constituted a health risk. Gatehouse J. was 
of the opinion that this did not constitute physical damage: 
"Personal injury or damage to property is a familiar enough phrase and 
in my judgment it means, as it does in other contexts, physical (or 
mental) injury or physical damage to tangible property ... 
The plaintiff's 
argument that `property' included the air space within the walls, 
ceilings and floors of (the house); that this has been damaged by the 
presence of radionuclides and the house rendered less valuable as the 
family's home, seems to me too far-fetched. " 105 
As the 1965 Act did not define `property damage' Gatehouse J. decided to apply the 
common law approach. This led him to the conclusion that, as the loss claimed was 
purely economic and as there was no special relationship or prior undertaking between 
the parties, damages would not have been recoverable in respect of the diminution in 
market value of the property: 
"I can see no reason why compensation under the Act of 1965 should 
extend to pure economic loss when such loss would not be recoverable 
at common law... No special relationship existed between the 
defendants and the plaintiffs, who were merely part of the general 
public living in the Sellafield area, such as would give rise to a duty of 
the Hedly Byrne & Co. Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] A. C. 465 
type, so it seems to me that any such claim at common law must have 
failed: see, for example, the judgments of the Court of Appeal and 
particularly Bingham L. J. in Simaan General Contracting Co. v. 
Pilkington Glass Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] Q. B. 758. "106 
105 [1990] 3 W. L. R. 383, at p. 394E-F. 
106 Ibid., at p. 395G-H. 
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The Merlin decision was distinguished in Blue Circle Industries Plc v. Ministry of 
Defence107. The plaintiffs owned a large estate which adjoined the Aldermaston 
Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE). As a result of heavy rainfall ponds on the 
AWE site overflowed onto the plaintiffs property thereby contaminating a small area 
with radioactive material. The contamination did not come to light until the plaintiffs 
were in negotiation for the sale of the site at a cost of approximately £10m. Following 
disclosure of the information the prospective purchaser withdrew from negotiations. 
The defendants accepted liability for the escape of radioactive materials and paid for 
the costs of removing the contaminated soil which amounted to £350,000. However, 
they refused to pay further costs in recognition of the diminution in market value of 
the land and the reduction of its saleability; the plaintiffs sought to recover these costs 
under section 12 of the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 and the rule in Rylands v. 
Fletcher. Carnwath J. reaffirmed that damage both for the purposes of the 1965 Act 
and the common law denotes physical damage to tangible property. Although the 
levels of radiation did not constitute a health risk the contamination nevertheless 
amounted to a physical change which impaired the use and hence value of the 
property. As radiation levels exceeded those permitted by regulation (Radioactive 
Substances Act 1960) the contaminated soil could not be left in situ108; thus the land 
was damaged in the sense that it could not be used for its original purpose until 
remediation measures had been taken109. Thus damages in respect of the diminution 
in market value of the property were not purely economic in that they flowed from 
physical damage. Accordingly, the plaintiffs were awarded damages amounting to the 
full clean up cost plus the income lost as a result of the failure to sell the property 
(subject to a 25% discount to reflect the possibility that the property might not have 
been sold in any case); this amounted to £5m. 
This case is significant in that it demonstrates that the ability of the plaintiff to recover 
damages in respect of contamination may depend upon how damage is defined. In the 
Blue Circle case physical damage was determined by reference to whether radiation 
levels exceeded regulatory standards. Had radiation levels not exceeded these 
standards it is likely that the loss would have been classed as purely economic. This is 
an issue which will be returned to in due course. 
107 [1997] 1 Env. L. R. 341. 
108 Ibid., at p. 346-347. 
109 Ibid. There was authority for the proposition that property which has been contaminated without 
physical alteration of its structure will be regarded as damaged in the sense that it cannot be used to its 
full extent until it has been cleaned; part of the value of property resides in its usability. See The Orjula 
[1995] 2 LI. L. R. 395 and Hunter v. LDDC [1996] 2 W. L. R. 348. 
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5.2 Injunctions 
These are discretionary remedies originating from the equitable jurisdiction of 
Chancery. They are most frequently granted in respect of continuing trespasses or 
nuisances although there is no theoretical reason why they should not be issued to 
restrain the continuation of any tort of any kind. As a discretionary remedy the courts 
are free to take into account a range of factors including the seriousness of the harm 
and the effect the granting of the injunction would have on the plaintiff. Turner L. J. 
summed up the manner in which courts should approach the use of injunctions in 
Goldsmith v. Tunbridge Wells Improvement Commissioners: 
"It is not in every case of nuisance that this Court should interfere. I 
think that it ought not to do so in cases in which the injury is merely 
temporary or trifling; but I think that it ought to do so in cases in which 
the injury is permanent and serious: and in determining whether the 
injury is serious or not, regard must be had to all the consequences 
which may flow from it. "110 
S. Z. 1 Prohibitory Injunctions 
These orders require the cessation of a continuing tortious activity and are thereby 
closely associated with the restoration of proprietary interests; namely, the rights to use 
and enjoyment and exclusive possession. Hence it is not necessary to establish physical 
damage before such relief is granted. As the remedy is discretionary and requires the 
courts to consider all the consequences flowing from its use, it is inextricably linked 
with the land use conflict aspects of nuisance. This is because the courts must balance 
the harm suffered by the plaintiff against the consequences of requiring the defendant 
to cease the offending activity. It may often be the case that the nuisance can be abated 
without significant loss to the defendants 11. However, where prohibition of the activity 
would result in substantial loss to the defendant or even the closure of the defendant's 
plant, the court may be tempted to balance the utility of the defendant's activity 
against the usually conservatory land use interests of the plaintiff. In the past there has 
been strong judicial disapproval of this approach, for example, in Shelfer v. City of 
London Electric Lighting Co., Lindley L. J. stated: 
"The circumstance the wrongdoer is in some sense a public 
benefactor... [has never] been considered a sufficient reason for refusing 
110 (1866) 1 Ch. App. 349. 
As in the New Zealand case of Bank of New Zealand v. Greenwood [1984] 1 N. Z. L. R. 525 where it 
was held that the nuisance caused by the glare of the defendant's windows could be abated by the 
installation of blinds in the plaintiffs premises at the defendants' expense. 
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to protect by injunction an individual whose rights are being 
persistently infringed. Expropriation, even for a monetary 
consideration, is only justifiable if Parliament has sanctioned it,,. 112 
Thus, on occasion, the courts have been prepared to grant prohibitory injunctions at 
the expense of the defendant's business. Not least of these few examples is the case of 
St. Helens Smelting v. Tipping. The availability of damages in lieu of an injunction 
means that it is rare for courts to take this step with the result that the remedy is more 
readily available where the consequences are less drastic for the defendant. Ball and 
Bell cite the example of the Anglers' Co-operative which has a 100% success rate in 
obtaining injunctive relief to restrain the continuing pollution of rivers by trade 
effluent. 113 
5.2.2 Quid Timet Injunctions 
In exceptional cases, this type of injunction may be obtained, where, if allowed to 
continue, the defendant's conduct would inevitably result in harm to the plaintiff. To 
give a hypothetical example, if leaking barrels of chemicals were brought onto land 
adjacent to a waterway, a down catchment riparian landholder may be able to obtain 
an injunction requiring removal of the barrels before any of the chemicals seep into the 
waterway. In practice, plaintiffs have rarely been able to satisfy the court that the 
apprehended harm is imminente 14 with the result that the remedy has been little used. 
In any case, in the hypothetical example given above, it is unlikely the down 
catchment owner would be aware of the potential harm until it was too late. 
5.2.3 Mandatory Injunctions 
This type of injunction can be used to require the rectification of physical damage 
which has already occurred. In Redland Bricks Ltd. v. Morris Lord Upjohn set out the 
circumstances where the remedy should be used. Firstly, where damages would be an 
inadequate remedy; this may include situations in which the defendant is best placed 
to rectify the damage himself. For example, where a contractor has caused damage to 
neighbouring property during the course of operations and is still on site. In the 
Redland Bricks case there was an immediate threat of subsidence occurring on the 
plaintiff's land unless the defendant took preventative action. The second instance his 
Lord Upjohn gave of where the remedy should be used was in cases in which the 
defendant had attempted to steal a march on the plaintiff or the court. This would 
112 [1895] 1 Ch. 287, at pp. 315-316. 
Ball, S., and Bell, S., Environmental Law, 2nd. edn., 1994, Blackstone Press Ltd., at p. 166. 
114 Att. Gen. v. Nottingham Corporation [1904] 1 Ch. 673; Redland Bricks Ltd. v. Morris [1970] A. C. 
652. 
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include cases in which the defendant has hastened to complete an activity with a view 
to presenting the court with a fait accompli. As a final point, his Lordship stated that 
the injunction should specify the remedial works to be carried out as precisely as 
possible. 
Prima facie, this remedy would appear to provide the ideal means of requiring the 
defendant to rectify any lasting damage caused by pollution or to clean up types of 
pollution which accumulates without dispersing. This latter category would encompass 
contaminated land. However, it is necessary to take account of the decision in Jordon 
v. Norfolk County Council and another115 In this case, the defendants had purchased 
land for the purposes of development. They mistakenly believed that the parcel of land 
they had purchased included part of a disused railway embankment belonging to the 
plaintiff. Their contractors trespassed upon the land and chopped down all the trees 
which grew on it and dug a drain. The plaintiff obtained a mandatory injunction 
requiring the removal of the drain and the replacement of trees so far as was 
reasonably practicable and to the reasonable satisfaction of the plaintiff's experts. The 
plaintiffs expert devised a scheme of works which took no account of cost and was 
designed to restore the land to the exact state it had been in before the trespass. This 
entailed obtaining fully mature trees with a girth of 60 - 70 centimetres and 
transporting them to the site at huge expense and the installation of complex irrigation 
equipment whilst the trees became established. The estimated cost of the works came 
to £231,000; the diminution in the value of the land caused by the trespass had only 
been estimated at £25,000. The defendants sought to have the order set aside and 
replaced with a less ambitious scheme requiring replacement of the trees with younger 
trees at a cost of £ 12,000. It was argued that the phrase `reasonably practicable' 
embraced financial viability and not just that which was physically possible. 
It was held by Sir Donald Nicholls V. C. that the term `Reasonably practicable' 
embraced cost considerations and in determining costs regard should be had to the 
value of the land: 
"In determining what should be the extent of the tree, hedge and shrub 
replacement, the landscape architect should prescribe items in so far, 
but only in so far, as their cost would be reasonable, having regard to 
the nature and value of the site". 116 
1115 16 
[1994] 1 W. L. R. 1353. 
Ibid., at p. 1358B. 
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In this case the scheme, proposed by the plaintiff, cost several times the market value 
of the land even before taking into account the diminution in value brought about by 
the removal of the trees. Hence the scheme could not be regarded as meeting the 
`reasonably practicable criteria'. Thus, the approach adopted in this case mirrors the 
assessment of damages, whereby, the costs of remediation will not be awarded if they 
are out of proportion to the diminution in market value of the land. 
5.2.4 Damages in Lieu of an Injunction 
The power to grant damages in lieu of an injunction was first conferred on Chancery 
by Lord Cairn's Act of 1858 and is now vested in the High Court by virtue of section 
50 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. They differ from ordinary damages in that they 
may be granted in respect of future damage which may occur in the absence of an 
inj unction. 
The issue of when damages should be awarded in place of an injunction has given rise 
to much debate. The main problem is that the award of damages in lieu of an 
injunction amounts to a compulsory purchase of the plaintiffs rights to the 
undisturbed use and enjoyment or exclusive possession of his property. This is because 
the sum is regarded as being in full and final settlement of the dispute with the result 
that the plaintiff may not return to court on future occasions if the nuisance 
continues 117. Thus, unless the remedy is used with care, it can give rise to an extreme 
unfettered market philosophy which takes no account of externalities. The courts have 
been aware of this problem for some considerable time. In Shelfer v. City of London 
Electric Lighting Co., Lindley L. J. stated that, in granting Chancery the power to 
award damages in lieu of an injunction, the legislature had not: 
"Intended to turn the Court into a tribunal for legalising wrongful acts; 
or in other words, the Court has always protested against the notion that 
117 In fact this point has caused the courts some conceptual difficulties in the past. In Anchor Brewhouse 
Developments Ltd. v. Berkley House (Docklands Developments) Ltd. (1987) 38 B. L. R. 87 Scott J. 
considered that damages could not put the defendant in the same position as someone who enjoys an 
easement over the neighbouring property. Hence, in theory the plaintiff would be in a position to claim 
further damages on limitless future occasions for as long as the trespass (as it was in this case) continued. 
However, this view was firmly rejected by the Court of Appeal in Jaggard v. Sawyer [1995] 1 W. L. R. 
269. Millet L. J. dismissed Scott Is argument as "fallacious" on the grounds that, "... it is not the award of 
damages which has the practical effect of licensing the defendant to commit the wrong, but the refusal of 
injunctive relief. Thereafter the defendant may have no right to act in the manner complained of, but he 
cannot be prevented from doing so. The court can in my judgment properly award damages `once and for 
all' in respect of future wrongs which an injunction would have prevented. The doctrine of res judicata 
operates to prevent the plaintiff and his successors in title from bringing proceedings thereafter to recover 
even nominal damages in respect of further wrongs for which the plaintiff has been fully compensated. ", 
per Millett L. J. at 285H-286B. 
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it ought to allow a wrong to continue simply because the wrongdoer is 
able and willing to pay for the injury he may inflict". 118 
Despite this assertion, the courts sometimes calculate the quantum of damages on the 
basis of what the defendant would have had to pay the plaintiff for the right to 
continue the activity119. In view of Lindley L. J. 's caution, A. L. Smith L. J. (also in 
Shelfer) set out a number of guidelines for determining whether the court should 
exercise its discretion to grant damages in lieu: 
"(1) If the injury to the plaintiffs legal rights is small, (2) And is one 
which is capable of being estimated in money, (3) And is one which can 
be adequately compensated by a small money payment, (4) And the 
case is one in which it would be oppressive to the defendant to grant an 
injunction: - then damages in substitution for an injunction may be 
given" 120 
The court must take particular care when applying the `oppression' criteria; in Jaggard 
v. Sawyer Sir Thomas Bingham M. R. noted: 
"It is important to bear in mind that the test is one of oppression, and 
the court should not slide into application of a general balance of 
convenience test. "121 
This refers to the fact that, in deciding whether an injunction would be oppressive to 
the defendant, courts should not be drawn into consideration of the merits of the 
defendant's activity. In his dissenting judgment in Miller v. Jackson122, which 
concerned whether injunctive relief should be available in order to protect the plaintiff 
from cricket balls hit for six, Lord Denning M. R. was in favour of such a `public 
interest' approach: 
"In this case it is our task to balance the right of the cricket club to 
continue playing cricket on their cricket ground - as against the right of 
the householder not to be interfered with... The public interest lies in 
protecting the environment by preserving our playing fields in the face 
of mounting development, and by enabling our youth to enjoy all the 
benefits of outdoor games, such as cricket and football. The private 
1118 19 
[1895] 1 Ch. 287, at pp. 315-316. 
See, for example, Bracewell v. Appleby [1975] 1 Ch. 406: "... I think that for the purpose of 
estimating damages they and the other servient owners in Hill Road, albeit reluctant, must be treated as 
being willing to accept a fair price for the right of way in question... ", per Graham J. at p. 419G-H. 120 [1895] 1 Ch. 287, at pp. 322-323. 
121 
[1995] 1 W. L. R. 269, at p. 283B. 
[1977] 1 Q. B. 966. 
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interest lies in securing the privacy of his [the plaintiff's] home and 
garden without intrusion or interference by anyone... In a new situation like this, we have to think afresh as to how discretion should be 
exercised... Either the cricket club has to move: but goodness knows 
where. I do not suppose for a moment there is any field in Lintz to 
which they could move. Or Mrs Miller must move elsewhere. As 
between their conflicting interests, I am of [the] opinion that the public interest should prevail over the private interest. The cricket club should 
not be driven out-123. 
Cumming-Bruce L. J. found academic support for this view and quoted from Spry on 
Equitable Remedies (1971), p. 365: 
"Regard must be had `not only to the dry strict rights of the plaintiff and 
the defendant, bit also the surrounding circumstances, to the rights of 
interests of other persons which may be more or less involved. ' So it is 
that where the plaintiff has prima facie a right to specific relief, a court 
of equity will, if occasion should arise, weigh the disadvantage or 
hardship which he will suffer if relief were refused against any hardship 
or disadvantage which would be caused to third persons or to the public 
generally if relief were granted". 
This reasoning was applied at first instance in Kennaway v. Thompson 124 in which the 
plaintiff sought injunctive relief against a noise nuisance created by a power boat club 
which used a nearby lake: 
"The question remains as to whether I should grant an injunction. I have 
considered the question most carefully and as to whether damages in 
this case would meet the position - and substantial damages. I have 
come to the conclusion from what I have heard there is considerable 
public interest in this club, that the public do attend in large numbers 
and that it would be oppressive in all the circumstances to grant an 
injunction other than the injunction I have indicated which would 
merely cause further litigation. - 125 
On appeal the public interest approach was firmly rejected and the Court of Appeal 
reaffirmed Lindley L. J. 's rejection, in Shelfer, of the view that the utility of the 
defendant's conduct should be taken into account: 
"Lord Denning M. R. 's statement that the public interest should prevail 
over the private interest runs counter to the principles enunciated in 
123 raid, at pp. 981D-982C. 
124 [1981] 1 Q. B. 88. 
125 Ibid., at p. 92C. 
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Shelfer's case and does not accord with Cumming-Bruce L. J. 's reason for refusing an injunction. We are of the opinion that there is nothing in 
Miller v. Jackson [ 1977] Q. B. 966 binding on us, which qualifies what 
was decided in Shelfer's case... which give support for the proposition 
that the public interest should prevail over the private interest must be 
read subject to the decision in Shelfer's case. "126 
At present the conduct of the defendant appears to be the most important factor when 
deciding whether to exercise the discretion; in Jaggard v. Sawyer, Sir Thomas 
Bingham M. R. was of the opinion that: 
"It would weigh against a finding of oppression if the defendants had 
acted in blatant and calculated disregard of the plaintiff's rights, of 
which they were aware. " 127 
This would be case where the defendant had deliberately set out to present the court 
with a fait accompli by, for example, hurrying to complete a building in breach of 
covenant. In such circumstances the court may decide to grant an injunction128" 
however, it seems that an honest yet mistaken belief that an activity was lawful will 
129 not count against the defendant 
Despite periodic assertions that injunctive relief should only be withheld in limited 
circumstances it seems that, where there are clear economic benefits associated with 
the defendant's activity, the court may be reluctant to grant injunctive relief. One 
notable exception concerns the Irish case of Bellew v. Cement Co. Ltd13o where an 
injunction was granted which had the effect of closing the defendant's works for three 
months despite the fact that it was the only cement factory in Ireland and building was 
a national priority at the time. However, on other occasions the courts have used the 
discretion as a convenient compromise solution which recognises the wrong suffered 
by the plaintiff whilst relieving them of the burden of having to determine which land 
use should predominate. This view was exemplified by Lord Denning M. R. in the 
Court of Appeal decision in Allen v. Gulf Oil Refining Ltd: 
126 Ibid., at p. 93F-G. 
[1995] 1 W. L. R. 269, at p. 283D. 
128 Harrow London Borough Council v. Donohue[1993] N. P. C. 49. 
129 See the judgment of Millett L. J. in , laggard v. Sawyer [1995] 1 W. L. R. 269, at p. 289A: "In 
considering whether the grant of an injunction would be oppressive to the defendant, all the 
circumstances of the case have to be considered. At one extreme, the defendant may have acted openly 
and in good faith and in ignorance of the plaintiffs rights, and thereby inadvertently placed himself in a 
position where the grant of an injunction would either force him to yield to the plaintiffs extortionate 
demands or expose him to substantial loss". 
130 [1948] Jr. R. 61. 
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"I realise that there is a difficulty about an injunction. No court would 
wish to grant an injunction to stop a great enterprise and render it 
useless. But that difficulty is easily overcome. By means of Lord 
Cairn's Act, the Chancery Amendment Act 1858, the court can award 
damages to cover past or future injury in lieu of an injunction". 131 
One solution would be to for the courts to adopt the `public interest' approach 
advocated by Lord Denning M. R. in Miller v. Jackson; this would enable the court to 
consider the wider environmental consequences of the plaintiffs activity. However, it 
would also enable the court to consider the wider economic benefits of the defendant's 
activity. Had such an approach been applied in Bellew the court would undoubtedly 
have found that the public interest demanded that the defendant's concrete production 
should continue unabated. Furthermore, the court may be led into a cost/benefit 
analysis of the respective merits of the competing land uses. As the economic benefits 
of industry such as employment, contribution to gross domestic product etc. are easier 
to quantify in monetary terms than environmental benefits,, the court is likely to be 
drawn to the conclusion that the industrial use should prevail. This is most clearly 
demonstrated by the US case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co 132. in which residents 
sought injunctive relief to prevent the continuance of a nuisance caused by smoke, dust 
and noise emanating from the defendant's facility. Bergan J. stated that "the ground 
for denial of injunction... is the large disparity in economic consequences of the 
nuisance and of the injunction". The court calculated that the costs of relocating the 
plant would amount to $45m whereas the total loss incurred by the residents was 
calculated as amounting to a mere $185,000. On this basis the court was inevitably led 
to the conclusion that damages should be awarded in lieu of an injunctionl33 
The problem with making direct cost comparisons of this type, whereby the value of a 
land use is measured in monetary terms, is that it takes a very narrow view of value. As 
the Boomer case demonstrates, it most cases this approach will lead to the inevitable 
conclusion that an industrial land use should prevail. This is simply because the 
benefits of industrial activities, such as contribution to the economy, are easier to 
quantify in monetary terms than the need for environmental protection. Economists 
have attempted to devise means of pricing conservatory land uses so as to redress the 
balance. 134 However, these values are still likely to be outweighed by the economic 
132 [1979] 3 W. L. R. 523, at p. 532F. 
26 N. Y. 2d 219,309 N. Y. S. 2d 312,257 N. E. 2d870 (Court of Appeals New York, 1970). 
133 This decision broke new ground in that there was no equivalent of Lord Cairn's Act in American law 
which allowed for the award of damages in lieu of an injunction. 134 It is relatively easy to quantify certain environmental costs such as the loss in market value of 
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benefits of industrial activities. 135 There is also a fundamental objection to such an 
approach which goes to the core of the purpose of tort in an environmental context. 
Pricing natural resources converts them into tradable commodities which can be 
bought at the right price. Such an approach invites the economic analysis of tort; for 
reasons which are discussed in the next chapter this is not conducive to environmental 
protection. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The difficulties associated with establishing liability in tort for environmental damage, 
described above, severely limit the role of civil liability in an environmental context. 
In some cases it is necessary to establish fault on the part of the defendant; in 
negligence, this entails demonstrating that, not only was the defendant aware of the 
hazard created by his activity, but that he also failed to take adequate steps to negate 
the hazard. The complexity of many industrial processes, which are capable of causing 
pollution, renders it extremely difficult for the plaintiff to establish that the defendant 
failed to take these steps. Furthermore, whether or not it is necessary to establish fault 
in a particular case, the plaintiff must establish a causal link between the defendant's 
activity and the harm. Once pollution is dispersed into the environment it becomes 
increasingly difficult to trace the damage pathways from source to impact. These 
difficulties are multiplied in the case of toxic micropollutants where the harmful 
substances are invisible and their effects insidious. It seems that existing common law 
tests for establishing causation have failed to keep pace with modern scientific 
damaged crops or the costs of removing contaminated soil. However, intangible environmental benefits, 
such as the pleasure one derives from a landscape, are extremely difficult to cost. Economists have 
experimented with a number of different valuation techniques over the past thirty years. Hedonic pricing 
methods examine the differences in property prices and rents payable in areas subject to differing degrees 
of pollution. Thus, environmental harm in the vicinity of the property is regarded as causing a loss in 
market value of the property. Contingent valuation methods (CVM) relies upon detailed surveys designed 
to ascertain how much a person would be willing to pay for a change in the quality of the environment. 
For a review of these methods see Navrud, S, and Pruckner, G. J. (1996) "Environmental Valuation - To 
use or not to use? A comparative study of the United States and Europe", in Environmental and 
Resources Economics; Bateman, I. J., and Turner, R. K. (1993), "Valuation of the Environment, Methods 
and Techniques, in R. K. Turner (ed. ), Sustainable Environmental Economics and Management, 
Belhaven Press; Clayton, M. H., and Radcliffe, N. J. (1996), Sustainability: A Systems Approach, 
Earthscan Publications, at pp. 109-111. 
135 Various CVM studies have been conducted in the US to determine the extent to which people value 
conservatory uses of natural resources. Results have been compiled by ERM Economics (1996), 
(Economic Aspects of Liability and Joint Compensation Systems: Valuation of Environmental Damage, 
European Commission DGXI). One study (Brookshire et al, 1982) indicated that a resident would be 
prepared to pay between $14.54 to $20.31 per month to have air quality restored from poor to good. 
Thus if such a calculation had been made in the Boomer case, in order to price the value of the plaintiffs' 
land use, this figure would have been multiplied by the number of residents involved in the dispute. 
Clearly, as the number of residents involved was low, this amount would not have approached the value 
of the defendants activity. 
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techniques for identifying links between, for example, radiation and various forms of 
cancer. Thus, the need to establish factors such as fault and causation places high costs 
on the plaintiff, often referred to as `transaction costs'. The obvious effect of these 
costs is that a potential plaintiff may be dissuaded from pursuing litigation. 
The other major limitation of tort is that it focuses on the loss suffered by the 
individual rather than the loss suffered by the environment. As a result, although the 
level of damages awarded may reflect the personal financial loss of the plaintiff, they 
may not provide sufficient funds to effect a full environmental clean-up. Furthermore, 
the fact that liability is contingent upon personal loss means that, in the absence of 
such loss, no one may be in a position to instigate proceedings. At present, 
environmental pressure groups, at least in the UK, are not afforded standing to seek 
civil remedies on behalf of the environment. Hence, in such circumstances it is 
necessary to rely entirely upon regulatory responses. 
Thus, it seems that the use of tort as a means of environmental protection will continue 
to be extremely limited, unless, there is a fundamental change of emphasis from the 
interests of the parties to the interests of the environment. In the next chapter it will be 
considered whether this is possible in conceptual terms and, furthermore, whether such 
a development would be desirable. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The procedural difficulties associated with establishing liability in tort and the fact that 
it focuses on personal loss, as opposed to environmental damage, must inevitably lead 
to consideration of whether there remains a role for civil liability in this context. The 
occasional assertion of private rights, which may or may not produce any collateral 
environmental benefit, is unlikely to have a significant impact on industry. Due to the 
limitations of the common law, environmental protection has largely been perceived as 
a matter for regulation. In the US case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement, Bergan J. stated 
that it is pointless to attempt to settle matters of public interest as a by-product of 
resolving private disputes. I Thus, he argued, it was entirely inappropriate to impute 
public policy considerations into the consideration of the case. This assumes that 
private law and public law operate in entirely different spheres and that private law 
should in no way encroach upon the territory of public law. Bergan J. clearly perceived 
matters of environmental policy as falling within the realm of public law, whereas, 
interference with private rights was perceived as falling squarely within the realm of 
private law. Hence, it seems that Bergan J. was of the opinion that ones private 
interests in, for example, land are divisible from the public interest in environmental 
protection. However, as will be seen below, the objectives of public and private law 
and not necessarily mutually exclusive and there is a role for both in the 
implementation of environmental policy. 
The purpose of this Chapter is, therefore, to identify a role for the use of tort in a 
system of environmental regulation which is dominated by public law responses. This 
entails consideration of two main issues. Firstly, it is important to have regard to 
theoretical perspectives on the role of tort with a view to determining whether it is 
conceptually possible to harness private mechanisms in pursuit of public interest 
1 26 N. Y. 2d 219,309 N. Y. S. 2d 312,257 N. E. 2d870 (Court of Appeals New York, 1970). "Effective 
control of air pollution is a problem presently far from solution even with the full public and financial 
powers of government. In large measure adequate technical procedures are yet to be developed and some 
that appear possible may be economically impracticable. 
It seems apparent that the amelioration of air pollution will depend on technical research in great depth; 
on a carefully balanced consideration of the economic impact of close regulation; and of the actual effect 
on public health. It is likely to require massive public expenditure and to demand more than any local 
community can accomplish and to depend on regional and interstate controls. 
A court should not try to do this on its own as a by-product of private litigation and it seems manifest 
that then judicial establishment is neither equipped in the limited nature of any judgement it can 
pronounce nor prepared to lay down and implement an effective policy for the elimination of air 
pollution. This is an area beyond the circumference of one private law suit. It is a direct responsibility for 
government and should not thus be undertaken as an incident to solving a dispute between property 
owners and a single cement plant - one of many in the Hudson River valley. " 
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objectives. Assuming that this is the case, it is then necessary whether there is a 
practical need to develop a specific environmental role for civil liability. 
2. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ROLE OF TORT 
Various attempts have been made to establish a unifying ('monistic') theory of the 
purpose of tort; it is possible to identify two monistic schools of thought. 2 The 
proponents of the economic analysis of tort argue that the purpose of the law should be 
to ensure an efficient allocation of resources. The more traditional view is that the law 
of tort is founded on principles of `corrective' justice in that it reflects the moral 
obligation of one individual to compensate another for the loss he has caused. In 
contrast to the monists, the pluralists have abandoned the quest for theoretical purity 
and argue that tort is multi-faceted and cannot be explained by reference to a single 
overriding principle. 
It is necessary to explore these ideas in more depth in order to determine whether it is 
possible to identify a sound conceptual basis for an environmental application of tort. 
2.1 The Economic Analysis of Tort 
Economists and lawyers have differing views regarding the proper function of tort in 
that, whereas most lawyers are concerned with rectification of harm suffered by an 
individual, the proponents of the economic approach are of the opinion that the courts 
should strive to ensure that the solutions at which they arrive are efficient in 
economic terms. As will be explained in more detail below, the effect of this is that, 
whilst lawyers consider that the role of tort should be to protect certain rights from 
harm, certain economists consider that the role of tort should be to provide a 
framework in which the market is left to determine whether such rights are worthy of 
protection. 
According the economic analysis of tort, one of society's main objectives is to achieve 
`wealth maximization'. This is achieved through allocating resources to their most 
highly valued uses as determined by voluntary transactions between individuals. Since 
wealth maximization is central to the economic approach it is worth quoting Posner's 
definition in its entirety: 
2 See Englard, I. (1993), The Philosophy of Tort Law, Dartmouth, at p. 30. 
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`By `wealth maximization' I mean the policy of trying to maximize the 
aggregate value of all goods and services, whether they are traded in 
formal markets (the usual `economic' goods and services) or (in the 
case of `non-economic' goods and services, such as life, leisure, family 
and freedom from pain and suffering) not traded in such markets. 
`Value' is determined by what the owner of the good or service would demand to part with it or what a non-owner would be willing to pay to 
obtain it - whichever is the greater. `Wealth' is the total value of all 
`economic' and `non-economic' goods and services and is maximized 
when all goods and services are, so far as is feasible, allocated to their 
most valuable uses. "3 
Posner argues that the law of tort should reflect this objective. 4 Of course, the problem 
with this approach is that buyers and sellers are normally motivated by self interest and 
do not, as a rule, consider the effect of a transaction on third parties. This gives rise to 
a phenomenon known by economists as `externalities' which constitute un-wanted 
by-products caused by the operation of the free market; pollution is a classic example 
of an externality. 5 Thus, an agreement reached between a property developer and an 
industrial concern to build a new facility may be mutually beneficial as far as the 
parties to the agreement are concerned, however, it may impose costs on neighbours in 
the form of pollution. 
Economists have long recognized this problem. However, they have proposed radically 
different solutions. One school of thought was of the opinion that the market should be 
regulated in a manner which punished those who failed to take externalities into 
account . 
For example, Pigou6 proposed the introduction of a punitive tax on 
pollution; to this day such taxes are often referred to as `Pigouvian'. However, another 
group of more radical economists, from the opposing `Chicago school', were in favour 
of a less interventionist approach which would allow the market to find its own 
solutions to such problems. Their cause was greatly advanced by the publication of 
Coase's famous paper on social cost the underlying thesis of which is now commonly 
referred to as the `Coase theorem'7. This appeared to provide a theoretical framework 
for a market solution to the problem of externalities with minimal intervention from 
3 Posner, R. A. (1995), "Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical Inquiry", in D. G. Owen 
ýd. ), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law", Oxford/Clarendon Press. 
Ibid. 
5 See Posner, R. A. (1986), Economic Analysis of Law, Little Brown & Co., at p. 343: "Monopoly, 
pollution, fraud, mistake, mismanagement, and other unhappy by-products of the market are 
conventionally viewed as failure's of the market's self-regulatory mechanisms and therefore as 
appropriate occasions for public regulation". 
6 Pigou, A. C., The Economics of Welfare (4th edn. 1932). 
Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost", (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1. 
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the law. In short, the theorem states that, provided there are no obstacles to bargaining 
(or transaction costs), the parties will reach their own agreement as to the most 
efficient allocation of the resource irrespective of any solution imposed by the court. 
When viewed at face value the theorem appears utterly unrealistic in that it relies upon 
the existence of a state of affairs, namely zero transaction costs, which cannot exist in 
reality8. However, as Coase himself was at pains to point out, the theorem should not 
be taken literally, 9rather, by illustrating the irrelevance of the law in a world of zero 
transaction costs, Coase hoped to illustrate the vital role which the law plays in a 
world of high transaction costs: 
"The world of zero transaction costs has been described as a Coasian 
world. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is the world ... 
I was 
hoping to persuade economists to leave... 
... 
The same approach which with zero transaction costs, demonstrates 
that the allocation of resources remains the same whatever the legal 
position, also shows that, with positive transaction costs, the law plays a 
crucial role in determining how resources are used. "10 
In practice, the economic approach is crystallized by the issue of the purpose of 
injunctive relief. According to the economic view, the function of the law of tort is to 
improve the bargaining position of, for example, neighbours affected by noise or 
fumes so as to enable them to reach a settlement with the polluter. Thus the remedy of 
injunctive relief is regarded as an instruction to the parties to bargain rather than a 
once and for all prohibition on the continuance of the activity. In other words, it 
merely serves to prevent a polluter from expunging a neighbour's right to the 
undisturbed enjoyment of his property without first offering compensation. The 
assumption is that the price at which the neighbour is prepared to settle will reflect the 
value of his use of the resource. In the words of Landes and Posner the effect of 
injunctive relief is, therefore, to channel transactions to the markets 1 
8 The theorem makes certain assumptions; for example, it assumes that there are no information costs. As 
the discussion in the previous chapter demonstrates, in many cases involving environmental damage, the 
plaintiff must undertake expensive investigations in order to establish causation. Thus, the production of 
this information gives rise to high information costs. 
9 See Dries, A. W. (1996), The Economics of Law, International Thomson Business Press, at p. 180. 
10 Coase, R. H. (1988), "Notes on the Problem of Social Cost", in The Firm, the Market and the Law, 
University of Chicago Press. 
11 Landes, W. M., and Posner, R. A. (1988), The Economic Structure of Tort Law, University of Chicago 
Press, at p. 31. 
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Veljanowski has applied this analysis to the case of Bellew v. Cement Co. Ltd. 12 in 
which, it will be recalled, the court granted injunctive relief in order to enjoin the 
emission of dust and noise from a cement works despite the fact that building was a 
national priority at the time: 
"[T]he critical literature on the law of nuisance has often claimed that 
the injunction is a blunt instrument because it freezes land use, and that 
the doctrinal framework does not take sufficient account of the benefits 
of the defendant's activities. The most extreme case of this kind is 
Bellew v. Cement Co. Ltd., where the court awarded the plaintiff an 
injunction that would have halted the operations of the only 
cement-producer in the Irish Republic at a time when building was an 
urgent public necessity. The courts seem in these rights-based torts 
often not to `balance the equities' in a way that would be implied by 
economic consideration. This, however, overlooks the fact that in many 
of these situations the parties are in a position to bargain both before 
and after litigation. The judges determine, not a final solution which 
imposes on the parties some immutable set of consequences, but the 
starting points for negotiations between the disputing parties. A great 
deal of the law of nuisance can be viewed as a framework for 
bargaining, either preventatively if the law is clear, or after the 
injunction has been granted. It is naive to assume, as does much legal 
discussion, that when the stakes at hand are so disproportionate and the 
defendant stands to lose so much, as in Bellew, he would not be driven 
to bargain with the plaintiff. "13 [emphasis added] 
However, it is also recognized that the parties may not bargain around an injunction 
in which case the court should impose its own settlement by making an award of 
damages. This may occur in circumstances where the pollution is diffuse and the 
number of victims is large. In such circumstances it may be impractical to expect the 
polluter to reach an individual settlement with each victim 14. Obstacles to bargaining 
may also occur where there are relatively few parties involved as a result of the `hold 
out' phenomenon which simply means that, where the stakes for the polluter are high, 
one of the victims may `hold out' for a settlement which is in excess of offers which 
have already been made to other victims 15. Even where there are only two parties to a 
transaction, namely one victim and one polluter, there is still no guarantee that the 
12 [1948] I. R. 62. 
13 Veljanowski, C. (1986), "Legal Theory, Economic Analysis and Tort", in, Twining (ed. ), Legal 
Theory and Common Law, Basil Blackwell. 
14 See Cooter, R., and Ulen, T., Law and Economics, Addison-Wesley, 1997, at p. 171. 
15 See Landes and Posner, op. cit., p. 45. 
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parties will bargain as a result of the `bilateral monopoly' problem which occurs where 
16 the victim refuses to settle at any price 
The US case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement17 is often used as a case study for 
demonstrating how the courts should apply this approach in practice. It will be recalled 
that this action also concerned an application for injunctive relief brought by the 
neighbours of a cement works in respect of noise and dust emanating from the facility. 
Bergan J. conducted a cost/benefit analysis between the cost to the cement works of 
having to relocate and the costs incurred by the plaintiffs. This inevitably led to the 
conclusion that injunctive relief should be denied as the costs to the defendant would 
far outweigh the costs incurred by the plaintiffs. The authorities on the economic 
analysis of law agree with the outcome in this case although they disagree with the 
reasoning used to arrive at the decision18. The consensus is that, given the fact that 
courts are not very good at conducting a cost benefit analysis between competing land 
uses, the decision should have been based on whether there was any likelihood of the 
parties negotiating a settlement between themselves. This decision should have been 
reached on the basis of whether the level of transaction costs (which it will be recalled 
constitute obstacles to bargaining) were high or low. In this case Landes and Posner 
were of the opinion that transaction costs were high in that, as the stakes were high, 
there was a risk of the `hold out' phenomenon coming in to play. It was, therefore, 
appropriate to award damages in lieu of an injunction: 
"Each party would have tried to acquire as much of the bargaining 
profit as possible, and given the large stakes to each of a successful 
outcome of the negotiation, both might have invested large amounts of 
time and money in hard bargaining. These transaction costs were 
avoided by the Court's manner of deciding the case. "19 
The practical result of this approach, as the proponents of the economic analysis 
admit, is that the courts would end up substituting an award of damages in almost all 
cases20. A neighbour who values the undisturbed use of his property beyond any price 
which the polluter is prepared to pay would, according to this analysis, be regarded as 
an unscrupulous individual who is attempting to extort an exorbitant offer from the 
polluter in return for releasing him from the threat of an injunction. Thus, the court 
would be led to award damages in lieu of an injunction on the grounds that he was 
16 Ibid., p. 34. 
26 N. Y. 2d 219,309 N. Y. S. 2d 312,257 N. E. 2d 870 (Court of Appeals of New York, 1970). 
18 Cooter and Ulen, op. cit., at p. 176; Landes and Posner, op. cit., p. 45. 
19 Op. cit., p. 45. 
20 Ibid., pp. 45-47. 
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exploiting a `bilateral monopoly' situation. This outcome is justified by Landes and 
Posner on the grounds that a solution which results in an operator having to close or 
move his plant at great expense is an inefficient solution21. However, as will be seen 
below, this will only be the outcome in the most extreme circumstances. 
There is evidence to suggest that the economic rationale for the granting of injunctive 
relief is beginning to permeate judicial reasoning in the English Courts. For example, 
in Jaggard v. Sawyer Millett L. J. described the effect of injunctive relief as follows: 
"The grant of an injunction would merely restore the parties to the same 
position, with each of them enjoying the same bargaining strength, that 
they had enjoyed before the trespass began"22 
This is a most unwelcome development from an environmental standpoint for the 
following reasons. The market analysis of tort gives rise to a situation in which the 
rights which persons enjoy in property are priced and converted into tradable interests 
which they can be forced to sell by the court. As Penner argues in his analyses of the 
decision in Gillingham Borough Council v. Medway (Chatham) Dock Co. Ltd: 
"[T]he economic analysis of law has been in the forefront of 
characterizing the law of nuisance as the law of competing land use 
rights; to the extent that use rights can be isolated from the general right 
to property courts can determine conflicts between them on any number 
of basis: public benefit, overall economic efficiency, etc., and the 
concept of harm is jettisoned. Buckley J. 's decision seems to implicitly 
accept that the case in Gillingham was a conflict between the rights of 
the dock company and the shippers to cause a serious noise disturbance 
and the right of the residents to make use of their property in ways 
which required a lesser degree of noise, and because of the planning 
permission given to the dock company the neighbourhood standard was 
to be regarded as one which favoured the dock company's and the 
shipper's use. "23 
The major problem with the economic approaches described above is that they assume 
that efficiency is the sole objective of law, this is clearly not the case. Most economists 
would accept that the operation of the market should be restricted in certain areas in 
pursuit of some higher objective. The eminent economist C. A. E. Goodhart is critical 
21 Ibid. 
232 [1995] 1 W. L. R. 269, at p. 288E. 
Penner, J. E., "Nuisance and the Character of the Neighbourhood" (1993) 5 Journal of Environmental 
Law 1, at p. 22. 
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of the work of Posner in that there is little reference to concepts such as justice and 
fairness: 
"I find Posner's arguments unconvincing... [in] that they often seem 
contrary to our personal beliefs in fairness, and in our beliefs in rights 
and wrongs... "24 
Similarly, in respect of Posner's assertion that the primary function of law is wealth 
maximisation25, Goodhart notes: 
"What I notice about that definition is that there is no reference there to 
the law being perceived as fair and just by those to whom it is 
addressed. Wealth maximisation is, indeed, a proper goal both for 
society and for the legal system within it, but can and should that 
objective be pursued without due recognition of what that same society 
regards as just and fair outcomes? I doubt it. "26 
Furthermore, in The Economic Analysis of Tort, Landes and Posner only make passing 
reference in the introduction to those who have criticised the economic analysis of tort 
on similar grounds27; there is no attempt to answer these criticisms. 
Goodhart concludes that economists must accept that they cannot extend their 
efficiency approach into all areas of human activity in that such an approach is not 
always in the best interests of society. Certain objectives, such as morality, cannot be 
priced and included in a cost/benefit analysis. As an extreme example Goodhart refers 
to the issue of corporal punishment. According to an economic analysis, corporal 
punishment is more cost effective than prison which is extremely expensive, however, 
as Goodhart states: 
"Flogging and cutting off peripheral bits of people's bodies would, by 
standard economic criteria, be far more wealth maximising for society 
than prison sentences. And yet a society that flogged and amputated is 
not one that I would want to embrace. When it comes to the questions 
of who should be allowed to do what to our bodies, we economists will 
24 Goodhart, C. A. E., "Economics and the Law: Too Much One-Way Traffic? " (1997) 60 Modern Law 
Review 1, at p. 13. 
25 Posner, R. A. (1983), "Essay on Utilitarianism, Economics and Social Theory" in The Economics of 
Justice, Harvard University Press, at pp. 74-75, "Wealth maximization provides a foundation not only for 
a theory of rights and of remedies, but for the concepts of law itself... " 26 Op. cit., at p. 16. 
27 Landes and Posner, op. cit., at p. 9. 
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just have to accept a boundary to our imperial grasp. "28 [emphasis 
added] 
Dworkin29 goes even further in his criticism of the wealth maximization approach and 
doubts whether the concept can provide any useful guide as to the value of a resource. 
One obvious flaw in the approach is that the seller may value a resource more highly 
than the purchaser yet may be forced to part with it out of necessity. To use Dworkin's 
example, an impoverished person may feel bound to sell a book, which has 
sentimental value, to a wealthier person who decides to purchase it on a whim on the 
off chance that he "might someday read it"30. In this case it would be absurd to argue 
that the transaction has resulted in the transfer of the resource to the person who values 
it most highly. This highlights the fact that the wealth maximization approach has no 
facility for attaching anything other than a monetary value to resources. Indeed, it 
leaves the legal/economic analysis open to the criticism that, rather than being 
objective as it purports to be, it is motivated by political free market ideology which 
seeks to exclude considerations other than the financial interests of the parties to a 
transaction. Dworkin argues that it is a mistake to equate individual wealth with the 
overall well being of society31. Any gains achieved through the reallocation of 
resources, pursuant to private transactions, may be outweighed by the damage caused 
to other societal interests32. It will be recalled that this is why the economist Pigou 
was in favour of punishing those who failed to take into account the environmental 
implications of their transaction by means of taxation. 
The environment concerns an area in which the operation of the market should be 
limited on the grounds that wealth maximization cannot be equated with the public 
interest. For example, the quality of life may be impaired and natural resources may 
be exhausted; as Steele argues, the economic analysis is flawed in that: 
"No attention is given to the fact that, in some instances, improvements 
in the quality of environmental media such as air may actually be 
feasible; or, indeed, that they may be essential in order to sustain human 
welfare. In some instances, true `sustainability' might therefore 
involve 
a decision not to allocate a `resource' between different claims, 
particularly in those instances where `use' takes the form of 
`contamination', or where there is a risk of extinction or exhaustion. A 
preference based view of costs and benefits, where allocative solutions 
28 Op. cit., at p. 17. 
Dworkin, R. N., "Is Wealth a Value? ", (1980) 9 Journal of Legal Studies 191. 
30 Ibid., at p. 200. 
31 Ibid., at p. 194. 
32 Ibid., at p. 201. 
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are generated through disputes over ownership or entitlement, does not 
leave sufficient scope for consideration of such issues. Such an 
approach, therefore, appears unconvincing where sound environmental 
policy requires positive improvements in quality, rather than different 
rates of contamination, or where the relevant issue is one of 
conservation". 33 
It seems that Posner himself may now have conceded the fact that an approach based 
upon resource allocation, according to market criteria, may be to the detriment of the 
environment. He accepts that "the non-pecuniary dimension of wealth is important to 
emphasise"34. However, he also accepts that, as the wealth maximization approach 
relies upon the assignment of property rights, transactions must be governed by the 
monetary value attached to those rights35. He then echoes Dworkin's argument that 
there is a difference between what a person may be willing to pay for a resource and 
the price at which he may be prepared to sell the resource36. Furthermore, these prices 
may in no way reflect the value placed on the resource by the parties to the transaction: 
"An indigent may not be able to pay anything for freedom from 
pollution, while a wealthy person may demand an astronomical price to 
surrender his right (if it is his right) to clean air and water. "37 
Rather than propose a solution to this issue, Posner elects to "prescind from these 
baseline problems and examine wealth maximization in the more common tort 
situations in which such problems are not acute. "38 In this admission it seems that 
Posner may also have come to the conclusion that the environment is an area in which, 
in the words of Goodhart, economists must accept a limit to their imperial grasp. 
2.2 Corrective Verses Distributive Justice 
Thus, it is necessary to consider whether the use of tort, in an environmental context, 
should be founded on some idea of justice. However, at this point we encounter a 
complication in the form of the Aristotelian distinction between corrective and 
distributive justice. 
33 Steele, J., "Remedies and Remediation: Foundation Issues in Environmental Liability", (1995) 58(5) 
Modern Law Review 615, pp. 633-634. 
34 Posner, R. A. (1995), "Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical Inquiry", in D. G. Owen 
c, Philosophical Foundations of Tort, Oxford/Clarendon Press, at p. 99. 
5 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., at p. 100. 
Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
96 
The Role of Tort in an Environmental Context 
2.2.1 Corrective Justice 
Corrective justice, of which one of the main proponents in recent times has been 
Weinrib39, focuses on the relationship between individuals and the moral obligation of 
one party to compensate another for the loss which he has caused40. Hence, according 
to this view, the sole purpose of the law of tort is to restore the status quo ante 
between the parties. The early development of the common law was clearly firmly 
rooted in the corrective principle in that the forms of action were designed to restore 
some interest of which the plaintiff had been wrongfully disseised41 
From an environmental perspective, this narrow view of corrective justice cannot 
provide a satisfactory theoretical basis. The main reason for this is that it precludes 
consideration of public interest objectives, of which environmental protection is an 
example. The distributional objectives of society are deemed to fall within the realm 
of public law. Thus, as Englard points out, according to Weinrib's corrective approach: 
"The plaintiff sues in order to have the wrong done to him set right. He 
42 or she is not a private enforcer of a public interest". 
In the previous chapter it was argued that one of the main limitations of tort in the 
field of environmental protection is that it focuses on the loss suffered by the 
individual; this may not correlate with the environmental damage caused. Thus, in 
order to be effective in this context, it is necessary to identify a theoretical basis which 
allows the law of tort to accommodate public interest considerations. To this end it is 
necessary to consider the extent to which tort may accommodate distributional 
considerations. 
2.2.2 Distributive Justice 
The industrialization of the nineteenth century and the resultant increase in industrial 
accidents, pollution and nuisance caused many to doubt whether society could afford a 
system of tort which was based purely on high moral principles43. Thus attention 
shifted from the theoretical to the practical and the extent to which tort could be 
harnessed in pursuit of social objectives44. In more recent times Josef Esser argued 
39 Weinrib, E. J., "Understanding Tort Law" 23 Val. U. Rec. 485. 
40 Weinrib, in common with most proponents of the corrective approach, bases this moral obligation on 
Kantian premises. In short, this provides that it is wrong for one person to use the other as a means to the 
first person's ends. See Weinrib, E. J., "Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason", (1987) 87 Columbia 
Law 
Review 472. 
42 See Chapter 2, above. 
Englard, I. (1993), The Philosophy of Tort Law, Dartmouth Publishing Co. Ltd., at p. 46. 
43 See Englard (1993), op. cit., at p. 98. 
44 Ibid., at p. 97. Englard notes that as early as 1889 The German jurist Otto von Gierke (1841-1921) 
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that the Aristotelian distinction between corrective and distributive justice could be 
used as a philosophical basis for a public interest model of tort. 45 Esser noted that the 
law of tort involves distributional issues in that it determines the circumstances in 
which a loss should be borne by the defendant as opposed to the plaintiff. As tort does 
not exist in a vacuum, it must inevitably absorb societal preferences regarding the 
distribution of such losses. These preferences are reflected in the criteria applied by 
the decision maker46: 
"Thus, in respect of distributive justice, which is directed at distributing 
a given object among persons according to a criterion of merit, the 
substance of that criterion will depend, among other things, on the 
deciding authority's moral and political philosophy. "47 
For example, the development of strict liability, in certain areas, represents a move 
towards a distributional approach in that it invites consideration of `at whose risk' 
should an activity be conducted as opposed to `whose fault' was the accident. 48 
The rapid growth in insurance markets, since the last century, has also increased the 
distributive role of tort. Given the fact that tort is concerned with loss allocation, the 
issue of which party is best placed to bear the loss is an important issue. In this respect 
the availability of insurance is clearly a material consideration. At one time, the courts 
were firmly of the opinion that the issue of whether or not the defendant was insured 
should have no bearing on the outcome of the case49. However, the courts have 
become more ambivalent in their attitude towards the existence of insurance. On a 
number of occasions, Lord Denning overtly based certain decisions, at least in part, on 
the fact that the insured party would be better able to bear the loss50. Most judges have 
delivered a paper at a lecture in Vienna entitled, "The Social Function of Private Law" (Die soziale 
Aufgabe des Privaterechts (1889,1948) in which he derided the tendency to isolate pure, abstract, 
dogmatic and individualistic private law from the social needs of the people. 
5 Esser, J. (1941) Grundlagen und Entwicklung der Gefährdungshaftung. München/Berlin. 
4 This would include the court when deciding the outcome of a dispute or the legislature when deciding 
whether to modify existing common law rules. 47 Englard (1993), op. cit., at p. 11. 
See Jolowicz, J. A., "Liability for Accidents" (1968) 26(1) Cambridge Law Journal 50. 
49 "In determining the rights inter se of A and B, the fact that one of them is insured is to be 
disregarded. " per Viscount Simmonds in Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage Ltd [1957] AC 555, at 
576-577. 
50 See Nettleship v. Weston [1971] 3 All E. R. 581 which concerned whether a learner driver should be 
expected to display the same degree of competence as a qualified driver. Lord Denning stated that judges 
would impose a high standard of skill, even on learner drivers, because every driver was required to be 
insured against third party risks; the reason being "that a person injured by a motor car should not be left 
to bear the loss on his own, but should be compensated out of the insurance fund. The fund is better able 
to bear it than he can. " Thus, Lord Denning concluded that, "we are, in this breach of the law, moving 
away from the concept: `no liability without fault. ' We are beginning to apply the test `On whom should 
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not gone as far as Lord Denning, nevertheless, it seems that the availability of 
insurance may add "a little extra tensile strength"51 to the chain which binds a 
tortfeasor to his responsibilities. 
It has been argued that the existence of insurance is incompatible with the corrective 
function of tort and represents a move towards an alternative system of compensation 
such as a social security scheme. 52 Such an approach, based entirely upon distributive 
principles, severs the bilateral relationship between the parties and "violate[s] the 
moral foundations of personal responsibility"53. For reasons which shall be discussed 
in due course, a system which relies entirely upon compensation funds is 
unsatisfactory in that it reduces incentives for risk management. However, the 
relationship between insurance and tort does not necessarily dispense with all notions 
of corrective justice in that it retains a degree of individual accountability. For 
example, a careless person is likely to incur higher premiums and in extreme cases 
may be denied cover altogether. Furthermore, the insurance policy may only meet part 
of the costs incurred by the insured; in certain cases there is an agreed upper limit or 
ceiling. 54 
2.3 The Pluralistic View of Tort 
Given that tort cannot function purely as a corrective or distributive mechanism, it is 
necessary to consider whether there is a theoretical basis which can accommodate both 
distributive and corrective objectives. There is increasing recognition of the fact that 
the objectives of tort are multi-faceted and cannot be encapsulated by monistic 
theories such as economic efficiency or corrective justice. Epstein argues: 
"It is unwise, indeed futile, to attempt to account for the complete 
structure of a complicated legal system by reference to any single value 
or principle - be it liberty or efficiency". 
55 
the risk fall? ' Morally the learner driver is not at fault: but legally she is liable to be because she is insured 
and the risk should fall on her. " Other decisions in which Lord Denning made similar determinations 
include Lamb v. Camden LBC [1981] Q. B. 625; Sparton Steel v. Martin [1973] Q. B. 27; and R. H. Willis 
and Son v. British Car Auctions Ltd [ 1978] 2 All E. R. 392. 51 Executor Trustee and Agency Co. Ltd v. Hearse [1961] S. A. S. R. 51, at p. 54, per Chamberlain J. 
52 See Heuston, R. F. V., and Buckley, R. A., Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts, (20th edn. ), 
Sweet & Maxwell, at p. 28: "Once it is conceded that insurance renders compensation the sole purpose 
of damages, then the tort action itself becomes more vulnerable to attack, for their are many ways - some 
perhaps fairer and administratively cheaper than tort - of compensating a victim for a loss he has 
suffered". 53 Englard (1993), op. cit., at p. 13. 
54 See Cane, P. (1996), Tort Law and Economic Interests, Clarendon Press, at pp. 479-481. 
55 Epstein, R. A., "Causation and Corrective Justice: A Reply", (1979) 8 Journal of Legal Studies 477, 
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Nevertheless, certain proponents of the corrective theory remain of the opinion that the 
distributional objectives of society should be met by entirely separate mechanisms56 
However, to remain firmly entrenched in the corrective view of tort is to ignore the 
existence of strict liability and insurance. As Englard argues, these factors introduce 
issues of efficient loss allocation: 
"Weinrib's insistence on complete theoretical purity, on the rigorous 
pursuit of one single value is... unsatisfactory. Areas of strict liability 
have become deeply entrenched in tort law, and the reality of insurance 
cannot be isolated from tort adjudication. The idea of efficient loss 
allocation should not be totally excluded from tort law, even if it does 
not accord with the Kantian premises of autonomy and moral 
responsibility. "57 
In theoretical terms, this `pluralistic' approach may appear unsatisfactory in that it 
lacks the purity of the monistic approaches. In order to overcome this objection, 
Englard has suggested grounding the pluralistic view of tort law in the theory of 
`complementarity'58. This derives from the physicist Neils Bohr's philosophical 
explanation for the anomalies produced by quantum mechanics. In short, the theory 
provides that conflicting principles may appear irreconcilable when viewed in 
isolation, yet, when viewed collectively, they may constitute a unified whole59: 
"Two or more descriptions of a thing are complementary if each alone 
is incapable of providing a complete description or explanation of the 
thing in question and both or all together provide a complete 
description". 60 
at p. 503 56 According to Weinrib, damage costs must be met either by the injurer according to tort rules founded 
upon corrective principles, or, from a compensation fund operated according to distributive principles. 
Thus, in his view there is no middle ground where both principles may be combined. See Weinrib, E. J. 
"Aristotle's Forms of Justice", (1989) 2 Ratio Juris, 211, at p. 214. 
57 Englard, I. (1995), "The Idea of Complementarity as a Philosophical Basis for Pluralism in Tort Law", 
in D. G. Owen (ed. ), Philosophical Foundations of Tort, Oxford/Clarendon Press, at p. 185. 
5$ Ibid. See also Wright, R. G., "Should the Law Reflect the World?: Lessons for Legal Theory from 
Quantum Mechanics", (1991) 18 Fla. St. U. L. Rev., 855. 
59 See Murdoch, D. (1987) Neils Bohr's Philosophy of Physics. Cambridge. In quantum mechanics it is 
possible to explain matter and radiation either as particles or waves (wave-particle duality). Despite the 
fact that the two concepts are incompatible, experimental findings may point to the existence of one or 
the other. In isolation the two concepts provide an explanation for some findings: together they provide 
an explanation for all findings. 60 Englard (1995), op. cit., at p. 188. 
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Thus, in certain cases, "opposing principles constitute a harmonious totality"61. As 
Englard notes, this is an idea that occurs throughout philosophy and religion. 62 Indeed, 
Bohr contended that the theory could be extended into many areas other than physics 
including culture, art and music63. Englard argues that complementarity is also 
consistent with a pluralistic view of tort. 
Such an approach may confer some degree of theoretical elegance on the pluralistic 
approach. However, the issue of whether it is possible to embody competing objectives 
in a single concrete legal rule or court decision in practice is another matter. Englard 
argues that such an approach is possible and refers to the fact that the solutions 
adopted by the court, in many cases, represent compromise solutions which embody 
competing objectives. He uses the example of criminal penalties, thus, in a case where 
a theory of retribution requires a term of imprisonment of 2 years whilst a theory of 
deterrence demands a term of 10 years, the court may decide to impose a term of 5 
years64 
Englard's analysis appears to provide a viable explanation for the use of tort in an 
environmental context where the difficulties of reconciling distributive and corrective 
issues are acute. It is possible to detect the application of a pluralistic approach in 
some of the substantive common law rules which have been encountered in the 
previous chapter. For example, the development of the `character of the 
neighbourhood' test65 in nuisance, as a threshold of damage, can be interpreted as an 
example of a pluralistic approach. The test clearly introduced distributional 
considerations in that it allowed activities to continue which would previously have 
been deemed unacceptable. However, it also retained the harm principle in that 
damage which exceeded the threshold remained actionable; this preserved an element 
of corrective justice. 
In Rylands v. Fletcher Blackburn J. explicitly addressed the issue of where the loss 
should fall where one land owner made an un-natural use of his property66. A 
conscience decision was made to hold the land owner liable, in such circumstances, by 
the establishment of a rule of strict liability. However, strict liability retains elements 
62 Ibid., at p. 190. 
Ibid., at p. 190. 
63 See, for example, Bohr, N. "Natural Philosophy and Human Culture", (1939) 143 Nature 268; Bohr, 
N. (1958) "Unity of Knowledge". In Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge (1961). 
64 Englard (1995), op. cit., at p. 194. 
65 St. Helen's Smelting v. Tipping (1865) 11 H. L. C. 462. 
66 (1866) L. R. 1 Ex. 265, at pp. 279-280. 
101 
The Role of Tort in an Environmental Context 
of corrective justice in that defences are normally available in respect of events which 
are entirely beyond the control of the land owner; these include acts of a stranger67 
and Acts of God. 68 
The use of injunctive relief also provides a clear example of an area in which the 
courts may adopt a pluralistic approach. On the face of it, the decision to grant 
injunctive relief may appear to represent a purely corrective approach which excludes 
consideration of distributional issues. However, this is based on the view that 
injunctions inevitably lead to the closure of the business or the imposition of 
unsustainable costs. On the contrary, it is important to note that an injunction need not 
operate as an inflexible instrument which expunges one land use in favour of another. 
Injunctions can be effective in forcing polluters to investigate cleaner technologies 
which enable the activity to continue at less cost to the environment. McLaren (1972) 
argues that producers are often reluctant to take this step of their own accord: 
"There is little doubt that industrialists will often ignore technological 
reality and resist making adjustment in their processes to accommodate 
pollution control, unless they are forced to think and to act. "69 
As evidence for this assertion he cites an extract from an interview with a 
manufacturer of pollution abatement equipment: 
"... we have found it very hard to place our equipment out in the field, 
mostly because industries refuse to spend any money for this cause. The 
attitude towards cleaning up the waste water is very negative, and they 
feel that they are paying for something in which there is no profit 
available to them. Therefore, unless they are forced into doing 
something about it, my opinion is that they are going to continue to 
stall, either by pulling political strings or denying that there is any 
purification equipment available. "70 
McLaren concludes that injunctions are the most effective means of forcing operators 
to adopt cleaner technologies. Once damages have been awarded the pollution may 
continue unabated, however, an injunction enables the court to influence the manner in 
which the plant is operated: 
67 See, for example, Northwestern Utilities Ltd. v. London Guarantee and Accident Co. Ltd [1936] A. C. 
108; Rickards v. Lothian [ 1913 ] A. C. 263. 
68 See, for example, Nichols v. Marsland (1876) 2 Ex. D. 1. 
69 McLaren, J. P. S., "Nuisance Actions and the Environmental Battle", (1972) 10(3) Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 505, p. 557. 
70 Esposito, "Air & Water Pollution: What to Do While Waiting for Washington", (1970) 5 Harv. Civ. 
Rights - Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 32. 
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"The choice of an injunction shows clearly that the court is serious 
about dealing with the root of the problem which has given rise to the 
plaintiffs claim. Moreover, when a court grants injunctive relief it 
undertakes a supervisory role in seeing that the terms of the injunction 
are satisfied, and thus can guarantee that the polluter takes the 
appropriate action. "71 
As technology advances it is becoming increasingly difficult for operators to argue that 
the technology does not exist to abate the pollution. Indeed, as long ago as the turn of 
the Century, Dewees empirical study of tort litigation arising out of sulphur dioxide 
emissions in the United States and Canada72 demonstrates that injunctions were 
extremely effective in encouraging operators to develop new abatement technology. In 
States where courts granted injunctive relief in preference to damages copper and lead 
smelter operators quickly adopted the latest available abatement technology known as 
the electro-static precipitator (ESP)73. Dewees concludes that: 
"[I]n general the abatement undertaken at these smelters represented 
either pioneering work or at least best practice at the time it was 
installed. This litigation, with its injunctive relief, seems to have been 
reasonably effective in pushing abatement near to the state of the art at 
the time. "74 
Far from imposing a burden on operators, in some cases it was found that new 
abatement technology actually led to cost savings; for example, ESP technology 
enabled metal particles to be recovered which would otherwise have been expelled 
with the flue gases. In another example quoted by Dewees, smelter owners in 
Tennessee who installed acid plants to remove sulphur dioxide from emissions found 
that the sulphuric acid produced as a by-product of the process was more profitable 
than the copper produced. Furthermore, the principal market for sulphuric acid was in 
the production of fertilizer, thus, the substance which had originally killed crops was 
converted into a form which enabled them to thrive. This was just a few years after a 
court had refused to enjoin smelter operators in Tennessee from producing sulphur 
dioxide emissions on the grounds that to do so would lead to the closure of the 
71 McClaren (1972), op. cit., p. 557. 
2 See Dewees, D., "Sulphur Dioxide Emissions from Smelters: The Historical Inefficiency of Tort 
Law", University of Toronto, January 2 1996; Dewees D., and Halewood, M., "The Efficiency of the 
Law: Sulphur Dioxide Emissions in Sudbury", (1992) 42 University of Toronto Law Journal 1. 
73 The flue gases were passed through a chamber which was fitted with electrically charged wires and 
oppositely charged plates. The wires charged the particles passing into the chamber which were then 
attracted to the plates through electromagnetic attraction. 74 Dewees (1996), op. cit. 
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smelters75. The case demonstrates the difficulties in conducting an accurate cost - 
benefit analysis between competing land uses. 
Furthermore, it is possible to attach conditions to injunctions which allow the activity 
to continue whilst reducing the harmful effects on the plaintiff Such conditions may 
be tailored to take account of technical feasibility76. 
To grant injunctive relief against a large and influential industrial concern demands 
courage on the part of the court. However, the larger and more successful the 
enterprise the more likely it is to have the resources to comply with the terms of an 
injunction. Where, an enterprise cannot comply with the terms of an injunction, even 
in circumstances where it has been tempered to take account of technical feasibility 
and cost, McLaren (1972) draws the harsh conclusion that such enterprises are not 
worth saving: 
"If in the final analysis, the practical result is the shutting down of the 
offending operation, then, in the writer's opinion, that has to be faced 
by the polluter and the community with what fortitude they can muster. 
It can well be argued that in the contemporary scale of social values 
endeavours to improve the state of the environment are more important 
than the continued existence of marginal or struggling industrial 
concerns. Apart from anything else it is not beyond the ingenuity of 
society and particularly governments to compensate for the adverse 
community consequences of the demise of a local employer. New 
non-polluting industries may be brought in or encouraged to set up. 
Workers may be absorbed in other plants are relocated. The 
consequences are remediable. However, pollution, by definition, has no 
other solution than to restrict or remove its sources. If it continues, then 
the sure result is further and perhaps irremediable corruption of the 
environment. "77 
The pluralistic analysis provides a sound and practicable theoretical basis for the use 
of tort in an environmental context. It is possible for liability to remain firmly 
anchored in the harm principle whilst preserving the ability of the law to take account 
75 Madison et al v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. Ltd. (1904) 83 S. W. 658 at 660: "It is 
found... that if the injunctive relief sought be granted, the defendants will be compelled to stop operations 
and their property will become practically worthless, the immense business conducted by them will cease, 
and they will be compelled to withdraw from the State. It is a necessary deduction from the foregoing 
that a great and increasing industry in the state will be destroyed, and all of the valuable copper properties 
of the State will become worthless... If these industries be suppressed, these thousands of people will 
have 
to wander forth to other localities to find shelter and work. " 
76 For an example of such an approach see Jordan v. Norfolk County Council and another [1994] 1 
W. L. R. 1353, ch. 3, above. 
77 Op. cit., p. 559. 
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of distributional issues. The law of tort has always absorbed social and political 
preferences regarding where loss should fall. Economic efficiency is only one criterion 
which can be applied and, as Posner appears to concede, may provide little guidance in 
determining the desirability of protecting a natural resource. The issue of where losses 
should fall must be determined in accordance with a broader range of criteria 
including "the deciding authority's moral and political philosophy". 
A useful example of the manner in which the law of tort may be developed, so as to 
reflect changing social and political preferences regarding the distribution of losses, is 
provided by industrial accident law. Dias and Markesinis argue that liability based 
upon fault "suited Victorian morality and cushioned growing industries at a time when 
insurance was in its infancy"78. However, it eventually became "politically 
unacceptable to let the loss lie on injured workmen"79. Furthermore, the development 
of insurance and the realization that costs could be passed to consumers through the 
pricing of goods "led to the conviction that employers were best equipped to carry 
such losses"80. Thus elements of loss distribution were introduced into industrial 
accident law. 
The political and social climate is now such that the focus of tort , 
in an environmental 
context, should be directed to the issue of `who should bear the loss'. If one applies 
general principles of environmental law it seems clear that the polluter should pay; 
hence the inclusion of the `polluter pays' principle in the Treaty of Rome81. However, 
the fact that tort is conceptually capable of accommodating such distributional 
objectives does not mean that it would necessarily augment regulatory responses 
already in place. This gives rise to the issue of whether tort has the capacity to fulfil a 
useful role as a component in a system of environmental regulation. 
3 THE ROLE OF TORT IN AN ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT 
3.1 Private Enforcement of Environmental Standards 
The bulk of environmental law consists of licensing regimes which permit emissions 
up to a certain limit82; these may be tightened in accordance with improvements in 
79 Dias, R. W. M. and Markesinis, B. S. (1984), Tort Law, Oxford/Clarendon Press, at p. 14. 
Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 See Chapter 5, below. 
82 Such as the `Integrated Pollution Control' (IPC) system introduced under Part 1 of the Environmental 
Protection Act (EPA) 1990. 
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abatement technology. 83 The regulator84 polices these limits and may have recourse to 
criminal penalties85 where they are breached. During the 1970s and 80s the regulators 
adopted a conciliatory approach and regarded prosecution as a last resort. 86 However, 
in recent years the EPA has adopted a far more assertive enforcement strategy. To this 
end it now considers that its role is to punish the flouting of environmental regulations 
in addition to co-operating with industry in attaining targets. 87 
These developments are welcome and will no doubt increase the deterrent effect of 
criminal sanctions which, in the past, have not been viewed as `proper' offences. 88 
However, no system of environmental regulation can rely entirely upon one 
mechanism; each method has strengths and weaknesses according to the 
circumstances. The use of licences, backed by criminal sanctions, leaves gaps in 
enforcement which tort may have a useful role in reducing. 
One problem is that, due to limited resources, enforcement agencies must pick and 
choose which matters to investigate. 89 As a result, many polluting incidents are not 
pursued by the regulator with the result that the polluter may not be called to 
account. 9° Where, however, the pollution causes private loss, the person concerned 
83 In determining which technology should be employed the `Best Available Technology Not Entailing 
Excessive Cost' (BATNEEC) test is applied; see s. 7(2)(a) Environmental Protection Act 1990. The 
concept is a more transparent version of the BPM approach first applied by the Alkali Acts and brings it 
into line with the test adopted by EC Framework Directive 84/360/EEC on combating air pollution from 
industrial plants, OJEC, L188,16 July 1984, Art 4.1. 
84 Complex or particularly hazardous activities fall within the jurisdiction of the Environment Agency, 
whereas, local authorities regulate atmospheric emissions of a less complex or hazardous nature; see s. 6 
EPA 1990. 
85 For example, under IPC, if an operator breaches the terms of a discharge consent, the EPA will serve 
an enforcement notice requiring the operator to remedy the situation. If this is not complied with he may 
be prosecuted under section 23(1)(c) EPA 1990. 
86 See Hawkins, K. (1984), Environment and Enforcement: Regulation and a Social Definition of 
Pollution; Baldwin and McCrudden (1987), "Regulatory Agencies: An Introduction", in Regulation and 
Public Law, Weidendeld and Nicolson. 
87 See Lomas, 0., and Fairley, R., "The Long Arms of the Environment Agency", (1997) 80 Legal 
Business, Supp. 8-9; Tromans, S, and Doring, M., "Convictions for Environmental Offences", (1996) 
85V) 
Environmental Law Monthly 10. 
In Sherras v. De Rutzen [1895] 1 QB 918 it was stated that administrative offences, "are not criminal 
in any real sense but are acts which in the public interest are prohibited under a penalty", per Wright J. at 
p 922. 
89 Certain research findings demonstrate that there is a tendency for enforcement agencies to either 
concentrate on petty offences, which are easy to prove, or high profile cases which may result in 
exemplary deterrence. See McMurry and Ramsy (1986), 19 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 1133, at 
&6116 1; Moodie (1981) 7 Environmental Policy and Law 17. 
According to figures submitted by the Environmental Protection Agency to McKenna Report & Co., 
it received 25,415 substantiated reports of pollution to water courses in 1994. However, there were only 
237 prosecutions resulting in 222 convictions. Cautions were only issued in 193 cases. See McKenna 
&Co. (1996), Study of Civil Liability Systems for Remedying Environmental Damage (independant 
study for EC Commission DGXI), Brussels: EC Commission DGXI, at p. 225. 
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may chose to pursue the matter under civil law. There are a number of advantages 
associated with such an approach. The remedies available under civil law are more 
flexible than criminal sanctions and may require the polluter to internalize a greater 
proportion of the pollution costs. Whereas fines are arbitrary91 and go straight to the 
Treasury, damages more accurately reflect the value of the damage caused and may be 
applied to the costs of remediation. 92 Furthermore, injunctions enable the court to 
take a proactive stance in requiring the polluter to actually take abatement measures or 
to rectify damage which has already occurred. 93 
A further potential benefit is that, whereas the standard of proof in criminal law is 
beyond reasonable doubt, in civil law the court must be satisfied on the balance of 
probabilities. As Burnett-Hall points out: 
"To avoid convicting a defendant on a criminal charge unfairly, he is, 
quite rightly, afforded a whole range of evidential and other procedural 
safeguards, notably the appreciably heavier criminal burden of proof. 
This protection inevitably means either that there are more acquittals 
than would otherwise be the case or - no doubt much more often - that 
proceedings are never brought in the first place. "94 
This burden is reduced where the offence is of strict liability, however, this only 
relates to the state of mind (mens rea) of the defendant; it is still necessary to show, 
beyond reasonable doubt, that the damage was attributable to the defendant (actus 
reus). It can be difficult to establish causation according to the civil test; this task is 
even more onerous under the criminal test. 95 
91 For example, in the UK, under section 85(6) of the Water Resources Act 1991, the maximum fine 
which a magistrates court can award is £20,000. The Crown Court is not subject to this limitation, 
however, the criteria it applies concern the ability of the accused to pay and the seriousness of the offence 
in terms of the culpability of the defendant; this does not necessarily correspond with the actual cost of 
the damage caused. In practice it is rare for fines to exceed £30,000 in the Crown Court. (Information 
supplied by the Environmental Protection Agency to McKenna & Co. and published in its Study of Civil 
Liability Systems for Remedying Environmental Damage, above). Furthermore, according to a 
comparative study prepared by Dr Gunther Heine of the Max Plank Institute for Foreign and 
International Criminal Law, Fieburg, Germany, in countries where heavy fines are available, courts are 
reluctant to impose penalties which in any way approach the maximum limit. See Heine, G. (1991), 
"Environment Protection and Criminal Law", in O. Lomas (ed. ), Frontiers of Environmental Law, 
Chancery Law Publishing. 
92 For example, following the Shell Mersey Estuary Oil spill of 1989, Shell was fined £1m which, up to 
that point, was the largest penalty ever imposed for environmental impairment. However, clean up costs 
amounted to £ 1.4m and property damage amounted to 12.1m. See Holmes, R., and Broughton, M., 
"Insurance Cover for Damage to the Environment", (1995) 9513 Estates Gazette 123. 
93 See McLaren (1972), op. cit., above. 
94 Burnett-Hall, R., "Enforcement through civil proceedings", (1997) 2 Amicus Curiae 24. 
95 This is clearly illustrated by the Australian case of EPA v. Barlow (Unreported, Land & Environment 
Court of New South Wales, 23 April 1993). In this case there seemed to be overwhelming prima facie 
evidence that fish had been killed as a result of a crop spray, known to be harmful to fish, used by the 
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3.2 Private Law and the Public Interest in the Environment 
Above, it was noted that, in a system of tortious liability which is characterized by 
corrective principles, a plaintiff cannot be viewed as a private enforcer of a public 
interest. However, it was then explained that there is a sound theoretical basis for 
admitting public interest issues into substantive tort rules and the remedies available to 
the courts. An important issue concerns whether it would be possible to take this 
approach one step further and allow private bodies to undertake actions, related to 
environmental damage, on the publics behalf. 
Such an approach would greatly increase the number of participants in the 
enforcement of environmental standards and reduce the need to rely upon enforcement 
agencies to take the initiative. A polluting incident which affects a limited number of 
individuals may not prompt a regulatory authority to take action. Nevertheless, from 
the perspective of the individuals concerned, the incident may appear to be of great 
importance and cause them to initiate their own proceedings. Thus, civil liability may 
penetrate a far greater range of activities than regulatory responses where regulatory 
authorities are constrained in the matters which they choose to pursue by issues such 
as staffing shortages, policy considerations and limited resources. 
To a limited extent, those statutes which impose civil liability (in addition to criminal 
penalties), by way of the tort of breach of statutory duty, facilitate a degree of private 
enforcement. As Rogers argues: 
"Provision for public participation and especially by those members 
who suffer particular loss or damage as a result of legislative 
non-compliance, would ensure that the public interest in the 
preservation of the environment was not compromised by governmental 
inactivity through negligence, political pressure or fiscal restraints. In 
the absence of legislative reform in this area, the common law tort of 
defendant on his cotton plants. The dead fish were found the day after the spray had been used and tests 
on the carcasses revealed traces of the chemical. However, the judge threw out the case on the grounds 
that there was a possibility, albeit improbable, that the contamination may have washed down from 
another plantation upstream. Hemmings, considers that there is a greater likelihood that the evidence 
would have been sufficient to establish causation under the civil test. (See Hemmings, N., "The 
New 
South Wales Experiment: The Relative Merits of Seeking to Protect the Environment though the 
Criminal Law by [sic] Alternative Means", (1993) Commonwealth Law Bulletin 1987. This would 
certainly be the case according to the position adopted by the House of Lords 
in McGhee v. N. C. B. 
[1973] 1 W. L. R. 1. Recall that, where it cannot be established whether a specific breach of duty led to 
the harm, there may be a presumption of causation provided the identity of the causal agent is not in 
doubt. In EPA v. Barlow there was no doubt that the chemical was only used by the cotton industry 
in 
that region; therefore, it seems likely that a civil court would have 
been in a position to make a 
presumption of causation in these circumstances. 
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breach of statutory duty would secure public participation in the 
enforcement process. " 96 
A useful case study of how tort actions may result in the private enforcement of 
environmental standards is provided by the Anglers Co-operative Association97. The 
ACA was founded in 1948 in order to fight pollution and now comprises 17,500 
angling clubs. The member clubs pay a subscription to the Association and in return 
the ACA indemnifies them for any legal action they pursue following a polluting 
incident. It will be recalled that, before one can undertake an action in nuisance, it is 
necessary to establish a proprietary interest in land. In view of this the ACA advises 
its members to obtain a lease from the riparian owner. The scheme has proved to be 
extremely successful and the vast majority of actions, supported by the ACA, have 
been won by the angling clubs. In many cases injunctive relief has been granted 
requiring operators to clean up pollution. 98 
The ACA example is unusual in that the participants in the scheme have found a 
means of establishing a proprietary interest in the resource they are seeking to protect. 
However, the solution to the standing problem adopted by the ACA would not be open 
to most environmental interest groups; save for those which actually own, for example, 
a nature reserve or a wildlife sanctuary. 99 Thus in order to extend the role of tort as a 
means of private enforcement it would be necessary to afford standing to such groups. 
At this point it would be useful to consider whether there is a conceptual basis which 
would allow this step to be taken. This would entail establishing a community interest 
in the environment which amounts to some form of proprietary interest. 
During the latter part of the 20th Century it has been possible to detect the emergence 
of a concept of `environmental rights'. In 1972 the Stockholm UN Conference on the 
Human Environment resolved in Principle 1 that: 
"Man has a fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate 
conditions of life, in an environment of quality that permits a life of 
dignity and well being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect 
and improve the environment for present and future generations. " 
96 Rogers, N., "Civil Liability for Environmental Damage: The Role of Breach of Statutory Duty" [1994] 
Environmental Liability 117, at p. 118. 
97 See Bate, R., "Water Pollution Prevention: A Nuisance Approach", (1994) 14(3) Economic Affairs 
13. 
98 Ibid. 
99 See, for example, League Against Cruel Sports v. Scott [1986] Q. B. 240. 
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Some twenty years later, the declaration following the Rio UN Conference on 
Environment and Development proclaimed in Principle 1 that: 
"Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable 
development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in 
harmony with nature. " 
Furthermore, in recent years the European Court of Human Rights has begun to impute 
certain `environmental rights' into the European Convention on Human rights 
although the Convention does not make any express reference to such a concept. In 
Lopez Ostra v. Spain 100 the applicant lived in close proximity to a new liquid waste 
treatment plant which had been built to deal with the by-products produced by the 
many leather tanneries in the area. Due to a malfunction on start up, gas fumes, 
pestilential smells and contamination were released which caused nuisance and health 
problems to those living in the area and necessitated re-housing. It transpired that the 
operators of the plant, SACURSA, had not obtained a licence and that, furthermore, 
the regulatory authorities had not taken any steps to enforce the licensing 
requirements. Having met with little success in pursuing SACURSA in various actions 
before the domestic courts, Mrs Lopez Ostra resorted to a human rights argument 
against the State on the grounds that, as a result of its omissions 101, the State had 
breached, inter alia, Article 8 of the Convention which provides as follows: 
"l. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise 
of this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. " 
The Court upheld this argument on the grounds that: 
"Naturally, severe environmental pollution may affect individuals' 
well-being and prevent them from enjoying their homes in such a way 
100 (1995) 20 E. H. R. R. (1) 277. 
101 The European Court of Human Rights has established that, in addition to placing obligations on 
states to refrain from breaching human rights, the Convention places a positive obligation on States to 
protect human rights from interference by others. See Marckx v. Belgium (A/31): 2 E. H. R. R. 330, para 
31; Young, James and Webster v. United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 7601/76 and 7806/77, Series B, 
No. 39, para. 168; x and y v. Netherlands (A/91): (1986) 8 E. H. R. R. 235, para. 23. 
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as to affect their private and family life adversely, without, however, 
seriously endangering their health. "102 
The most interesting aspect of this decision is that a dispute which had the 
characteristics of a tort problem was converted into a rights issue and pursued against 
the State. However, it is not always possible to convert such matters into rights issues 
affecting the state; as the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
demonstrates, it is necessary to show an omission on the part of the State to safeguard 
the rights in question. This gives rise to an interesting issue, namely, whether it would 
be possible to use the law of tort as a means of protecting such interests. Such an 
approach is possible in theory, although, it may entail a reassessment of the way in 
which the concept of property is viewed in this context. It would necessitate expanding 
the notion of property so as to afford persons a form of proprietary interest in the 
environment. 
A useful starting point for this debate is provided by an article written by Reich in 
1964103. Reich was deeply concerned by the fact that the well being and livelihoods of 
citizens in the United States was increasingly dependant upon the `largess' of 
government. Largess encompasses state benefits, government contracts, provision of 
employment in the public sector, the provision of licenses to pursue a trade or 
profession and so forth104. However, he noted that such benefits were perceived as 
privileges which could be revoked without good reason. Thus, many individuals were 
needlessly deprived of their livelihoods and status. In certain cases this resulted in 
los gross abuses of civil liberties 
Reich argued that property is an essential component of liberty: 
"[T]he Bill of Rights comes into play only at extraordinary moments of 
conflict or crisis, property affords day-to-day protection in the ordinary 
affairs of life. "106 
102 At para. 51. 
103 Reich, C. A., "The New Property", (1964) 73(5) Yale Law Journal 733. 
104 Ibid., at pp. 734-739. 
105 Reich was particularly disturbed by the case of Fleming v. Nestor 363 U. S. 603 (1960). Nestor had 
arrived in the U. S. in 1913 and, upon retirement in 1955, became eligible for old age benefits (his 
employers had made regular contributions). However, following the revelation that he had been a 
member of the Communist party between 1930 and 1939 he was deported and the payment of benefits to 
his wife was terminated. The Supreme Court decided that the benefits constituted a gratuity and that the 
state was under no contractual obligation to maintain them. See Reich, op. cit., at pp. 768-769. 
106 Op. cit., at pp. 771. 
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However, during the industrial revolution, the idea of liberty based upon property 
became increasingly vested in the tangible resource itself; societal constraints on the 
use of resources were ousted. Thus a person could do as he wished with his land, even 
if this was at the expense of his neighbours107. Reich argued that, as a result of such 
abuses, powers were increasingly transferred from the private to the public sector 
during the early part of the twentieth century108. However, Government itself became 
guilty of the same abuses: 
"Government as an employer, or as dispenser of wealth, has used the 
theory that it was handing out gratuities to claim a managerial power as 
great as that which the capitalists claimed. Moreover, the corporations 
allied themselves with, or actually took over, part of government's 
system of power. Today, it is the combined power of government and 
the corporations that presses against the individual. "109 
Reich concluded that the only way to safeguard essential benefits conferred by 
government largess would be to establish proprietary rights in those interests. He also 
argued that there was no conceptual difficulty with such an approach. The notion of 
property is an invention of society and may be adapted to suit society's needs 11o Thus, 
governments may confer proprietary interests in benefits it1 and stipulate the terms 
upon which those benefits are held: 
"Once property is seen not as a natural right but as a construction 
designed to serve certain functions, then its origin ceases to be decisive 
in determining how much regulation should be imposed. The conditions 
that can be attached to receipt, ownership, and use depend not on where 
property came from, but on what job it should be expected to 
perform. "112 
Thus, according to this view, property vests in rights and duties associated with use of 
a resource rather than the resource itself. Macpherson argues that there was originally 
a much broader conception of property which, apart from the right to exclusive 
possession, included "an individual right not to be excluded from the use or 
enjoyment of things the society had declared to be for common use - common lands, 
107 Ibid., at p. 772. 
108 Ibid., at p. 773. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid., at pp. 771-772. 
111 Reich made the point that rights in real property ultimately vest in the state and were originally 
conferred by the Crown (before US independence). In the UK it is the case that property ultimately 
reverts to the Crown as bona vacantia in the absence of an individual who can show title. See Reich, op. 
cit at p. 778. 
11 J Ibid., at p. 779. 
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parks, roads, waters" 113 Hence, the right to exclusive possession of an area of land 
would have to be balanced against, for example, the grazing rights of others. 
In common with Reich, Macpherson argues that it is only since the growth of free 
market economics that the conception of property has narrowed to the resource itself 
and the right to exclude others: 
"[W]ith the predominance of the market, all individual's effective 
rights, liberties, ability to develop their own persons and exercise their 
own capacities came to depend so much on the amount of their material 
property that it was not unrealistic to equate their individual property 
with their material property. "114 
As the right not to be excluded was not marketable it "virtually dropped out of 
sight" 115 
In earlier epoques, individuals enjoyed a form of proprietary interest in certain socially 
valued resources with the result that a private individual could not appropriate such 
resources and exclude all others from benefiting from them. Macpherson points out 
that in pre-market societies there were established "legal rights not only to life but to a 
certain quality of life. Thus: 
"the rights of different orders or ranks, guild masters, journeymen, 
apprentices, servants and labourers; serfs, freemen and noblemen; 
members of the first and second and third estates. All of these were 
rights, enforced by law or custom, to a certain standard of life, not just 
to material means of life, but also of liberties, privileges, honour, and 
status. And these rights could be seen as properties. "116 
Hence, interests which are currently being developed as human rights issues such as 
the right to a certain quality of life were viewed as property rights. Furthermore, 
Macpherson argues that this is a more democratic notion of property than one which 
merely focuses on the right to exclude others from the use of a resource. 
These arguments may seem highly theoretical, however, Gray117 points to certain 
areas in which, at least in the United States, there are signs of a return to such a 
113 Macpherson, C. B., 
114 Ibid., at pp. 74-75. 
115 Ibid., at p. 75. 
116 
117 
Ibid., at p. 77. 
Op. cit. 
"Human Rights as Property Rights", (1977) 24 Dissent 72, at p. 73. 
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conception of property. For example, he refers to the development of a concept of 
quasi public places 118 such as shopping centres and parks in which, despite being 
privately owned, certain test cases have established that the public has a right not to be 
unreasonably excluded from them119 Thus, certain obligations are placed on land 
holders which may be enforced by the beneficiaries of those obligations with the result 
that the public gain a form of "equitable ownership of the resource". This is 
exemplified by developments which have taken place in environmental law where, 
Gray argues that: 
"[T]he vital ecological resources of the earth are increasingly seen as 
governed by a trust for the preservation of environmental quality under 
conditions of reasonable shared access for all citizens. Meaningful 
reference can thus begin to be made to the collective beneficial rights of 
the generalised public in respect of strategically important 
environmental assets. "120 
It is possible to detect the emergence of this concept of `stewardship' in the famous 
dissenting judgment of Douglas J. in Sierra Club v. Morton 121. The case concerned 
whether the Sierra Club, which undertakes conservation work and promotes outdoor 
pursuits, had standing to seek injunctive relief in order to restrain environmentally 
harmful commercial development of the Mineral King Valley in the Sierra Nevada of 
Northern California. Standing was denied by the majority, however, in his dissenting 
judgment, Douglas J. appeared to suggest that there could be such a thing as a public 
trust doctrine in ecological resources. He argued that those persons who have a 
"meaningful" or "intimate" relationship with the resource such as those who "hike it, 
fish it, hunt it, camp in it, frequent it, or visit it merely to sit in solitude and 
wonderment must be in a position to speak for its values. "122 Unless there was some 
means of affording indirect standing to ecological resources through the use of 
representative actions; "priceless bits of Americana (such as a valley, or alpine 
meadow, a river or a lake) [would be] forever lost or... so transformed as to be reduced 
to the eventual rubble of our urban environment. "123 At one point Douglas J. 
appeared to take the radical approach advocated by Stone124 who argued that the 
elements which comprise the environment itself such as flora and fauna should be 
1118 19 
Op. cit., at pp. 172-181. 
See, for example, Robins v. Prune Yard Shopping Center 592 P2d 341 (1979), afd sub nom Prune 
Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 US 74,64 L Ed 2d 741 (US Supreme Court 1980) . 120 Op. cit., at p. 189. 
405 US 727,31 L. Ed 2d 636 (1972). 
122 Ibid., at 648f. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Stone, C, "Should Trees have Standing? - Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects", 45 
S Cal L 
Rev 450 (1972). 
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regarded as possessing rights themselves which interested parties should be capable of 
enforcing in the capacity of a form of guardian ad litern: 
"inarticulate members of the ecological group cannot speak... those 
people who have to frequent the place as to know its values and 
wonders will be able to speak for the entire ecological community. "125 
Such an approach opens a philosophical debate, however, whether a representative 
action is viewed as upholding the public interest in an ecological resource or the 
resource itself the practical result is the same. However, Douglas J. also appeared to 
recognize that the beneficial interests which he listed may be extremely diffuse and 
difficult to quantify. For example, how many times must a hiker visit an area before he 
is regarded as having a beneficial interest in the resource? It is for this reason that 
Douglas J. was in favour of affording standing to groups with a special interest in the 
environment such as the Sierra Club. 
Thus the recognition in public law that there is a right to an unpolluted environment on 
the grounds that it is an important aspect of the quality of life is mirrored by 
developments in private law in the US which recognize that the public has an equitable 
proprietary interest in the maintenance of a certain quality of life. The use of private 
mechanisms as a means of protecting rights which are normally considered as 
belonging to the realms of public law may appear radical. However, as Macpherson 
has pointed out, there is historical precedent for such an approach. Furthermore, in a 
society which is dominated by and governed in accordance with the notion of property 
the only effective way to protect those rights is to assimilate them with the institutions 
of property. The argument in favour of harnessing the property institutions as a means 
of protecting fundamental rights is most clearly set out by Gray explains (drawing on 
the work of Macpherson): 
"It may, of course, be asked why the interests represented in the new 
equitable property are not merely urged as human or civil rights. The 
answer must be the one given by Professor Macpherson: `We have 
made property so central to our society that any thing and any rights 
that are not property are very apt to take second place. ' 126 In adopting 
the terminology of equitable property we lock into the insidiously 
powerful leverage of the primal claim, `it's mine', and we harness this 
claim for more constructive social purposes. When important assets of 
the human community are threatened, we are able to say with collective 
force, `You can't do that: those assets are ours. ' When you pollute our 
125 Per Dougals J., at p. 653. 
126 Op. cit., at p. 77. 
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air or our rivers or exclude us unreasonably from wild and open spaces, 
we can mobilise the enormous symbolic and emotional impact of the 
property attribution by asserting that you are taking away some of our 
property "127 
Thus, Gray concludes that there is no "unbridgeable gulf' 128 between public and 
private law in that it is conceptually possible to harness private law as a means of 
securing public interest objectives such as environmental protection. As he goes on to 
state: 
"The constant imposition of social and moral limits on the scope of 
`property' necessarily entails that private property can never be truly 
private. It has always been one of the fundamental features of a 
civilised society that exclusory claims of property stop where the 
infringement of more basic human freedoms begins. - 129 
It is apparent that most developments towards the establishment of a concept of 
equitable property in ecological resources have occurred in the United States, 
however, there is evidence to suggest that the concept may also become firmly 
established in European jurisdictions. Gray notes that the EC may be instrumental in 
developing a concept of environmental rights enforceable by individuals: 
"Inevitably there will remain some who cannot, even in their wildest 
dreams, envisage such `equitable property' vested in the 
community... Yet there is today one set of institutions which, in this and 
many other contexts, may convert even your wildest thoughts into 
present reality. These institutions are, of course, the institutions of the 
European Community of the European Union. - 130 
As will be seen in the next chapter, EC intervention in the field of civil liability for 
environmental damage may be instrumental in the establishment of a form of equitable 
property in the environment in Europe. 
4. THE EFFECT OF INSURANCE ON THE ROLE OF TORT 
As stated above, it is not possible to consider the role of tort in isolation from the issue 
of insurance; historically, the availability of insurance has affected the development of 
tort. Thus the extent to which tort may fulfil a useful role, as a means of environmental 
protection, is partly dependant upon the availability of insurance for environmental 
127 Op. cit., at p. 210. 
Op. cit., at p. 211. 
129 
128 
Ibid. 
130 Ibid., p. 205. 
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damage. However, there are particular problems associated with providing insurance 
cover in this area. 
4.1 Public Liability Policies and the `Pollution Exclusion' 
Claims arising from pollution have usually been indemnified by public liability 
policies (comprehensive general liability (CGL) in the United States). However, 
following a rapid increase in claims arising from pollution in the early 1970s131, 
insurance companies in the US sought to exclude pollution from CGL policies save for 
that which was caused by "sudden and accidental escapes". 132 In 1991 the Association 
of British Insurers (ABI) advised British insurers to follow suit and proposed a 
standard endorsement as follows: 
"This policy excludes all liability in respect of Pollution or 
Contamination other than pollution caused by a sudden, identifiable, 
unintended and unexpected accident133 which takes place in its entirety 
at a specific time and place during the period of insurance. "134 
Thus, as regards public liability, the general position is now that only costs resulting 
from an unexpected and temporal event, such as an explosion135, can be recovered 
under the terms of the policy. In the US certain courts have, on occasion, attacked the 
exclusion by finding that `sudden' denotes any unexpected event rather than a 
131 See Clark, S., "Pollution gives general insurers cold feet", (1994) 34 International Corporate Law 
25. 
132 The ISO pollution exclusion provides: "This policy does not apply to.. . property 
damage arising out 
of the discharge, dispersal or release or escape of smoke, vapours, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic 
chemicals, liquids, or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon 
land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of water: but this exclusion does not apply if such 
discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental. " For an overview of the manner in which 
the exclusion has been interpreted in the US see Nyssens, A., "Pollution Insurance: The Seepage of 
American Influence" [ 1996] Environmental Liability 11. 
133 It should be noted that, in insurance law, accident means any unexpected event from the point of 
view of the insured; this does not always mean a calamitous occurrence such as a crash. For example, in 
Mills v. Smith (Sinclair Third Party) [1964] 1 Q. B. 30, it was found that damage caused by encroaching 
tree roots could constitute an accident for the purposes of property insurance. In Trim Joint District 
School Board of Management v. Kelly [ 1914] AC 667 the following test was proposed: "If, so far as the 
property is concerned, unexpected misfortune happens and damage is caused, the insured is to be 
indemnified". See Merkin, R. M. and McGee, A. (1989-90), Insurance Contract Law, London: Kluwer, at 
B. 10.6. 
134 ABI, Ref: g/250/065, July 23,1990. 
135 See Staefa Control-Systems, Inc. v. St. Paul's Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 847 F. Supp. 1460, 
1468 (N. D. Cal. 1994), "[T]he `sudden accident' exception applies only to events that occur quickly, 
such as an explosion. " 
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temporal occurrence. 136 However, these decisions are exceptional and the view that 
the event should have a temporal quality has now largely been restored137. 
In the UK, an exclusion of this type was upheld in Middleton v. Wiggins138. In this 
case a waste disposal company, which had been found liable in respect of an 
explosion caused by a build up of methane gas emanating from a landfill site, claimed 
indemnity under their public liability policy. The insurers sought to rely on an 
endorsement which excluded liability for damage arising from "the disposal of waste 
materials in the way the insured intended to dispose of them unless such claim arises 
from an accident in the method of disposal. " In the Court of Appeal, Hutchison L. J. 
held that the accident was not "in the method of disposal" since the unforeseen events 
which caused the explosion occurred after the waste had been disposed of139 
McCowan L. J., dissenting, considered that the process of putrefaction and degradation, 
which causes methane gas, should be regarded as an integral part of the method of 
disposal140 
However, the exclusion may not insulate insurers from `long tail' risks. A catastrophic 
event, such as an explosion, may cause immediate property damage and personal 
injuries, in addition, any chemicals released may lead to long term contamination of 
the surrounding area. The effects of the contamination may not manifest themselves 
until years later. As most policies are underwritten on an `occurrence' basis insurance 
companies are obliged to meet any claims resulting from accidents, occurring during 
the period of cover, irrespective of whether the policy has expired141. As a result, they 
136 See, for example, Jackson Township Municipal Utilities Authority v. Hartford Accident and 
Indemnity Company, 451 A. 2d 990 (N. J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982). The plaintiff in this case had been 
held liable in respect of damage caused by contaminants which had leached from a landfill site into a 
water supply. Despite the fact that the policy excluded pollution, save for that which was caused by 
sudden and accidental escapes, and that the pollution had occurred over a twelve year period the court 
held that the plaintiff could recover its costs under its insurance policy. 
137 Ranney, N. B., and Ardisson, S., "Recent Developments in California in Respect of the `Sudden and 
Accidental' Exception to the Pollution Exclusion", (1995) 2 International Journal of Insurance Law 
123. The predominant view is that sudden and accidental connotes a temporal quality. See, for example 
Trico Industries Inc. v. Travellers Indemnity Company 853 F. Supp. 1190 (C. D. Cal. 1944). In this case 
the plaintiff company sought to recover costs under its general liability incurred under the Superfund 
Programme as a result of chemical waste contamination at its site caused by the activities of a previous 
occupier. Trico argued that the term "sudden" was ambiguous and should be interpreted in its favour so 
as to read "unexpected". However, the court rejected this argument on the grounds that "most recent 
decisions... indicate the emerging majority rule to be that `sudden' contains a temporal element". Applying 
this to the facts of the case in question it was found that "the decade of continuous pollution at the site 
was not abrupt, quick or immediate. Since this pollution did not occur suddenly, plaintiffs settlement 
paments are not covered under the INA policies... " 3 [1996] Env L. R. 17. 1 
139 Ibid., at pp. 24-25. 
140 Ibid., at p. 28. 141 Knight v. Faith (1850) 15 Q. B. 649, per Lord Campbell C. J., at p. 667; Daff v. Midland Colliery 
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may find themselves liable in respect of unforeseen damage. In the US, for example, 
the unforeseen long term consequences of an intentional act have been found to 
constitute unexpected events covered by the exception to the pollution exclusion 142 
As a result of such problems, certain insurers in the US have attempted to entirely 
exclude liability for environmental damage from CGL policies143. It would be more 
difficult for European Insurers to take this step en masse due to EU competition rules 
which may prevent them from operating as a cartel144. Nevertheless, the mere threat 
of the total withdrawal of insurance companies from this market would certainly not 
be conducive to an increased role for tort as a means of environmental protection. 
However, as the environmental damage field is a potentially lucrative market, the 
insurance industry has begun investigating solutions. 
4.2 Environmental Impairment Liability 
In recent years insurance companies have developed specialist environmental 
impairment liability (EIL) policies designed to fund clean up costs associated with 
accidents. At present the product is only offered by a limited number of companies in 
the UK, principally, AIG Europe (UK), ECS Underwriters (as agents for Reliance 
Insurers), Swiss Re, Michael Payne Syndicate at LLoyd's and Sun Alliance. 145 
Such policies are expensive as they are not available `off the peg' and must be tailor 
made according to the nature of the environmental hazard at a particular site. To this 
Owners' Indemnity Co (1913) 6 BWCC 799, per Lord Moulton, at p. 820. See generally, Hardy-Evamy, 
E. R. (1993), General Principles of Insurance Law, Butterworths, chapter 37. 
142 In Waste Management Inc v. Peerless Insurance Co, 340 S. E. 2d (N. C. 1986) the insured were 
covered because, although the discharge of toxins into a landfill was intentional, the subsequent 
contamination of a drinking water supply was unexpected and unintended. 
143 Nyssens, op. cit., has found two decisions in which a total exclusion has been upheld by the courts, 
viz, Titan Holding Syndicate Inc v. City of Keene, 898 F. 2d 265 (1 Cir. 1990) and Park-Ohio Industries 
Inc v. Home Indemnity Co, 975 F. 2d 1215 (6 Cir. 1992). The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected a total 
exclusion in South Central Bell Telephone Co v. Ka Jon Food Stores of Louisiana Inc and Others, 
93-CC-2926, May 1994, however, this was largely due to the fact that the insurers had misled the 
insurerd as to the inclusion and effect of the endorsement. 
144 Layard argues that a co-ordinated position adopted by the British Insurance Industry as a whole, 
which affects the competitiveness of other groupings, could amount to an abuse "... of a dominant 
position within the common market or within a substantial part of it" contrary to Article 82 EC (86 prior 
to the Treaty of Amsterdam). See Layard, A., "Insuring Pollution in the UK" [1996] Environmental 
Liability 17, at p. 18. However, it is more likely that such an agreement could fall foul of Article 81 EC 
(85 prior to Treaty of Amsterdam) which restricts agreements between undertakings which "[L]imit or 
control production, markets, technical development, or investment". Article 86 is designed to control 
restrictive practices adopted by specific dominant companies rather than entire business sectors. See 
Craig, P. and De Burca G. (1998), EULaw, Oxford University Press, at pp. 972-975. 
145 See Holmes, R., and Broughton, M., "Insurance Cover for Damage to the Environment", 9513 
Estates Gazette 123, at p. 124. 
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end the party seeking insurance must first answer a detailed questionnaire regarding 
the nature of his activities and the history of the site. The insurers may then appoint 
environmental consultants, at the prospective insured's expense146, to conduct an on 
site inspection and produce a detailed report. Based upon this information147 risk 
engineers will make a recommendation as to whether cover should be offered; if this is 
favourable the underwriters will draft a policy. 
However, EIL policies in the UK do not serve as `blank cheques' to meet open ended 
costs. This is because the insurers have chosen to insert `claims made' triggers rather 
than the more usual `occurrence' tnggers148. Thus, the insured may only seek 
indemnity in respect of claims made during the currency of the policy or within a 
specified period after its expiration. This insulates the insurers from the problem of 
`long tail' risks. Although claims made policies are legal under English Law149 they 
have been ruled illegal in certain European jurisdictions or subjected to statutory 
controlslso These restrictions have been counter-productive in that the development 
of the EIL market in the UK and US is largely due to the legality of claims made 
policies. 151 
A further restriction is that the insured may only seek indemnity in respect of 
fortuitous as opposed to inevitable escapes. This precludes latent damage caused 
during the normal course of operations without any breach of applicable regulations. 
To this end a standard clause has emerged in EIL policies which excludes: 
"Any liability arising from Environmental Impairment which is 
inevitable having regard to the cumulative effects of the normal 
Business of the Insured and where the harmful nature of any 
contaminant or irritant was known or should reasonably have been 
known by the Insured. "152 
146 Ibid. An independent survey costs between £3,500 and £5,000. 
147 See Marshall, R., "Environmental Impairment - Insurance Perspectives", (1994) 3(2/3) Review of 
European Community and International Environmental Law 153, at p. 156. The particular factors to be 
taken into account include type of activity; materials used; geology of the site; the flow of watercourses; 
prevailing meteorological conditions; political climate (e. g. media coverage, activity of pressure groups); 
managerial attitudes; claims history; compliance with regulations etc. 148 Ibid., at p. 154-155. 
149 Pennsylvania Co for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities v. Mumford [1920] 2 K. B. 537; 
Maxwell v. Price [1960] 2 Lloyd's Rep 155. See Hardy-Ivamy, op. cit., at p. 405. 
150 See Lee, R. G., "Claims-Made Policies: European Occurrences" [1994] Environmental Liability 25. 
See Lee, op. cit., and Marshall, op. cit., at p. 154-155. 
152 See Marshall, op. cit., at p. 156. Thus in a case such as Cambridge Water (assuming for the moment 
that it had been possible to bring a claim during the period of cover) the exclusion would not have 
precluded Cambridge Water from indemnification. It will be recalled that the hazardous nature of the 
chemical released was not known at the material time. 
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This is consistent with general principles of English Law which provide that an insured 
cannot, at the insurer's expense, purchase the right to continue a nuisancels3 
Despite these limitations, EIL policies still afford more scope for the recovery of costs, 
associated with pollution damage, than claims brought under the sudden and 
accidental exemption to the pollution exclusion in public liability policies. This is 
because they are specifically geared to providing indemnity in respect of accidental 
pollution. For example, in Middleton v. Wiggins it will be recalled that a very 
restrictive interpretation was placed on the exception to the pollution exclusion. Thus 
the insured could not claim in respect of the on-going hazard caused by the landfill. 
Such costs are, however, anticipated by the specialist Landfill Cover EIL policy 
offered by the Swiss Re-insurance Company. This provides cover while waste is being 
dumped (the `active' period) and for ten years after the site has been filled in (the 
`passive' period)154 Had such a policy operated in a case such as Middleton v. 
Wiggins the operators would have been indemnified notwithstanding the fact that the 
site had been closed. 
4.3 Re-evaluation of Existing Public Liability Policies 
It is doubtful whether the EIL market can provide a complete solution, in the short 
term at least, to the problem of insuring against environmental damage. To date, only a 
limited number of companies offer the product in the UK and the market in other 
European countries has been limited by hostility to `claims made' triggers. 
This has led Holmes and Broughton155 to consider whether it would be viable for 
insurers to continue using public liability policies in this context, subject to the 
pollution exclusion. Above it was noted that claims brought under the exception to the 
exclusion, namely damage resulting from sudden and accidental escapes, may expose 
insurers to far greater clean up costs than they anticipated. Holmes and Broughton 
argue that insurers have been short sighted in continuing to offer this form of pollution 
cover, as part of public liability policies, without requiring any site surveys and 
without increasing premiums accordingly. Hence the potentially huge costs associated 
1153 54 
Corbin v. Payne, The Times, October 11 1990. 
See Marshall, op. cit., at p. 157. The insured's premiums are held in a fund together with an 
additional lump sum payment. Any liabilities incurred during the passive phase are met from the fund. If 
no liabilities are incurred, the lump sum payment will be returned at the expiration of the policy. 155 Op cit., at pp. 124-125. 
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with clean up156 are effectively provided "free of charge"157 as part of standard `off 
the peg' public liability policies. Holmes and Broughton conclude that the solution 
may be for insurers to require risk assessments as standard before agreeing to offer 
public liability insurance covering accidental pollution158. They point out that, in 
order to reduce costs, it would be a relatively straightforward task to categorize 
activities according to risk on the basis of the information supplied by the insured159. 
This is not necessarily an onerous requirement in that many operators are already 
accustomed to producing such information for the purpose of risk assessments 160 
Indeed, there is now a British Standard (BS7750) for conducting environmental hazard 
audits. Detailed site surveys, of the type introduced under EIL, could be reserved for 
the more hazardous classifications. 
4.4 Effect of Insurance on Risk Management 
The existence of insurance does not undermine the element of individual 
accountability associated with liability in tort. Insurance is principally designed to 
provide cover in respect of fortuitous events such as accidents. In order to reduce the 
risk of such events occurring, insurers may exert a great deal of influence on operators 
to reduce the risk of accidents. This is certainly the case as regards the provision of 
EIL cover. As described above, detailed site audits must be undertaken and any 
deficiencies corrected before cover will be offered; this will usually be followed by 
annual assessments as part of the renewal process. Furthermore, it may be a condition 
of cover that certain pollution prevention measures are adopted. 161 Thus, far from 
156 For example, in the aftermath of the fire at a warehouse owned by Sandoz in Schweizerhalle, 
Switzerland, in which water used to fight the fire washed chemicals into a river, clean up costs amounted 
to £57m. Sandoz successfully claimed all costs from their insurers. See Holmes and Broughton, op. cit., 
at p. 124. 157 See Schubert, M. (manager Casualty Facultative, Cologne RE), "Sitting on a Time Bomb", Post 
Magazine (insurance trade journal) March 9 1995: "For many industrial and commercial operations the 
environmental hazard is a prime exposure. Nevertheless, in the majority of cases this hazard is neither 
assessed nor rated properly. Many insurers are knowingly providing cover for an exposure that has 
grown exponentially, and they are doing so indiscriminately and virtually free of charge. " 158 Op. cit., at p. 124-125. 
159 Ibid. 
160 See, for example EC Directive 82/501/EEC (OJ No. L 230/1) on the major accident hazards of 
certain industrial activities, the `Seveso Directive' (as amended by Directives 87/216/EEC and 
88/610/EEC); implemented in the UK through the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1984, 
SI No. 1902, as amended. This requires specified operators to carry out detailed risk assessments for the 
purpose of drawing up emergency contingency plans. See Mumma, A. (1995), Environmental Law - 
Meeting UK and EC Requirements, McGraw-Hill, at pp. 200-20 1. 
161 British and European Insurers advocate the establishment of a set of environmental compliance 
conditions for environmental policies. See Lewis, Kirk, D., "Deterring Pollution", (1995) Business 
Insurance 23; McDonald, J., "Financial Responsibility Requirements: Liability Insurance as an 
Environmental Management Tool" [ 1996] Environmental Liability 2. 
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absolving polluters of liability, insurance companies may be instrumental in requiring 
polluters to reduce the risk of their activities. As the chief executive of a major insurer 
has stated: 
"We feel insurance and loss prevention go hand in hand with proactive 
environmental protection. From an economic viewpoint, it is more 
profitable to employ resources in prevention than in paying insurance 
claims. "162 
To date, the provision of cover for sudden and accidental escapes under standard 
public liability policies has not been accompanied by similar incentives for the 
management of environmental risks. Nevertheless, as a matter economic necessity, 
insurers will soon have to remedy this situation by introducing measures of the type 
described by Holmes and Broughton. 163 
Existing public liability policies do, however, provide an incentive for the insured to 
limit the consequences of pollution due to the fact that the insured is under a general 
duty to mitigate the loss. This is demonstrated by the case of Yorkshire Water Services 
Ltd v. Sun Alliance and London Insurance Plc164 which concerned damage caused by 
the deposit of sewage sludge into a river. The sewage affected an ICI chemical works 
which, somewhat ironically, found itself as the victim of pollution. Yorkshire Water 
settled a claim of £300,000 with ICI and sought to recover this amount under its public 
liability policy. In addition it claimed costs in respect of alleviation work it had carried 
out in order to limit the spread of the sewage. Yorkshire Water argued that they should 
be indemnified in respect of these costs since they mitigated the loss which the 
insurers may otherwise have had to meet. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument 
and held that there was no implied term in the policy which would allow the recovery 
of such costs. A loss which had not yet occurred could not be quantified. 
Thus, there is a close link between the conduct of the insured and the availability of 
insurance. The viability of the insurance contract very much depends upon the ability 
of the insured to mitigate the losses passed to the insurers. Thus, in this respect, 
although insurance introduces notions of distributional justice, it also dovetails with 
the corrective functions of tort in that it is consistent with individual accountability. 
This limits the availability of insurance, and hence the role of tort, as a means of 
environmental protection in cases where the insured does not have the opportunity to 
162 A. Konswold, quoted in Lewis-Kirk, op. cit., n. 41. 163 Op. cit. 
164 [1997] 2 LLoyd's Rep. 21. 
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internalize any of the costs for which he is held liable. This problem is particularly 
acute in the case of historic pollution. 
4.5 The Problem of Historic Pollution 
On occasion, it has been mooted whether tort can play any part in the allocation of 
responsibility for historic pollution. For example, in its response to the House of 
Commons Select Committee Report on Contaminated Land, the UK Government 
stated: 
"The Committee have recommended that there should be a clearer 
position on liability for damage caused by contamination and that 
urgent attention should be given to the possibility of creating statutory 
liability. That recommendation has arisen from the Committee's 
discovery that there appear to be no reported cases in the UK 
concerning the application of relevant common law principles to 
contaminated land issues... 
... 
The Government's basic view is that the firm UK common law 
tradition should only be set aside where it is clearly demonstrated that 
such principles are inappropriate. Consequently, the case for statutory 
liability should first depend upon a test of the current principles in the 
Courts. In particular, Rylands v. Fletcher could have extensive 
implications in its application to questions of contamination. -165 
Since this statement the House of Lords has made it clear, in Cambridge Water v. 
Eastern Counties Leather166, that there is no prospect of the common law being used 
to hold operators liable in respect of historic pollution. It will be recalled from chapter 
2 that Lord Goff stated that it would be for the legislature to develop civil liability in 
this manner. However, it would not be advisable for the legislature to take this step for 
the following reasons. 
Such an application would divest tort of its corrective functions and convert it into a 
purely distributional instrument. As the pollution has already occurred the responsible 
parties are not in a position to internalize any of the costs. Thus, if such a scheme were 
to be introduced, in may cases, insurers would bear the brunt of unmitigated losses. 
165 Contaminated Land, Government Response to First Report of the House of Commons Environment 
Committee, Cm. 1161, July 1990, p. 13 at 4.13. 
166 [1994] 2 A. C. 264. 
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This would no doubt lead to the total exclusion of cover for any form of pollution 
damage167. 
This is demonstrated by the experience in the United States where an attempt was 
made to finance the clean up of contaminated land under the Comprehensive 
, 
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act 1981 (CERCLA)168 
commonly referred to as `Superfund'. 
The scheme was instigated following the `Love Canal' incident which highlighted the 
problem of contaminated land169. CERCLA introduced a scheme which empowers the 
State to effect the clean up of designated areas of contaminated land170 and to recover 
the costs from `responsible parties' who include both present and past operators. 
Liability for clean up costs is strict171 and joint and several between the responsible 
parties. Thus, the present occupier of a site may find himself held responsible for full 
clean up costs even though the bulk of the contamination may have been attributable 
to a previous operator172. Where it is not possible to trace any responsible party costs 
have to be recovered from a central clean up fund which is financed through taxes on 
polluting industries . 
173 
167 Prior to the Court of Appeal judgment in Cambridge Water v. Eastern Counties Leather, the 
Association of British Insurers (ABI) issued a press release which stated that, if the Court found in favour 
of Cambridge Water, its members would be forced to withdraw cover for pollution altogether. See 
La yard, op. cit., at p. 18. 
168 42 U. S. C. 9601 et seq. 
169 Between 1942 and 1953, the Hooker Chemical Company dumped 21,000 tons of chemical waste 
into an abandoned canal, known as the Love Canal, in Niagara Falls, New York. The area of land 
including the canal was sold in 1953 to the local board of education which built a school upon the site; 
over the years that followed this gave rise to an entire community. In the 1970s contaminated 
groundwater began seeping into basements and yards. In May 1980 President Jimmy Carter declared a 
state of emergency and ordered the relocation of 710 families. 
170 For this purpose the Environmental Protection Agency compiles a National Priorities list setting out 
those sites most urgently in need of clean-up. Due to the scale of the problem, only about 4% of 
contaminated sites reported to the EPA are included on the list. See Sacripanti, P. J., and Traeger, K. E., 
"Super clean", Environment Risk (1991) 1, pp. 13-20. 
171 CERCLA paragraph 107(a), 42 USC paragraph 9607(a). These provisions are silent as to the need 
to establish fault and have therefore been interpreted as establishing strict liability. 172 This is subject to certain limited defences set out in paragraph 107(b), 42 USC paragraph 9607(b): 
these include act of God; act of war; acts solely attributable to independent contractors. In addition 
paragraph 101(35)(A), 42 USC paragraph 9601 (3 5)(A) provides a limited "innocent landowner" defence 
which may be relied upon by persons who made "all appropriate inquiry" prior to purchasing a property 
and had no knowledge of the contamination. Furthermore, paragraph 107(j), 42 USC paragraph 9607(j) 
provides a defence in respect of "federally permitted releases" i. e. releases made in pursuance of a 
discharge consent. 
173 Taxes are apportioned between various industries as follows: $550m PA from petroleum excise 
taxes; $275m PA from chemical feedstock excise taxes. In addition, Congress occasionally supplements 
the fund with appropriations from general taxes. The cost of clean-up under Superfund amounts to $35m 
per year, thus, in order to safeguard the fund, it is necessary to recover from a responsible party wherever 
possible. The State succeeds in recovering approximately 60% of clean up costs from responsible parties. 
125 
The Role of Tort in an Environmental Context 
The scheme resulted in massive losses for insurers 174 and led many to withdraw cover 
for pollution damage altogether175. This led to the closure of certain companies who 
could not pursue their activities without appropriate insurance cover. It could be 
argued that, in certain cases, such an outcome would be desirable if it resulted in the 
discontinuance of a harmful activity. However, this does not, of course, take into 
account the fact that there may be advantages associated with the activity which 
outweigh the disadvantages. For example, certain companies involved in the 
management of hazardous waste were unable to continue their activities on the 
grounds that they were unable to obtain cover176. From an environmental perspective 
this was counterproductive in that hazardous waste cannot be disposed of safely 
without such companies. 
For this reason it is important that the role of tort does not become embroiled in the 
debate regarding the clean up of historic pollution. Tort rules, backed by insurance, 
govern present and future conduct, it is inappropriate to use the system as a means of 
dealing with the consequences of past activities when different standards pervaded. 
The linking of tort with the issue of historic pollution has deflected attention from the 
use of tort in future and has had a deleterious effect on the development of new 
insurance strategies. As Marshall notes: "Is there any incentive for a buyer of insurance 
to invest in the future, particularly when the focus is on the past and the problems of 
today? " 177 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
It is conceptually possible to harness private law in pursuit of public interest 
objectives. The pluralistic view of tort, perhaps grounded in Englard's interpretation of 
the theory of complementarity, provides a sound philosophical basis for the use of tort 
See Sacripanti and Traeger, op. cit. 174 In 1994 Lloyd's of London announced that they had incurred losses of £2bn and that half this loss 
was due to worsening asbestosis and pollution claims in the United States. See Holmes and Broughton, 
op cit. 
175 See Huber, P. (1988) "Environmental Hazards and Liability Law", in R. E. Litan and C. Winston 
Liability Perspectives and Policy, The Brookings Institution. ýeds. ) 
76 See US Department of Justice (1986), Report of the Tort Policy Working Group on the Causes, 
Extent and Policy Implications of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability, 
Washington D. C. Forty seven companies involved in the management of hazardous waste were 
compelled to close their facilities due to the fact that they were unable to obtain insurance for their 
operations. In another report it was claimed that 400 consulting engineering firms involved in offering 
advice to toxic waste handlers were "refusing to handle toxic waste sites unless their clients protecte[d] 
them from lawsuits", on the grounds that they had been "unable to purchase pollution liability insurance 
in any amount, at any price. " See "New Snag in Toxic Cleanups", New York Times, September 8,1986. 
177 op. cit., at p. 158. 
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in an environmental context. The manner in which tort has developed, particularly 
since the nineteenth century, shows that it is no longer possible to isolate a private 
dispute from the distributional objectives of society. However, it is equally unrealistic 
to determine these distributional objectives in accordance with narrow wealth 
maximization criteria. As Posner now seems to admit, the market may no longer be 
regarded as providing a reliable indicator of the value of natural resources. These 
determinations must now be made by reference to wider criteria including the 
predominant moral and political philosophy; this clearly includes recognition of the 
desirability of environmental protection. 
The law of tort has the capacity to augment regulatory responses by affording each 
member of society the ability to participate in policing the environment. At present, 
this depends upon whether an individual, or organization, can establish a direct 
proprietary interest in the resource affected. However, as the arguments put forward by 
Reich, Macpherson and Gray suggest, it may be possible to extend this approach one 
step further and confer a form of `equitable property' in the environment upon each 
member of society. This would open the way for representative actions undertaken by 
an environmental interest group on the publics' behalf. 
However, although tort can accommodate distributional objectives, it must always be 
borne in mind that its correctional functions serve an important purpose. The element 
of individual accountability associated with tort provides incentives for risk 
management. If tort liability is extended into areas in which their is no opportunity to 
internalize costs, such as historic pollution, insurance becomes unworkable and costs 
unsustainable. 
As will be seen in the next chapter, there is evidence to suggest that the EC is 
particularly attracted by the capacity of civil liability to serve as a means of private 
enforcement of environmental standards. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The EC has been at the forefront of recent initiatives on the introduction of a specialist 
environmental civil liability regime. To date no actual legislation has been 
implemented, however, certain Member States of the EC have already introduced their 
own schemes. Given the fact that most EC environmental legislation is of an 
administrative nature, and is implemented by regulatory authorities, it is not 
immediately apparent where civil liability fits into the EC's environmental strategy. 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore, to explore the reasons for EC intervention in 
this field. The specific proposals generated by the EC initiatives are examined in the 
next chapter. 
In the previous chapter, the idea was introduced that there is a conceptual basis which 
would allow civil liability to be used as a means of protecting environmental rights. A 
nascent concept of environmental rights is beginning to emerge in EC environmental 
policy; below it is argued that EC initiatives on civil liability for environmental 
damage represent an integral part in the development of this concept. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam has recently altered the numbering of articles in the Treaty 
of Rome. Articles will be referred to according to their new numbers, however, in 
order to avoid confusion, the previous numbers will also be indicated. 
2. GENERAL EC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
2.1 Background 
There was no European environmental policy at the inception of the EEC by the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957. In the post-war years the main objective of the EC was to link 
economies in a manner which would facilitate economic expansion and bring about 
increased prosperity, employment and better housing. It was hoped that this would 
create the stable social and economic conditions necessary to ensure a lasting peace in 
Europe. At this time there was no appreciation of how environmental protection might 
be accommodated by this overall strategy. Although public health issues were 
recognized as being associated with the standard of living, the objectives of 
environmental protection in the widest sense of the term and economic expansion 
were generally considered as being irreconcilable; it was the latter objective which 
took priority. 
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However, in the same year as the signing of the Treaty of Rome, a new awareness of 
the heavy price which the environment was having to pay as a result of the pursuit of 
these objectives began to emerge following the publication of the book, Silent Spring, 
by Rachel Carson. This focused on the abuse of pesticides in agriculture and the 
consequential poisoning of birds eggs which, it was feared, would literally result in a 
`Silent Spring'. Ten years later the 1967 Torrey Canyon disaster marked the first in a 
continuing series of highly publicized peace time environmental catastrophes. By 
stirring the public conscience, events such as these created the political climate 
necessary for actions. 
It was against this background that the Community Institutions began to consider 
whether it was desirable to formulate a Community environmental policy. In 1970 the 
Commission sent a memorandum to the Council stating that it was necessary to draw 
up a Community Action Programme on the environment; this was soon followed by a 
formal communication in July 19712. There was then considerable debate as to 
whether action on the environment should take the form of inter-governmental 
agreements and co-ordination of national policies or action at Community level. The 
Commission, following consultation with the Parliament, decided in favour of the 
latter approach and was supported by the October 1972 European Council which 
declared: 
"Economic expansion is not an end in itself. Its firm aim should be to 
enable disparities in living conditions to be reduced. It must take place 
with the participation of all the social partners. It should result in an 
improvement in the quality of life as well as in standards of living. As 
befits the genius of Europe, particular attention will be given to 
intangible values and to protecting the environment, so that progress 
may really be put at the service of mankind. "3 
2.2 Sources of EC Legislation 
In the wake of the above developments the EEC instigated the first in a series of 
environmental action programmes4 which provided a guiding policy framework for the 
implementation of environmental protection measures5. Although environmental 
1 See Kiss, A., and Shelton, D. (1990), Manual of European Environmental Law, Cambridge University 
Press, Chapter 1. 
2 Commission SEC(71)2616 fmal (July 22,1971). 
3 Commission, Sixth General Report (1972), p. 8. 
4 OJ No. C 112 of 20 December 1973. 
5 Action Programmes do not in themselves have any binding effect, rather, they are, "Political 
declarations of intent which take all the measures planned for a certain period, place them in an overall 
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objectives were yet to be incorporated in the Treaty of Rome, it was still possible to 
introduce secondary legislation by virtue of Article 235 (now Article 308) which 
facilitates legislation in the absence of specific Treaty provisions6. 
The Single European Act, which represented the first major overhaul of the Treaty of 
Rome, provided the opportunity to include environmental objectives in the primary 
legislation of the EC. To this end a new chapter, Title XVI (now XIX), was introduced 
which included three new Articles, viz, 130r, 130s and 130t (now Articles 174,175 
and 176 respectively). This provides a specific platform for environmental legislation. 
The Treaty on European Union commenced the process of `greening the treaty'. The 
object of this exercise has been to incorporate environmental objectives into all areas 
of policy so that the environment is not regarded as a distinct policy area. To this end 
the objective of "sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment" 
was inserted into the main aims of the Community as set out in Article 2. The Treaty 
of Amsterdam has removed the rather vague concept of "respecting the environment" 
and introduced the more concrete objective of `sustainable development'. This was 
defined by the Brundtland Commission as follows: 
"Sustainable development is development that meets the need of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs. " 
Doubts have been expressed regarding whether this development will have a 
significant effect on future environmental policy. This is largely because the Treaty 
does not make it clear whether `sustainable development' has priority over 
`sustainable growth'. The two concepts are not necessarily compatible in that 
`sustainable development' cannot mean ever increasing consumption of limited 
resources This would meet the needs of the present at the expense of future 
generations7. 
context, set priorities and, if necessary, introduce or explain changes in due course. " See Krämer, 
L. 
(1990), EEC Treaty and Environmental Protection, Sweet & Maxwell, at p. 2. 
The legality of using Article 235 was confirmed in Case 240/83 ADBHU [1985] E. C. R. 531 concerning 
a directive on the disposal of waste oils. 7 See Haigh, N., (1998), "Introducing the Concept of Sustainable Development into the Treaties of the 
European Union", in T. O'Riordan and H. Voisen (eds. ), The Transition to Sustainability: Politics of 
Agenda 21 in Europe, Earthscan. 
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2.3 Legal Basis 
It is likely that any future legislation on environmental liability would be passed on the 
basis of the Community's environment policy as set out in Title XIX. For a time there 
was also a possibility that legislation on environmental liability could be passed on the 
basis of Article 100a (now Article 95), on approximation of laws affecting the internal 
market8. However, for reasons which shall be discussed in due course this is now most 
unlikely. 
2.3.1 Articles 174,175, and 176 (formerly Articles, 130r, 130s, 130t) 
Article 174(1) sets out the objectives of the EC's environmental policy which are 
stated as being the preservation, protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environment, the protection of human health, and the prudent and rational utilisation 
of resources. Article 174(2) then sets out the principles by which the EC should seek to 
attain these objectives, namely, that action shall be based upon the precautionary 
principle, preventative action should be preferred to remedial measures9; 
environmental damage should be rectified at source and the `polluter pays' principle. 
The original Article 130r(2) also stated that environmental policies should form a 
component of the EC's other policies (the `integration requirement'). This is intended 
to `green the treaty' by ensuring that environmental issues are taken into account in all 
policy areas. However, its location in the Environment Chapter was incompatible with 
this objective in that, as Poostchi states "This failed to give out the necessary political 
message that the integration obligation applied to all policy areas"10. As a result, the 
integration requirement has now been moved to the general principles of Community 
policy where it is set out in a new Article 3C. 
Article 175 sets out the legislative procedure to be followed by the institutionslI and 
Article 176 makes the important assertion that "protective measures adopted pursuant 
8 Defined in Article 14(2) (formerly Article 7a(2)) as "an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons services capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. 9 It is not entirely clear how this differs from the precautionary principle. Krämer has suggested that the 
precautionary principle may refer to the environmental policy as a whole whereas the preventative 
principle refers to the individual action. See Krämer, L. (1995), EC Treaty and Environmental Law, 
Butterworths, at p. 54. 10 Poostchi, B., "The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam - Implications for EU Environmental Law and Policy 
Making", (1998) 7(1) Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 76, at p. 
78. 
11 Until recently, most measures based upon the old Article 130s were subject to qualified majority 
voting (QMV) in Council following the Article 189c (now Article 248) ('co-operation') procedure (an 
enhanced consultation procedure allowing Parliament a second reading and the ability to compel Council 
to act unanimously if it refuses to accept Parliament's recommendations). However, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam will render the new Article 175 subject to the Article 247 (formerly Article 189b) 
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to Article 175 shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing 
more stringent protective measures. " This is provided that such measures are 
compatible with the Treaty and are notified to the Commission. 
2 3.2 Article 95 (formerly Article 100a) 
Articles 174 to 176 are specifically concerned with environmental protection. The 
second limb of the EC's environment policy is concerned with the establishment of the 
internal, or single, market. Legislation related to this area of policy must be based 
upon Article 9512. 
One of the fundamental objectives of the EC is to establish a single market in which 
domestic goods produced in one Member State can compete on an equal footing with 
goods imported from any other Member State. If the laws governing the manufacture 
and distribution of products vary between Member States there is a risk that the market 
will be distorted. For example, it may be more difficult for manufacturers of imported 
goods to comply with the regulations13. Hence, Directives designed to facilitate the 
establishment of the internal market by, for example, harmonizing the laws governing 
certain activities, may be passed on the basis of Article 95. Furthermore, Article 95(3), 
clearly contemplates the implementation of Directives which may also have 
environmental objectives since it provides that, where action is taken concerning 
health, safety, environmental or consumer protection, a high level of protection should 
be achieved. 
2.3.3 Correct Treaty Basis 
The issue of the whether an item of legislation should be based on Article 175 or 95 is 
of importance in that legislation must be based on the most appropriate Article. 
Basing legislation on the wrong Article may constitute a breach of an essential 
procedural requirement. This may render the legislation susceptible to challenge by 
Member States, or other EC Institutions, under the Article 230 (previously Article 173) 
annulment procedure. Furthermore, from a practical point of view, the area of policy 
with which the legislation is primarily concerned determines which of the 
Commissions Directorates assumes responsibility for its enforcement. 
('co-decision') procedure. This is a complex procedure, suffice to say, it affords the Parliament equal 
legislative powers to those enjoyed by the Council; thus, the Council may not proceed without the 
agreement of the Parliament. 12 The European Court of Justice confirmed the legality of basing such measures on Article 100 in Case 
92/79 Commission v. Italy [1980] E. C. R. 1115 concerning Directive 75/716 on the maximum sulphur 
content in liquid fuels. 
13 See Commission v. Denmark (Re Disposable Beer Cans) (case 302/86) [1989] C. M. L. R. 619. 
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As a result of challenges brought under the former Article 173, it has fallen to the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) to determine the circumstances in which 
environmental legislation should be passed on the basis of the former Article 100 or 
100a as opposed to the former 130s. In Case C155/91, Commission v. Council14, 
concerning the correct basis of Directive 91/156 amending framework Directive 
75/442 on waste, the Court of Justice stated that the determining factor was the centre 
of gravity of the Directive; mere ancillary free market effects would not suffice to 
bring the Directive within the ambit of Article 100a. 
The scope of Article 95, as a basis for environmental legislation, has been further 
limited by certain amendments introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam. To recap, the 
former Article 100a(3) placed a responsibility on the Commission to "take as a base a 
high level of protection" when formulating proposals having an environmental impact. 
The new Article 95(3) has added an important proviso which states that this 
determination should take into account "any new development based upon scientific 
fact". Poostchi15 is concerned that the use of the word `fact' denotes conclusive 
scientific evidence; this would not accord with the precautionary principle. By the time 
such evidence is forthcoming the harm is already likely to have occurred. This 
suggests that the EC is still somewhat ambivalent regarding the extent to which it is 
prepared to allow restrictions on trade in pursuit of environmental, or other public 
interest objectives. 16 No such limitation has been introduced into the environment 
chapter (Title XIX). In the next chapter it will be seen that certain environmental 
liability proposals embody the precautionary principle. For example, a reversal of the 
burden of proof on causation may dispense with the need to establish cause and effect 
with scientific certainty. It would be difficult to justify such measures on the basis of 
Article 95 and leads to the inevitable conclusion that Article 176 is the only possible 
basis. This inconsistency is, perhaps, indicative of the fact that the EC has still not 
fully reconciled its internal market and environmental policies. It has yet to establish a 
hierarchy of norms in which environmental considerations take precedence. 
A final consideration, which may also militate against the use of Article 95, is that, 
following changes introduced by Amsterdam, the European Parliament is now less 
14 [1993] E. C. R. 939. 
15 Op. cit., at p. 80. 
16 See, for example, Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany [1987] ECR 1227. Germany sought to 
ban 
the marketing of beer which contained additives. Since this affected 
imports the restriction constituted a 
prima facie breach of the Article 30 (now 28) prohibition on quantitative restrictions. 
Germany sought to 
justify this under the Article 36 (now 30) derogations on the grounds that the measure was necessary 
in 
the interests of public health. However, the ECJ held that the 
defence would not apply as there was 
insufficient scientific evidence from, inter alia, the World Health 
Organization to support this claim. 
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likely to challenge environmental measures on procedural grounds. Previously, the 
Parliament enjoyed greater legislative powers in internal market matters than in 
environmental matters. Whereas measures based under the old Article 100a were 
subject to the co-decision procedure, measures based upon the former Article 130s 
were subject to the co-operation procedure. In order to safeguard its powers, the 
Parliament has challenged environmental measures which it considers should have 
been passed on the basis of internal market policy17. Save for certain exceptions18, 
most environmental measures introduced on the basis of the new Article 175 will now 
also be subject to the co-decision procedure19. This reduces the likelihood of 
`boundary disputes'. 20 
2.4 Subsidiarity 
The concept of subsidiarity was first introduced, exclusively as an aspect of 
environmental policy, by the SEA; this inserted an Article 130r(4) which provided: 
"The Community shall take action relating to the environment to the 
extent to which (objectives) can be better attained at the Community 
Level than at the level of individual Member States. " 
This was superseded by the Maastricht Treaty which expressly adopted the principle of 
subsidiarity as a general principle of EC law. To this end, Article 3b (now Article 5) 
was inserted into the Treaty of Rome which provides: 
"In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of 
Subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can 
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved by the Community. " 
Subsidiarity is an ancient philosophical concept21 which can both limit and facilitate 
action by a higher authority depending upon which of its two etymological origins 
17 See Case 187/93 European Parliament v. Council (Waste Regulation) [1994] E. C. R. 1-2874. 
18 These are set out in Article 175(2) (formerly Article 130s(2)) and include provisions of a fiscal nature; 
measures concerning town and country planning and land use in general; and measures affecting a 
Member State's choice of energy supply. In these cases measures must be passed by unanimity in Council 
following consultation with Parliament. 19 See note 11, above. 20 See Craig, P., and De Bürca, G., (1998), EULaw, Oxford, at p. 1120. 
21 Some academics claim to have traced its origins as far back as Aristotle, see Millon-Delsol, L 'etat 
subsidaire, Paris, PUF, 1992. 
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emphasis is placed22. This will normally depend upon the context in which it arises; in 
the context of European Union it can be viewed as a prescriptive enabling power 
which determines the circumstances in which the EC is entitled to intervene23. In 
short, it seeks to ensure that a higher authority does not overwhelm a lower authority 
and only assumes competence in a matter when this is necessary in order to attain an 
objective. For example, in R v. London Boroughs Transport Committee, ex parte, 
Freight Transport Association24, the House of Lords determined that local authorities 
are in the best position to determine how heavy goods vehicles should be regulated in 
cities in the interests of environmental protection. Lord Templeman reasoned that 
centrally imposed controls cannot take account of the different local factors which 
pertain in each city25. 
Furthermore, even where a case for Community intervention is established, any action 
must only be to the extent necessary to attain the objective. This is known as the 
proportionality principle and is expressed in Article 5 (formerly 3b) as follows: 
"Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of this Treaty. " 
3. DEVELOPMENT OF AN EC ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY POLICY 
3.1 Impetus for EC Action on Civil Liability for Environmental Damage 
Since the instigation of its first Action Programme in 1973, the Community has 
accumulated a substantial body of environmental legislation. However, most 
22 See Council of Europe Research Paper, Definition and limits of the principle of subsidiarity, Local 
and regional authorities in Europe, No. 55, Council of Europe Press 1994, p. 10, "The first meaning of 
the word `subsidiarity' evokes the idea of substitution, hence something of secondary, lesser importance. 
It is in fact the name given in Antiquity to reserve troops. This means that the higher authority, primarily 
the state, can intervene only to the extent to which the lower authority (or the individual) has shown or 
proved its incapacity... The second meaning evokes the idea of help (subsidum) and has the connotation of 
the idea of intervention. " 
23 Thus where the principle is used to determine the allocation of responsibilities between a sovereign 
state and its regions or local authorities, emphasis is placed on the restrictive aspects of the concept in 
that the power relationship is tilted in favour of the higher authority. The Council of Europe Research 
Paper, op. cit., states, at p. 14 "There appears to be a fundamental difference between the Council of 
Europe's approach and that of the EEC. The latter has to find a balance between the political objective of 
union and the initial powers of the states ... while the 
former simply has the priority task of spreading local 
and regional self government as widely as possible, without any interference, in the internal organisation 
of its members. " 24 [1992] 1 C. M. L. R. 5. 
25 Ibid., at paras. 32-33. See generally D'Sa, R. M. (1994), European Community Law and Civil 
Remedies in England and Wales, Sweet & Maxwell, at pp. 72-77. 
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environmental measures take the form of Directives which are designed to achieve an 
overall reduction in the level of pollutants released into the environment during the 
normal course of industrial processes26. This approach does not deal with the 
consequences of abnormal, unintentional pollution either resulting from sudden, large 
scale escapes of noxious substances or gradual accumulations. Such incidents often 
result in the release of high concentrations of pollutants capable of causing damage to 
both real and personal property and, in the most extreme cases, personal injury and 
even death. Thus, in terms of the pressures placed on the environment, the effects of 
such incidents differ considerably from escapes resulting from routine operations. In 
these circumstances there is a need for a mechanism which is capable of securing the 
clean-up of the contamination and reducing the chances of such incidents occurring in 
future. 
This gap in the EC's environmental strategy was highlighted during the 1970s and 80s 
by a number of highly publicized disasters involving the release of extremely harmful 
agents. For example, in 1976 in Seveso, Italy, there was an extremely large scale 
release of one of the most hazardous toxins, tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD) from 
the ICMESA plant. During the production of trichlorophenol, an uncontrollable 
exothermic27 reaction occurred which forced open a safety valve thereby allowing the 
escape of the toxin which then formed a vapour cloud. This was borne by a light wind 
and settled over 1800 ha of densely populated land to the South East of the plant. 
Many people suffered skin damage in the form of dermal lesions known as chloracne 
as a result of exposure to the toxin. Plants and crops were damaged and 77,000 
livestock had to be slaughtered. In order to monitor the long term effects of the 
accident a health monitoring programme was introduced which was not concluded 
until as recently as 199628. 
3.2 Chronology of Developments on Civil Liability 
The immediate response to these disasters focused on improving plant safety and 
emergency procedures. To this end Council Directive 82/501/EEC (the `Seveso' 
Directive)29 was passed which obliges operators of plants, engaged in specified 
26 For example, the Drinking Water Directive 80/778/EEC (OJ No. L 229/11) sets a maximum 
concentration level for nitrates of 50 mg/l and a guide value of 25 mg/l. 
27 A chemical reaction which releases heat into the surroundings. 28 For an overview of Seveso and other accidents causing serious pollution problems 
in Europe, see 
report of the European Environment Agency (edited 
by P. Stanners and P. Bordeau), Europe's 
Environment: The Dobris Assessment, Office for Official Publications: Luxembourg. 
29 OJ No. L 230/1. 
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hazardous production processes, to take `all measures necessary' to prevent major 
accidents and limit their consequences. In short the Directive requires the 
implementation of schemes designed to ensure that operators identify major accident 
hazards, adopt all necessary safety procedures and provide appropriate training and 
information for persons present on site. In the case of certain specified high risk 
activities, the Directive requires the establishment of a complex notification procedure 
which must make the `competent authority' aware of the exact nature of the activities 
being carried out, the technical processes involved and the safety procedures followed 
so that emergency contingency plans can be drawn up. 
3.2.1 5th Environmental Action Programme 
Whilst it was hoped that the above approach would reduce the risk of major disasters 
occurring, it was recognized that it only provided a partial response to the problem. 
This is because the Directive does not address the issue of apportionment of liability 
following an accidental escape and the compensation of victims. Thus, following the 
Sandoz incident in 1986, the Council called upon the Commission to review all 
existing measures relating to the prevention and remediation of environmental damage 
and asserted that new measures should be considered which would ensure "prompt 
clean-up and restoration, coupled with equitable arrangements for liability and 
compensation by the polluters for any damage caused. "30 
These statements focused attention on the possible use of civil liability as a component 
of the EC's environmental strategy. Such an approach has now been formally 
recognized as a result of the 5th Environmental Action Programme31 which provides: 
"... an integrated Community approach to environmental liability will be 
established... making sure that, if damage to the environment does 
occur, it is properly remedied through restoration. Liability will be an 
essential tool of last resort to punish despoliation of the environment. In 
addition - and in line with the objective of prevention at source - it will 
provide a very clear economic incentive for management and control of 
risk, pollution and waste. " 
3.2.2 Proposals on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste 
The Commission commenced by developing a sector specific response starting with 
waste. In 1989 a formal proposal on Civil Liability for Damage caused by Waste was 
30 [1986] E. C. Bull. 11, pt 2.1.146. 
OJ No. C 138 of 17 May 1993 (due to run until the year 2000). 
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published in the form of a draft Directive32 which concentrated on the establishment 
of a strict liability regime. Following consultation with Parliament33 a new more 
far-reaching proposal was published in 199134. This also included proposals for the 
establishment of clean up funds and increased standing for non governmental 
organisations (NGOs) such as environmental pressure groups. 
3.2.3 Commission Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage 
The debate was widened following the publication of a Commission Green Paper in 
199335 which contemplated the possibility of establishing a wider civil liability regime 
covering a broader range of activities. The paper was designed to stimulate debate on 
the subject and addresses all aspects of the issue including strict liability; the difficulty 
of establishing causation in environmental damage cases; whether normal civil 
remedies are adequate to compensate for environmental damage; and, whether 
adequate insurance cover could be provided for increased civil liability. In addition, it 
considers, in more detail than the waste proposals, means by which central clean up 
funds could be established for use in circumstances where civil liability cannot be 
established. Following the publication of the Green Paper a joint public hearing on the 
subject was held by the European Parliament and the Commission at which interested 
parties, including industry and environmental organizations, had the opportunity to put 
their points of view36. Shortly after the hearing the Parliament exercised its powers 
under Article 138(b)(2) (now Article 192(2)) of the Treaty of Rome to call upon the 
Commission to submit a proposal for a Directive on civil liability in respect of 
environmental damage37. 
The Commission then instigated two independent detailed reports on the subject 
including a comparative analysis of civil liability for environmental damage in each 
Member State38 plus the United States, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland and an 
32 Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, 1989 
OJ (C 251) 3 [hereinafter referred to as the 1989 Proposal]. 33 In accordance with the `consultation' procedure which was, at that time, applicable for legislation 
based upon Article 100a. Parliament submitted its findings in Parliament Resolution on the Commission 
Proposal for a Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, 1990 OJ (C 324) 248. 
34 Amended Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by 
Waste, 1991, OJ (C 192) [hereinafter referred to as the Amended Proposal]. 
35 Communication from the Commission to the Council and Parliament on Environmental Liability, 
COM(93)47 final. 
36 Joint Public Hearing of the European Parliament (Committee on the Environment, Public Health and 
Consumer Protection) and the Commission (Directorate-General XI Environment, Nuclear Safety and 
Civil Protection) on `Preventing and Remedying Environmental Damage', Brussels, 3rd and 4th 
November 1993. 
3g OJEC (C 128) 165. 
McKenna & Co., Study of Civil Liability Systems for Remedying Environmental Damage, Contract 
B4/3040/94/00065/MAR/H1, June 1996. (Copies available from European Commission DG XI) 
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economic feasibility study39. The Green Paper does not specifically supersede the 
draft directive on waste40, however, the programme does appear to be on hold whilst 
the debate generated by the Green Paper runs its course. However, it is entirely 
possible that the proposal on Waste would be shelved if a new all encompassing 
proposal on civil liability for environmental damage was published. 41 
3.2.4 The Council of Europe Convention on Civil Liability 
It is also necessary to have regard to a Council of Europe initiative, namely, the 
Council of Europe Convention on Civil Liability for Damage resulting from Activities 
Dangerous to the Environment (the Lugano Convention)42. Although the Council of 
Europe is not part of the EU, the Convention is important in that the Community may 
decide to accede to the Convention as opposed to drafting its own proposal. Articles 
174(4) and 300 (formerly 130r(4) and 228) of the Treaty of Rome make express 
provision for the signing of agreements with international organisations. The 
Environment Commissioner has, in the past, expressed support for this approach43 due 
to the length of time it would take the Community to pass its own free standing 
Directive. In short, the Convention requires signatories to adopt strict liability regimes 
for environmental damage subject to certain defences and affords considerable 
standing to non governmental organisations to pursue claims. A novel feature of the 
Convention is that it covers genetically modified organisms (GMOs), this could 
present an obstacle to the signing of the Convention by the EU in that the EU has yet 
to determine its position regarding the status of GMOs. 
39 ERM Economics, Economic Aspects of Liability and Joint Compensation Systems for Remedying 
Environmental Damage, Ref. 3066 March 1996. (Copies available from European Commission DGXI). 40 When the first draft of the Green Paper was published in 1991 Dr. Karl von Kempis of the EC 
Commission stated at the European Liability Insurance Congress in Berlin that the Green Paper was not 
designed to replace the draft Waste Liability Directive and that it would "not contain detailed legislative 
proposals, but rather state the situation in the member countries and show the Commission's position in 
the discussion with the Council of Ministers and the Parliament. " Reported in World Insurance Report, 
May 8,1992, at 7,8. See Goldberg, J. I. L., "An Uncertain Future: Retroactivity, Insurance, and the EC's 
Attempts at Environmental Liability Legislation", (1993) 33 Virginia Journal of International Law 685, 
at pp. 698-699. 
41 Ibid. 
42 The Council of Europe Convention on civil liability resulting from activities dangerous to the 
environment; agreed in March 1993 and opened for signature at Lugano, Switzerland on 21 June 1993. 
To date, the Convention has been signed by Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. However, it will not come into force until it has been 
ratified by three states. 
43 According to Mr. Chris Clark, an official of the Environmental Directorate of the Commission, 
DGXI), addressing a seminar on environmental liability held by Simmonds & Simmonds on 27th 
September 1996. Reported in `Bjerregaard poised for fresh move on environmental liability', ENDS 
Report 260 September 1996, p. 38. 
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3.2.5 Proposed White Paper 
On the 29th January 1997 the Commission held an orientation debate to consider its 
future policy on the subject of environmental liability44. It was resolved that there was 
a need to respond to the Parliamentary Article 138(b)(2) (now 192(2)) resolution of 
April 199445 and that this should take the form of a White Paper setting out the 
various options and the issues raised. To this end the views of interested parties (such 
as industry, insurance companies and environmental interest groups) have been 
canvassed by the circulation of a working paper which identifies the key issues46. At 
the time of writing the White Paper has yet to be published, however, the working 
paper indicates the types of measures which the Commission is considering. For 
example, the working paper refers to the possibility of easing the burden of proof on 
causation and increasing standing for environmental pressure groups. This latter 
proposal represents a departure from the position adopted in the Green Paper where 
the need for more liberal standing requirements was firmly rejected. The reason for 
this about face shall become apparent in due course. The 1997 Paper also stresses the 
need to ensure that any regime is consistent with the principle of subsidiarity. 
3.3 Reasons for EC Intervention 
The principle of subsidiarity requires the EC to justify why intervention is necessary in 
areas of dual competence between the EC and the Member States. To this end the EC 
must demonstrate that the area in which it wishes to act falls within the overall 
objectives of the EC and that action at a Member State level would not be sufficient to 
meet those objectives47. A corollary of subsidiarity is the proportionality principle 
which provides that, once the EC has established that it enjoys competence in a matter, 
it must only act to the extent necessary to attain its objectives48. As a result it is 
44 According to a fax received from the Legal Affairs Directorate of European Commission DGXI 
(XI. B. 3), Brussels, 2 June 1998. 
45 Mr. Clark of DGXI of the Commission stated that failure to respond to the resolution "may" have 
legal consequences; see note 43 above. Not surprisingly the Commission and the Parliament disagree on 
the effect of Article 192(2) (formerly 138b(2)). The Parliament considers that this right to request the 
Commission to generate proposals represents a sharing of the Commission's right of initiative; see Rules 
of Procedure, Rule 36B, entitled "Legislative initiative. " However, the Commission is of the opinion that 
the Treaty confers sole legal and political responsibility for any proposals submitted on the Commission, 
irrespective of whether they were drawn up at the request of another body; see answer to written 
1 uestion No. 3471/92: [1993] O. J. C292/22. 
6 Commission of the European Communities (DGXI), Working Paper on Environmental Liability, 
Brussels, 17 November 1997. 
47 Article 5 (formerly 3b EC): "In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of Subsidiarity, only if and so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, 
b reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action be better achieved by the Community. " 
4 Ibid., "Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives 
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necessary to consider the justifications for EC intervention in the area of civil liability 
for environmental damage. 
3.3.1 The Polluter Pays and the Precautionary Principles 
Civil liability is consistent with two of the most important principles which underpin 
the EC's environment policy, namely, the polluter pays and the precautionary 
principles. As has been explained above, the Single European Act provided a 
legislative platform for environmental measures by the introduction of Articles 130r, s 
and t. It will be recalled that Article 174(1) (formerly 130r(l)) sets out the objectives 
of Community Environmental policy and that Article 174(2) (formerly 130r(2)) sets 
out the principles by which the Community should seek to attain these objectives. It 
will also be recalled that two key principles concern the idea that the polluter should 
pay and that pollution should be prevented from occurring in the first place. Various 
statements have been made to the effect that a rigorous civil liability regime would 
encapsulate both these principles. This is because liability would force operators to 
bear the costs of any damage which they cause in line with the polluter pays principle. 
Furthermore, the risk of incurring such liability would persuade operators to take 
sufficient steps to prevent future incidents in line with the preventative principle. Thus, 
the Fifth Action Programme49 justifies Community intervention in this field on the 
basis that: 
"Liability will be an essential tool of last resort to punish despoliation 
of the environment [by requiring the polluter to pay for any damage 
caused]. In addition - and in line with the objective of prevention at 
source - it will provide a very clear economic incentive for management 
and control of risk, pollution and waste. " 
The Commission Green Paper reiterated this justification as follows: 
"A Community wide system of civil liability for environmental damage 
would draw on a basic and universal principle of civil law, the concept 
that a person should rectify damage that he causes. This legal principle 
is strongly related to two principles forming the basis of Community 
environmental policy since the adoption of the Single Act, the principle 
of prevention and the "polluter pays" principle... 
... the 
"polluter pays" principle is evoked, because civil liability is a 
means for making parties causing pollution to pay for damage that 
results. The prevention principle is involved in that potential polluters 
of this Treaty. " 49 OJ No. C 138 of 17 May 1993. 
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who know they will be liable for the costs of remedying the damage 
they cause have a strong incentive to avoid causing such damage. "so 
Placing costs on the polluter in this way satisfies the distributional requirements of the 
Community's economic policy. In order to understand why this is so it is necessary to 
refer to the aims of the "polluter pays principle" which accompanied the concept when 
it was unveiled in the First Action Programme51. Here it was stated that one of the 
main objectives of the concept was to "cause no significant distortion to international 
trade and investment. "52 As McIntyre explains53, placing costs on the producer means 
that they are eventually passed to the consumer to the exclusion of the state thereby 
avoiding indirect state subsidy of industry which is, of course, anti-competitive. Hence, 
environmental costs are much like any other costs (or externalities to use economic 
terminology) which should be met by the operation of market forces. According to this 
model, in order to avoid passing costs on to the consumer thereby harming their 
market share, operators have to reduce costs by reducing damage caused to the 
environment. 
3.3.2 Private Enforcement of EC Environment Policy 
It will be recalled that the bulk of EC environmental legislation consists of Directives 
which seek to reduce the levels of certain contaminants released into the environment. 
To this end limits are set for acceptable levels of specified substances in, for example, 
water. However, the EC has experienced considerable difficulties in enforcing these 
standards due to limited enforcement powers and resources. This is resulting in a great 
deal of under enforcement of environmental standards, a problem which has caused 
the Court of Auditors a great deal of concern: 
"The Directives leave the Commission very little scope for action with 
regard to the difficulties' faced by the Member States in applying them. 
About a hundred cases have been referred to the Court of Justice of the 
Communities, which, in numerous judgments, has declared that the 
Member States concerned, by not supplying the information requested 
or by not taking the necessary steps to implement the Directives within 
the relevant deadlines, have failed to fulfil their Treaty obligations. "54 
50 COM(93) 47 final, p. 5 at 1.0. 
OJ No. C 112 of 20 December 1973. 
52 raid, Part I, Title II, No. 5. 
5 McIntyre, 0, "European Community Proposals on Civil Liability for Environmental Damage - Issues 
and Implications", [1995] Environmental Liability 29 at pp. 30-31. 
54 Court of Auditors Special Report No. 3/92, concerning the environment, O. J. 1992 C 245/1, p. 19 at 
4.10. 
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The Court of Auditors has also made the point that, despite the proliferation of 
environmental Directives, implementation continues to be an exceedingly slow 
process due to their technical nature. For example, as regards Council Directive 
76/464/EEC on the discharge of certain substances into the aquatic environment, by 
1991 limits had only been established in respect of 17 out of 130 substances originally 
identified by the Commission as having maximum priority55 
Responsibility for enforcing EC law falls upon the Commission and the European 
Court of Justice whose powers are set out in Articles 226 and 228 (formerly 169 and 
171) EC. Despite attempts to expedite them under the Treaty on European Union 
(Maastricht Treaty) the procedures are slow and cumbersome and the sanctions which 
may be imposed against the Member State are limited56. Even if the problems 
associated with the Article 226 and 228 enforcement procedures could be overcome, 
it would still be impractical to expect the institutions of the EC to assume sole 
responsibility for the enforcement of environmental policy; the backlog of cases 
awaiting action is considerable. The Commission and the Court of Justice are not 
omnipotent and cannot possibly discover and act upon more than a small percentage of 
breaches of environmental standards. In its Report, Implementing Community 
Environmental Law, the Commission states: 
"Many environmental regulations and directives have to be applied on a 
daily basis by large numbers of people throughout the Member States. It 
would be neither possible nor practical for all the legal actions which 
could arise from these cases to be channelled through one enforcing 
authority, the Commission, and one court of law, the Court of Justice. 
In addition, Article 169 creates a Community `enforcement mechanism' 
which is directed against the central governments of the Member States: 
the Commission is unable to oversee, on the ground, the application of 
individual decisions (either voluntary or binding) necessary to comply 
with Community legislation. "57 
55 Ibid. 
56 Where a Member State has failed to fulfil its Treaty obligations by failing to implement a directive or 
to transpose it correctly, Article 226 (formerly 169) affords the Commission the power to bring the 
matter before the European Court of Justice. However, as the Commission does not have any 
investigative powers as regards compliance with environmental policy, it is reliant upon the Member 
State concerned to supply it with relevant information for the purpose of formulating its case; this 
information is requested by means of a letter of formal notice. Once all the facts have been gathered the 
Commission delivers a reasoned opinion which sets out in detail why the Commission considers that the 
state has failed in its duties and what steps are needed to remedy the situation. If the State refuses to 
comply with the findings of the Commission, the matter may be brought before the ECJ which ultimately 
has the power to impose a lump sum or penalty fine pursuant to Article 228(2) (formerly 171(2)) 
(implemented by the Maastricht Treaty). However, the Commission may have difficulty in making out its 
case if the Member State refuses to co-operate at the information gathering stage of the proceedings. 57 Communication from the Commission, COM(96) 500 final, Brussels, 22.10.1996, at p. 5, para. 13. 
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The Report concludes that the way forward is to increase access to justice for 
individuals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This would have the effect 
of "channelling litigation on the enforcement of Community environmental law"58 to 
the most appropriate level in that those most directly affected by environmental 
degradation `on the ground' would be in a position to rely upon EC environmental 
standards before the national courts. The advantages of this approach are clear; as 
stated in the previous chapter, the reach of enforcement agencies can be restricted by 
limited resources. Thus they must be selective in terms of choosing which cases to 
pursue. However, a polluting incident, which is of no interest to an authority, may 
nevertheless be of great concern to an individual or NGO with a specialized interest in 
the matter. By allowing such persons to enforce EC standards against, for example, 
relatively minor polluters, EC environmental policy would be able to penetrate 
everyday activities to a far greater depth than is currently possible. As the Commission 
Report on enforcing EC environmental law states: 
"Better access to courts for non-governmental organisations and 
individuals would have a number of helpful effects in relation to the 
implementation of Community environmental law. First, it will make it 
more likely that, where necessary, individual cases concerning 
problems of implementation of Community law are resolved in 
accordance with the requirements of Community law. Second, and 
probably more important, it will have a general effect of improving 
practical application and enforcement of Community environmental 
law, since potentially liable actors will tend to comply with its 
requirements in order to avoid the greater likelihood of litigation. "59 
However, the Report does not set out the basis upon which an individual or NGO 
would be able to establish a sufficient interest to intervene in an environmental matter. 
One possible solution would be to confer `environmental rights' on private citizens 
which they could rely upon before the courts in civil actions against polluters. In 
Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany60ý 
concerning whether Germany had properly transposed certain Directives on sulphur 
dioxide emissions, the Advocate General stated that the Directives were intended to 
give "individuals, ordinary citizens... the rights that the air which they breath should 
comply with the quality standards which have been laid down. "61 This raises the issue 
of how such a right could be concretized and enforced. The Treaty of Amsterdam 
58 Ibid., at p. 12 para. 41. 58 Ibid., at p. 12 para. 40. 60 Joint Cases C-361/88, [1991] ECR 1-2567 and C-59/89, [1991] ECR 1-2607. 
61 [1991] ECR 1-2567, at 2591. 
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offered the opportunity to formally recognize environmental rights62. However, 
despite support from the Environment Commissioner63, the idea was not included on 
the 1996 IGC Agenda. 64 
The decision in Francovich65 provides a possible, albeit very limited, means for an 
individual to seek compensation against the state in respect of a violation of his 
`environmental rights'. The decision established a principle whereby an individual 
who has suffered loss, as a result of a state's failure to properly transpose a Directive, 
may obtain compensation against the state. Thus, the remedy is particularly useful in 
circumstances where it is not possible for an individual to rely upon direct66 or 
indirect67 effect. However, liability is subject to certain conditions which have been 
refined by subsequent cases68. In short, there must be a sufficiently serious breach of 
the duties placed on the state69; the directive must confer rights for the benefit of 
individuals; and there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation 
and the loss suffered by the individual. As the decision in Commission v. Germany, 
above, demonstrates, it seems that environmental directives may be capable of 
conferring rights on individuals which could be enforced under Francovich. 
62 See Greening the Treaty II, loc. cit. This proposed a new Article 8d stating: "Every citizen of the 
Union shall have the right to a clean and healthy environment, access to the decision-making process, 
information, and justice as part of a general right to human development. " 63 In a speech delivered to the Environment Bureau on 1 December 1995, the Commissioner stated: "In 
order to strengthen the democratic dimension of the Treaty, to bring it closer to the citizen and to 
develop new kinds of rights for citizens of the Union, we could consider the inclusion in the Treaty of a 
new right to a clean and healthy environment, a right of access to transparent decision making, to 
information and to justice in relation to the environment. " See Poostchi (1997), op. cit., at pp. 82-83. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Francovich v. Italian Republic, Cases C-6/90 and 9/90, [1993] 2 CMLR 66. 
66 The doctrine of direct effect enables private persons to rely directly upon principles of EC law, before 
national courts, provided that the provision in question is sufficiently clear and unambiguous; see Van 
Gend en Loos v. Netherlands [1963] ECR 1. Whereas those Treaty Articles and regulations, which have 
been held to have direct effect, can be enforced both against the state (vertical direct effect) and other 
private persons (horizontal direct effect), directives can only be enforced against the state (or emanation 
of the state); see Case 152/84 Marshall v. Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health 
Authority [1986] ECR 723. 
67 The principle of indirect effect, developed by the jurisprudence of the ECJ, imposes a duty on national 
courts to interpret, "in so far as is possible" national legislation in a manner which conforms with relevant 
directives; see Case 106/89 Marleasing SA v. La Commercial Internaconal de Alimentacion SA [1992] 
ECR 1-4135. 
68 Principally joined Cases 46,48/93 Brasserie de Pecheur v. Germany, and R. v. Secretary of State for 
Transport, ex parte Factortame [ 1996] ECR 1-1029. This brought the conditions for establishing state 
liability into line with the tests already in place for establishing the non-contractual liability of the 
Community under Article 288 (formerly 215). 
69 Ibid., at para. 56. This entails taking into account factors such as, for example, whether the 
Community provision was ambiguous and whether the breach was unintentional. 
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However, the scope of Francovich as a means of protecting `environmental rights' is 
seriously restricted by certain limitations. Of particular note is the fact that it must be 
possible to identify direct personal loss. Thus an individual could only seek 
compensation under Francovich in respect of breaches of those directives which 
confer personal rights on individuals70. This would preclude those directives which are 
designed to protect the environment for its own sake such as the Directives on the 
conservation of wild flora and faunal1 and wild birds72. It seems unlikely that the ECJ 
would be willing to afford standing to NGOs to pursue actions on behalf of the 
environment73. In addition, the test of causation applied appears to be a rigorous one 
which does not allow room for the application of the precautionary principle. 
Furthermore the remedy of injunctive relief is unavailable; as argued in the previous 
chapter, this is the most effective remedy in an environmental context. The most basic 
limitation is that, so far at least, the rule does not establish horizontal liability74; this 
may preclude actions against the polluters themselves who are often private 
enterprises75. 
Thus, in order to make full use of civil liability as a means of enforcing environmental 
rights, it would be necessary to establish a specialist liability regime for environmental 
damage. There is increasing evidence to suggest that the EC views civil liability as an 
indirect means of enforcing its environmental standards against individual polluters. It 
is possible to gain this inference from the Fifth Action Programme, referred to above, 
which states that "liability will be an essential tool of last resort... " Furthermore, 
70 Somsen has identified three classes of directives which could confer such personal rights: 1. Those 
directives which provide for public participation, e. g. Directive 85/337 on environmental impact 
assessment (OJ 1985 No. L 175): 2. Directives which are concerned with the protection of human health, 
e. g. Directive 80/779 on air quality limit values and guide values for sulphur dioxide emissions and 
suspended particulates; Directive 75/440 on the quality of surface water intended for the abstraction of 
drinking water (OJ 1975 No. L. 194); Directive 90/219 on the contained use of genetically modified 
micro-organisms (OJ 1990 No. L 117; Directive 90/220 on the deliberate release of genetically modified 
organisms (OJ 1990 No. L 117): 3. Directives designed to harmonize technical standards pursuant to the 
establishment of the internal market, e. g. Directive 70/220 on emissions from motor vehicles (OJ 1970 
No. L 76); Directive 67/548 on the classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous substances. 
Breaches of such standards could lead to personal loss. See Somsen, H. (1996), "Francovich and its 
Application to EC Environmental Law". In H. Somsen (ed. ), Protecting the European Environment: 
Enforcing EC Environmental Law. Blackstone, at pp. 146-147. 
71 Directive 92/43 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (OJ No. L 78/38 of 
26.03.1991). 
72 2 Directive 79/409 on the protection of wild birds (OJ No. L 103/1 of 25.04.1979). 
See comments by Advocate General Van Gerven in Case 131/88 Commission v. Germany (1991) 
ECR 1-825, at p. 850. 74 Advocate Generral Van Gerven has in fact mused on the possibility of a horizontal application of 
Francovich in Case 128/92 Banks v. British Coal [ 1994] ECR 1-1209. 
75 It should be noted that many of the privatized utilities may fall within the definition of `organ of the 
state' following the judgment in Case 188/89 Foster v. British Gas [1990] ECR 1-3313. 
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McIntyre argues that the Green Paper76 suggests that the definition of damage, for the 
purposes of triggering liability, could be linked to environmental standards set by the 
EC's existing environmental legislation: 
"The Green Paper suggests that, in deciding whether an environmental 
impact is sufficiently significant to warrant restoration, existing EC 
legislation setting quality requirements for various aspects of the 
environment would provide a useful starting point or baseline. "77 
It is possible to base this view on the fact that the Paper refers to the need for society 
to set quality standards for the purposes of determining the standards to which 
damaged property should be restored78. More recent support for this assertion is 
provided by a speech given by the Environment Commissioner to the Belgian 
Environmental Law Association in Brussels on 13th June 1996. In it she stated that: 
"A liability scheme is likely to improve the implementation of 
environmental rules in general. I see as a sort of common sense 
objective the linking of liability rules as effectively as possible to the 
rest of EC environmental law and policy, so that it supports that body of 
legislation and helps its proper enforcement. "79 
The 1997 Working Paper reiterates this objective: 
"The implementation of existing and future Community Environmental 
legislation will be strengthened by the liability regime, since liability 
will work as an additional sanction for infractions, thus ensuring 
stronger compliance incentives. Therefore the liability regime has to be 
designed in such a way that it is coherent with such legislation. "80 
This could be achieved by linking the definition of environmental damage to 
environmental standards; thus, a person would have a cause of action against a polluter 
where his property was contaminated by levels of substances which exceeded the 
relevant EC standard. As a result it would be possible to recover damages 
for 
environmental impairment: 
76 COM(93) 47 final, p. 
Op cit. at p. 32. 78 See ch. 6, below. 
SPEECH/96/158, `Speech by Mrs Ritt Bjerregaard Member of the European Commission on 
Environmental Liability at the Meeting of the Belgian Environmental Law Association', Brussels, 13 
June 
1996. 
80 Op. cit., at p. 1. 
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"For instance, as far as natural resource damage is concerned, it could be foreseen to initially only cover natural resources which are already 
protected under Community Law (e. g. wild birds and habitats). Later on 
this might be extended to other natural resources, such as areas 
protected under the future Water Framework Directive. "81 
This approach also overcomes the difficulties of arriving at a satisfactory definition of 
nebulous concepts such as environmental impairment, ecological damage or natural 
resource damage. It is unlikely that the courts would be able to arrive at a satisfactory 
definition due to their limited expertise; EC standards are set following extensive 
scientific research. 
The case of Cambridge Water v. Eastern Counties Leather82 provides a useful case 
study of how civil liability could be used to enforce EC environmental standards in the 
manner described above. As Tromans83 has noted, Cambridge Water would not have 
suffered loss but for the imposition of the EC limit on acceptable levels of PCE in 
drinking water. The substance had not previously been monitored for and there was no 
evidence that water abstracted at Sawston Mill constituted a threat to public health. In 
the High Court decision Kennedy J. stated: 
"There is no evidence in this case that the concentrations of 
organochlorines in the water taken from Sawston Mill is injurious to 
health, and I have no doubt that there is an immense margin of safety in 
the prescribed figures. For all that, Sawston Mill water is now, by 
reason of the Directive and Regulations and with effect from July 1985, 
unfit to be supplied for use for one of its primary purposes, human 
consumption. To my mind it is unimportant that such standards might 
be thought to be arbitrarily set, or to be variable. It is common place 
that acceptable standards in many fields vary over the years as scientific 
knowledge enlarges. Sawston Mill water is by today's standards unfit 
for the purpose for which the plaintiff's wish to use it. "84 
This passage also demonstrates how the EC would be able to accommodate the 
precautionary principle into the definition of environmental damage for the purposes 
of civil liability. 
81 Ibid. 
82 [1994] 2 A. C. 264. 
83 Tromans, S. (1996), "EC Environmental Law and the Practising Lawyer", in H. Somsen (ed. ), 
Protecting the European Environment: Enforcing EC Environmental Law, Blackstone, at p. 271. 
Cambridge Water v. Eastern Counties Leather plc [ 1992] 1 JEL 81 at p. 90. 
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By creating a role for civil liability in the enforcement of its overall environmental 
policy objectives the EC would be able to justify intervention in the field of civil 
liability for environmental damage. Furthermore, the use of civil liability to enforce 
environmental standards represents a form of de-centralized control; as the Öko 
Institute has suggested, the principle of subsidiarity demands the application of 
de-centralized regulatory techniques: 
"... the p5 inciple of subsidiarity, as laid down in Art. 130r(4) of the EEC 
Treatyg, and not least the widespread (and understandable) distrust of 
`big government' among the public of the Member States speak against 
any large scale extension of administrative powers at Community level. 
The preferable solution to the problem therefore is to promote a 
de-centralized control of the implementation of environmental law. 
This is precisely what can be achieved by improving the access to 
national courts and complaints facilities for citizens and organizations 
who act in the interest of environmental protection. "$6 
Thus, by extending the concept of damage to encompass environmental impairment 
defined by reference to EC standards and increased standing for environmental interest 
groups87, the EC is clearly of the opinion that civil liability can be harnessed in pursuit 
of its environmental objectives. 
3.3.3 Internal Market Considerations 
Another possible basis for Community intervention in environmental matters is, as we 
have seen above, based upon the need to harmonize regulations in key areas in order to 
establish the internal market under Article 14 (formerly 7a) of the Treaty of Rome. 
Failure to do so may place producers in Member States with lax regulations at a 
competitive advantage in respect of rival producers in Member States with more 
rigorous controls. Furthermore, such disparities may encourage producers to `forum 
shop' by selecting the country with the most lenient environmental laws. As will be 
seen in the next Chapter, Member states have already been pursuing their own 
initiatives on civil liability for environmental damage. Thus intervention in this area 
could be justified on the basis of Article 95 (formerly 100a) which, as we have seen, 
provides that: 
85 It will be recalled that this provision has been superseded by Article 5 (formerly 3b), inserted by the 
Maastricht Treaty, which has adopted subsidiarity as a general principle of EC law. 86 Öko Institute Final Report on Access to Justice, "Legal Standing for Environmental Associations in 
the European Community", (1994) 3(4) Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law 261. 
87 See below. 
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"The Council shall... adopt... measures for the approximation of the 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establishing and functioning of the internal market. " 
The proposed directives on civil liability for damage caused by waste were based on 
Article 100a (now 95) on the grounds that: 
"[D]isparities among laws of the Member States concerning the liability 
for damage and injury to the environment caused by waste could lead to 
artificial patterns of investment and waste;... such a situation would 
distort competition, affect the free movement of goods within the 
internal market and entail differences in the level of protection of 
health, property and the environment;... an approximation of the laws of 
the Member States on this subject is therefore needed. "88 
This led to considerable criticism, particularly from the Economic and Social 
89 Committee, on the grounds that the main objectives of the draft directives were 
concerned with environmental protection. 
Nevertheless, the Green Paper appeared to suggest that internal market considerations 
alone would be enough to justify intervention and stated that, "Variances in the use of 
civil liability for environmental damage among the Member States... could lead to 
distortions of competition. "90 However, this claim has met with considerable 
scepticism. For example, Turrall-Clarke states "There is no available empirical 
evidence that markets would be distorted if Member States continued with their 
present civil liability regimes. "91 In its written representations to the 1993 European 
Parliament and Commission Joint Public Hearing on `Preventing and Remedying 
Environmental Damage'92 the Union of Industrial and Employer's Confederations of 
Europe (UNICE) displayed similar reservations, 
88 OJ No C 192/6. 
89 Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Directive on Civil Liability 
for Damage Caused by Waste, 1990 O. J. (C 112) 23, at 2.2, "The Commission bases the draft Directive 
on Article 100A. In view of the objectives set out by the Commission, however, reference to Article 
100A is not justified. Reference should be made in the text, as currently drafted, to Articles 130R and S 
of the Treaty. The Committee calls upon the Commission to revise its line of approach in order to bring it 
into accordance with the legal basis selected. " 90 COM(93) 47 final, p. 5 at 1.0. 
Turrall-Clarke, R., Civil Liability for Environmental Damage in Europe, Cambridge Academic 
Publications 1993, at p. 12. 
92 Above. 
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"The Green Paper states that different systems of civil liability could lead to distortions of competition but it does not contain any evidence for this assertion... 
... 
U TICE is of the opinion that harmonisation of legislation should only be envisaged if victims are in practice protected in a completely 
unequal manner in different Member States and if these divergences 
between legislation create a sufficiently large distortion of 
competition. "93 
The Commission took note of this request for empirical data on the likely effects of 
allowing differing standards of environmental liability to develop. Accordingly, it 
requested ERM Economics to address the issue in its report to the Commission on the 
economic aspects of liability for environmental damage. 94 ERM chose to use a trade 
model developed by Professor Tony Venables and Professor Alistair Ulph of the 
University of Southampton. The model uses recorded data95 to estimate effects on 
market share and plant location decisions brought about by alterations in operating 
costs. Thus ERM sought to use the model to ascertain the possible effects on the 
competitiveness of industry caused by differing operating costs resulting from 
divergent environmental liability regimes. 
The results of the simulation were inconclusive and demonstrated that conditions in 
the global market had more effect on market share than intra-Community 
considerations. Nevertheless, the report noted that the alterations in market share 
predicted by the study were more pronounced than those forecast by other studies: 
"However, the changes in market shares arising from the costs of 
environmental liability systems in these simulations are much greater 
than in other studies of the impacts of environmental costs on 
competitiveness. These have generally found little direct evidence that 
the stringency of environmental regulations has had significant effects 
on plant location and choice and on industries' international 
competitiveness. "96 
However, as stated above, there is increasing evidence to suggest that the Commission 
considers that civil liability has the potential to form an integral component of the 
93 UMCE, Position paper on the fundamental options in the Green Paper on remedying environmental 
damage [COM(93) 47 final]. 
94 Op. cit. 95 Published data on trade, production and input-output relationships for the chemicals industry for all 
countries in the World for 1985 - the most recent date for which consistent data were available at that 
time. 
96 Op cit., at 3.3.2, p. 63. 
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EC's environmental policy. This shows that, since the publication of the draft 
directives on waste, the `centre of gravity' of EC policy, in the field of civil liability, is 
shifting towards environmental rather than market considerations. Thus it now seems 
certain that any future legislation would be passed on the basis of Article 175 
(formerly 130s) as opposed to Article 95 (formerly 100a). Indeed, the 1997 Working 
Paper states unequivocally that any future legislation would be passed on the basis of 
Article 130s (now 175), no mention is made of Article 100a (now 95) as a possible 
basis. This approach is certainly correct, the theoretical possibility that the 
development of divergent liability regimes could lead to some distortion of 
competition would not, according to the latest jurisprudence of the ECJ, justify 
legislation in this field on the basis of the new Article 95. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
It is only in recent years that a clear rationale for EC intervention in the field of civil 
liability for environmental damage has begun to emerge. The view that measures 
should be founded on internal market justifications has now largely been abandoned. It 
seems that any legislation in this field will almost certainly be based upon the 
Community's environment policy as set out in Title XIX EC. 
EC initiatives in this area must be viewed in the context of wider developments in 
European Environmental Law. Although environmental rights were not formally 
recognized in the Treaty of Amsterdam, the belief that the way forward in 
environmental law is to increase public participation is gathering momentum. The 
principle of state liability, established by Francovich, provides a limited private 
enforcement mechanism in respect of those directives which may be capable of 
conferring private rights. However, a specialist civil liability regime would have the 
potential to afford full protection to those rights in the manner advocated by Gray97 in 
the previous chapter. 
The specific proposals generated by the various European initiatives must now be 
considered in the light of these issues. 
97 Gray, K., "Equitable Property", (1994) Current Legal Problems 157. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Having identified the possible reasons why the EC has been contemplating the 
introduction of an environmental liability regime and the objectives which such a 
regime would be intended to meet it is necessary to consider the specific proposals 
which have emerged. The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to analyse these 
proposals in detail with a view to ascertaining whether they would secure the 
objectives of an effective civil liability regime; it will be recalled that these include 
deterrence, private enforcement of environmental standards, full internalization of 
costs and remediation of environmental damage. 
It is also necessary to consider how these proposals accord with the philosophical 
perspectives discussed in chapter 4. 
2. STRICT LIABILITY 
2.1 General Issues 
The empirical evidence regarding whether strict liability provides a superior incentive 
for risk management is inconclusive and sometimes contradictory. In fact there is 
some support for the argument that, in certain circumstances, fault based liability may 
provide a superior incentive for complying with regulatory standards than strict 
liability. Landes and Posner argue that this is because, where liability is fault based, 
the operator can avoid all liability by complying with a set standard. However, under a 
system of strict liability, compliance with the standard will not absolve the operator of 
liability, therefore, "the benefits to him of additional benefits in care are therefore 
smaller. "1 This appears to be supported by one empirical study in which it was found 
that the introduction of no-fault liability led to an increase in automobile accidents 
resulting from a drop in the level of care exercised by drivers. 2 
However, there are also major drawbacks associated with reliance upon fault as a 
trigger of liability. Compliance with regulatory standards is often of evidential 
importance in determining whether the defendant was at fault. This is not always 
sufficient to prevent accidents from occurring. In the case of Cockerill Sambre S. A. v. 
1 Landes W. M., and Posner, R. A. (1987), The Economic Structure of Tort Law, Harvard University 
Press, at p. 259. 2 See, for example, Devlin, R. A., "Some Welfare Implications of No-Fault Automobile Insurance 
Regimes", (1990) 10 International Review of Law and Economics 193. 
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Foundation Reinwater and others3 , 
for example, although the defendants complied 
with the terms of a discharge consent, their coke factory polluted the Sambre and 
Meuse rivers with high levels of polycyclical aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs). The 
levels of emissions did in fact exceed limits set by Directive 76/464/EEC on pollution 
caused by certain dangerous substances released into the aquatic environment. 
Nevertheless, this could not be taken into account as the Directive had not been 
implemented and, in any case, directives cannot have horizontal direct effect4. As a 
result the court treated compliance with the relevant domestic regulations as decisive5 
in determining whether Cockerill had exercised due care. This approach is inconsistent 
with the `polluter pays' principle in that the polluter is not required to internalize all 
pollution costs; environmental costs which do not result from any fault on the part of 
the polluter are priced at zero. 6 
The major advantage of strict liability is that, given that compliance with a set 
standard of care will not absolve the operator of liability, he must investigate 
alternative means of reducing the risk of accidental escapes. To this end he must either 
reduce his activity levels7 or invest in safer and cleaner technologies. The former 
option entails ceasing operations, reducing output, or moving the plants. There is some 
empirical evidence available which suggests that the imposition of strict liability, in 
respect of polluting industries, has had this effect in North America9. However, in 
3 Court of Appeal Den Bosch, May 31,1994 Case No. KG229/93/MA. Published in [1995] 
TMA/Environmental Liability Law Review. 
4 An unimplemented directive cannot create rights as regards the bilateral relationship between two third 
parties to whom the directive was not addressed i. e. in these circumstances it does not have `horizontal 
effect'. See Marshall v. Southampton and South West Area Health Authority [1986] E. C. R. 
723. Uilhoorn argues that it may have been possible for the court to apply indirect effect, which requires 
national courts to interpret national law, in so far as is possible, in the light of Community norms. See 
Uilhoorn, "The Cockerill Case", [1995] Environmental Liability CS62 
5 Ibid., at CS63, "[The] position of the Court is untenable, particularly since the Supreme Court in 1919 
abandoned the concept that `illegal' means `contrary to written law'. No support can be found in the 
applicable law that there must be a hard written standard in order to establish a negligence case for 
pollution. " 
b See Swanson, T. M. (1991), "Environmental Economics and Regulations", in 0. Lomas (ed. ), Frontiers 
0/Environmental Law, Chancery, at p. 149, n. 41. 
See Shavell, S., "Strict Liability Versus Negligence", (1980) 9 Journal of Legal Studies 1. 8 Landes and Posner, op. cit, at p. 111-112, argue that the courts have historically used strict liability to 
discourage certain activities. This reflects societal preferences, thus an activity which is more highly 
valued in the US than in the UK may be subject fault as opposed to strict liability. For example, in Turner 
v. Big Lake Oil Co, 128 Tex. 155,165-66,96 S. W. 2d 221,226 (1936), the court stated that, in an and 
region, the storage of water in reservoirs is a more important land use than in a damp country such as 
England. Thus, whereas in the UK the activity was subjected to a strict duty under Rylands v. Fletcher, 
in Texas the same activity would be subjected to a fault based duty of care. 
9 Dewees, D., "Sulphur Dioxide Emissions from Smelters: The Historical Inefficiency of Tort Law", 
University of Toronto, January 2nd, 1996: Dewees, D., and Halewood, M., "The Efficiency of the Law: 
Sulphur Dioxide Emissions in Sudbury", (1992) 42 University of Toronto Law Journal 1. These studies 
found that, following a spate of litigation at the turn of the century related to sulphur dioxide emissions, a 
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Europe, where populations are denser and land is more expensive, re-location may not 
be a realistic option; in any case, such an approach would not solve the problem, it 
would merely move it elsewhere, In such circumstances the polluters only option may 
be to implement new abatement technology. 
Thus, strict liability clearly accords more closely with the polluter pays principle than 
fault in that it requires the polluter to internalize a greater proportion of the pollution 
costs. Of course, this will only be the case if it is backed by adequate sanctions which 
accurately reflect the costs of pollution or induce the operator to take preventative 
measures. 10 
2.2 Developments In Member States 
Whilst the EC has been considering the need for a specialist environmental liability 
regime, a number of Member States, including Swedeni 1, Germany12, Finland13, and 
Denmark14 have already introduced their own schemes and Spain is in the process of 
enacting legislation15. 
A common feature of these schemes is the introduction of strict liability, however, the 
manner in which the principle is applied varies considerably. One difference occurs in 
the range of activities which are covered by the legislation. In Denmark and Germany 
strict liability is reserved for those activities which pose the greatest threat to the 
environment. In contrast, the schemes in operation in Sweden and Finland16 are not 
limited to specified hazardous activities; the type of damage is the determining factor 
rather than nature of the activity which caused it. Thus, section 1 of the Swedish 
Environmental Protection Act (1969: 387) provides that any use of land, buildings or 
number of copper and lead smelters in California and around Salt Lake City, re-located to less densely 
populated areas. A more recent study has examined the effects of strict liability under the US Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) on the decisions of oil companies to bid for leases to exploit oil 
reserves on the outer continental shelf. It was found that, following the introduction of the Act, oil 
companies bid far less for the leases. This shows that the leases were regarded as far less attractive 
propositions with the result that they became less sought after. See Grigalunas and Opaluch, "Controlling 
Stochastic Pollution Events with Liability Rules: Some evidence from OCS leasing", (1984) 15 Rand 
Journal of Economics. 10 Remedies are discussed in section 6, below. 12 Environmental Protection Act (1969: 387); Environmental Damage Act (1986: 225). 
Environmental Liability Act 1991 (UmweltHG). 
13 Environmental Damage Compensation Act, 737/1994. 
14 Act on Compensation for Environmental Damage, 225/1994. 15 For a review of the Draft Act see, Barrenetxea, J. M. G., "The Spanish Draft Act on Liability 
for 
Environmental Damage" [ 1997] Environmental Liability 115. 
16 See Wetterstein, P., "The Finnish Environmental Damage and Compensation Act - and some 
Comparisons with Norwegian and Swedish Law" [1995] Environmental Liability 41. 
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installations which either results in the discharge of tangible substances or causes a 
disturbance to the surrounding environment shall be deemed a hazardous activity for 
the purposes of the Act. This provision is extremely broad in scope in that it 
encompasses traditional nuisance type problems such as noise or vibration which may 
not necessarily result in any tangible damage to the environment. In one case, for 
example, smallholders succeeded in claiming compensation in respect of noise 
pollution caused by a new road which was judged to have adversely affected the 
market value of their properties17. The position in Finland is similar in that the 
Environmental Damage and Compensation Act 1994 is not limited to actual damage 
resulting from the most hazardous activities, it also covers lesser forms of 
environmental harm giving rise to nuisance types problems. Matters of this nature 
were formerly dealt with under the Neighbour Relations Act 26/20 which, under 
section 17, gives rise to strict liability for certain types of "enduring and unreasonable 
nuisance" affecting neighbours. Examples of activities found to be nuisances by the 
Supreme Court include noise caused by granite quarrying18 and soot from a coke 
plant19 which caused damage to the stock of a timber merchants. It seems that the 
courts also applied a test somewhat analogous to the character of the neighbourhood 
test which occurs in English law. In case 1936 II 87 noise and smell from a poultry 
house was held not to be unreasonable due to the rural setting of the premises. It 
remains to be seen whether the 1994 Act will be interpreted in respect of this type of 
dispute in a similar manner. 
Another difference occurs in the range of defences available. In Germany Liability is 
only excluded on very limited grounds; the principal exclusion is for damage caused 
by force majeure (höhere Gewalt)20. Despite intensive lobbying from industry, a 
development risk defence21 was not included with the result that an operator cannot 
escape liability on the grounds that the state of scientific knowledge at the time did not 
allow the defendant to appreciate the potential risk to the environment. In Finland and 
Sweden the standard of liability is even more rigorous in that no defences at all are 
provided; this would suggest that liability is absolute rather than strict22. The Spanish 
17 Supreme Court NJA 1977 s. 376. 
Case 1982 II 109. 
19 Case 1962 II 26. 
20ELAs. 4. 
Such a defence is provided in s. 1(2) of the Products Liability Act (Gesetz über 
die Haftung für 
fehlerhafte Produkte). 
22 The terms `strict' and `absolute' liability are often used interchangeably, however, liability should only 
referred to as absolute where no defences of any sort are available: see Rogers, 
W. V. H. (1989), Winfield 
and Jolowicz on Tort, (13th edn. ), Sweet & Maxwell, at p. 424. A rare example of a statutory provision 
imposing absolute liability in tort occurs under section 14 of the Gas Act 1965. 
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Draft Act is, in contrast, more lenient in that it provides for defences on the basis of 
force majeure, necessity, and where the damage results from the malicious act of a 
third party. 23 
2.3 European Initiatives 
European initiatives on civil liability for environmental damage also show that there is 
an assumption that strict liability is a prerequisite of an environmental liability regime. 
2.3.1 The Lugano Convention 
The Council of Europe Convention on Civil Liability requires signatories to introduce 
strict liability regimes in respect of `dangerous activities' which includes the 
production, handling, storage, use, destruction, disposal of dangerous substances24, 
genetically modified organisms25, or hazardous micro-organisms26. The regime also 
applies to operators engaged in the operation of an installation or site for the 
incineration, treatment, handling or recycling of hazardous waste27. Such an approach 
is justified by the Convention in its preamble on the grounds that it takes into account 
the `polluter pays' principle. To this end Article 6 provides that. 
"The operator in respect of a dangerous activity... shall be liable for the 
damage caused by the activity as a result of the incidents at the time or 
during the period when he was exercising control of that activity. " 
Furthermore, liability in respect of a continuing occurrence or a series of consecutive 
occurrences having a common origin is joint and several as between all those who 
23 Article 4.2 (draft Act); see Barrenetxea, op. cit., at p. 120. 
24 Article 2(2)(a) provides that dangerous substances include those having properties which constitute a 
significant risk for man, the environment or property. This comprises substances which are explosive, 
oxidising, extremely flammable, toxic harmful, corrosive, irritant, sensitising, carcinogenic, mutagenic, 
toxic for reproduction or dangerous for the environment. Annex I Part A provides that these properties 
shall be determined by reference to the criteria and methods referred to in or annexed to, the 
Council 
Directive of the European Communities 67/548/EEC (OJEC No. L196/1) as amended 
by Council 
Directive 92/32/EEC (OJEC No. 154/1) and as adapted to technical progress by Council Directive 
92/37/EEC (OJEC No. L154/30). 
25 Article 2(3) defines Genetically Modified Organisms as any organism in which the genetic material has 
been altered in such a way which does not occur naturally be mating and/or natural recombination. 
It 
excludes from the scope of the Convention organisms obtained by mutagenesis provided that genetically 
modified organisms are not used as recipient organisms and plants obtained by cell 
fusion provided that 
the resulting plant can also be obtained through natural breeding methods and that genetically modified 
org anisms are not used as parental organisms. 20 Article 2(1)(b). Includes, for example, micro organisms which are pathogenic or which produce 
toxins. 
27 Article 2(1)(c) provides that such waste falls within the definition of a dangerous substance. 
Annex II 
of the Convention sets out the specific waste handling processes covered 
by the Convention. 
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have operated the site at the material times. However, where it is possible for an 
operator to identify the specific part of the damage which was attributable to the 
period in which he was in charge of the site, he will only be liable in respect of that 
part of the damage28. Where the damage is latent and only becomes known after the 
activity responsible for the damage at the site has ceased, the last operator is held 
liable unless he or the person who has suffered damage can show that the damage, in 
whole or in part, stemmed from an incident occurring prior to the time at which the 
last operator took over the site29 
The Convention also contains a more extensive set of defences than the domestic civil 
liability regimes introduced by some of the Member States of the EC reviewed above. 
These are set out in Article 8 which provides that the operator shall not be held liable 
in respect of incidents resulting from acts of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or 
natural phenomena of "an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character". Events of 
this nature equate with the force majeure defence which, as we have seen, has been 
included in the 1991 German Environmental Liability Act. In addition, Article 8 also 
exempts liability in respect of deliberate damage caused by a third party (provided that 
the operator had taken sufficient measures to guard against such incidents); 
compliance with a specific order or compulsory measure of a public authority; 
pollution which is at tolerable levels according to local circumstances; activities 
undertaken lawfully in the interests of the person who suffered the damage provided 
that the action was reasonable. 
2.3.2 Draft Directives on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste 
The 1991 draft proposal30 provides that producers of waste shall be strictly liable for 
environmental harm caused by such waste31 and justifies this approach on the grounds 
that: 
"[W]hereas, in view of the risk inherent in the very existence of waste, 
the strict liability of the producer constitutes the best solution to the 
problem. " 
Producer is defined as any body, 
29 Article 6(2) and (3). 
Article 6(4). 
30 OJ No C 192/6. 
31 Article 3: "The producer of waste shall be liable under civil law for the damage and impairment of the 
environment caused by the waste, irrespective of fault on his part. " 
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"Who in the course of a commercial or industrial activity, produces 
waste and/or anyone who carries out pre-processing, mixing or other 
operations resulting in a change in the nature or composition of this 
waste. "32 
In addition, importers of waste are also deemed to be producers33 as are those who had 
actual control of the waste at the time the pollution occurred (unless they can identify 
the originator of the waste as defined in paragraph 1(a) of Article 2 within a reasonable 
period) and those responsible for any installation, establishment or undertaking at 
which the waste was held at the time the pollution occurred34 
The only defence provided is that of force majeure35, however, liability is far from 
absolute in that liability for historic pollution is expressly excluded by Article 13 
which provides that the, 
"directive shall not apply to damage or injury to the environment 
arising from an incident which occurred before the date on which its 
provisions are implemented. " 
The amended 1991 Proposal has not altered the 1989 proposals as regards strict 
liability, this continues to be a central theme. In order to deal with pollution occurring 
after the introduction of any legislation which could remain undetected for some years, 
Article 10 provides a 30 year statutory limitation period during which time an action 
may be brought. Once environmental harm has been detected, Article 9(1) provides 
that the plaintiff must bring an action within three years of the time at which he first 
knew, or ought to have known, of the harm and the identity of the polluter. 
In summary, it seems that the Waste proposals share common features with some of 
the initiatives already undertaken by certain Member States as described above. 
Common features include the fact that the standard is not weakened by a multitude of 
statutory defences, this is limited to force majeure. However, the scope of the proposal 
is limited in other ways, principally by the fact that there can be no liability in respect 
of pollution occurring prior to the introduction of the legislation. This precludes the 
possibility of retroactive liability for historic pollution. 
32 Art. 2(1)(a). 
3 Art. 2(1) (a) (a). 
34 Art. 2(1) (a) (c). Installations, establishments or undertakings for the purposes of this provision are 
those licensed pursuant to Article 8 of Directive 75/442/EEC, Article 6 of Directive 75/439/EEC or 
Article 9of Directive 78/319/EEC or those approved pursuant to Article 6 of Directive 76/403/EEC. 
3 Art. 6. 
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2.3.3 Discussion Documents 
Both the Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage and the latest working 
paper also refer to the need for strict liability. The Green Paper argues that strict 
liability accords more closely with the polluter pays principle in that it requires the 
operator to internalize a greater proportion of the pollution costs. 36 It also notes that it 
may be difficult for a plaintiff to establish fault where the operator complied with 
regulatory standards. 37 This problem is illustrated by the Cockerill case, discussed 
above. 
2.4 Main Considerations 
2.4.1 Scope of Strict Liability 
A basic consideration concerns the issue of which activities should be subjected to a 
strict liability regime. As noted above, in Sweden strict liability is triggered by the type 
of damage, whereas, in Germany strict liability under the UmweltHG is imposed on 
specified industries. 
The European Environmental Law Association argue that the drawback of linking 
strict liability to the type of damage is that it risks creating uncertainty as to whether a 
person is subject to the regime38. However, it is impossible to draft an exhaustive list 
of harmful activities or harmful substances. An otherwise harmless substance may 
cause serious pollution if deposited in large quantities in a river39. Thus, in drafting a 
list of activities the legislator would need to be aware of three broad classes of 
potentially liable persons. Namely those engaged in inherently hazardous activities; 
those who handle substances which are potentially harmful in large quantities; and 
those whose activities may be environmentally harmful in sensitive locations40. The 
1996 Working Paper suggests that the Commission is in favour of such an approach: 
"[A]ctivities which are not normally considered to bear an inherent risk 
can also result in damage to protected natural resources, for instance 
36 COM(47) final, a 4.1.2. 37 Ibid., at 4.1.1. 38 European Environmental Law Association (EELA), Repairing Damage to the Environment -A 
Community System of Civil Liability (Position paper submitted to the Commission of the European 
Communities), p. 14, at para. 7.1. 
39 The EELA, above, use the example of an overturned milk tanker depositing its cargo in a river. 40There is a precedent for such an approach in Directive 85/377 on environmental impact assessment (OJ 
1985 No. L 175/40). This distinguishes between schedule 1 projects, which are inherently hazardous, and 
schedule 2 projects which may be hazardous as a result of their nature size or location. A schedule 1 
project would include an oil refinery whereas a schedule 2 project would include a major construction 
project such as the building of a bridge near a nature reserve. 
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construction works. Therefore, these activities have to be covered as 
well, as far as protected natural resources are concerned. " 
Z. 4.2 Defences 
Strict liability increases the distributional functions of tort, however, it is also 
consistent with the corrective functions of tort in that it allows for certain defences. 
This is where strict liability differs from absolute liability which serves as a purely 
distributional device. A difficult balance has to be struck between maximizing the 
proportion of the damages costs which must be met by the polluter whilst retaining 
incentives to take care. Thus it is appropriate to admit defences in respect of events 
which were entirely beyond the control of the polluter such as force majeure. In the 
UK most environmental regulations, which impose strict criminal liability, allow for 
defences in respect of natural phenomena (Act of God)41 or third party intervention42. 
The issue of whether a `development risk' defence should be included is rather more 
complex. 
The problem with the development risk defence, which has been developed in the field 
of products liability, is that it relates to the manner in which the operator has managed 
his activities. Accordingly there is a risk that the defence may equate the standard of 
liability with negligence and undermine the distributional function of strict liability. 
This is because the development risk defence is based upon a `risk-utility' analysis; 
such an approach is now frequently adopted in negligence for the purpose of 
determining whether the defendant has taken due care43. Nevertheless, Terry points 
out that there is a distinction inasmuch as negligence judges the conduct of the 
defendant whereas the development risk defence judges the product44. Thus, in US 
products liability cases, the courts have adopted objective tests for determining 
whether a producer should have been aware of a risk. Where knowledge of a defect 
exists, prior to the marketing of a product, the knowledge is imputed to the producer 
irrespective of whether he was in possession of the knowledge. In other words, there is 
a presumption that he ought to have been in possession of the knowledge. Compliance 
with regulatory standards and independent assessments of industry capability have 
41 The defendant is, however, expected to take precautions against foreseeable natural phenomena such 
as heavy rain. See Southern Water Authority v. Pegrum [1989] Crim L. R. 442; Alphacell v. Woodward 
1972] C. L. Y. 3549. 
2 See Impress (Worcester) Ltd v. Rees [1971] 2 All E. R. 357; Welsh Water Authority v. Williams 
Motors (Cwmdu) Ltd, The Times, 5 December 1988. 
43 English court have long since become accustomed to weighing the magnitude of the risk against the 
practicality of precautions. See, for example, Latimer v. A. E. C. [1953] A. C. 643. 
44 Terry, N. P., "State of the Art Evidence: From Logical Construct to Judicial Retrenchment", (1991) 
20(3) Anglo-American Law Review 285. 
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been admitted as sufficiently objective tests to invoke the defence45. In contrast, 
evidence relating to industry practice and standards set by the industry itself is 
regarded with suspicion46. Tests based on industry custom are subjective and focus 
attention on the conduct of the producer rather than the safety of the product; 47 such 
evidence has, therefore, been dismissed by the US courts on a number of occasions48. 
In Europe, Directive 85/374/EEC49 on product liability required Member States to 
introduce strict liability in respect of certain types of harm caused by defective 
products. This incorporated a development risk defence as follows: 
"The producer shall not be liable as a result of this Directive if he 
proves... that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time 
when he put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the 
existence of the defect to be discovered. "50 
This is a rigorous objective standard in that it suggests that the defence will be denied 
if the knowledge existed somewhere. There is no suggestion that the knowledge should 
have been discoverable from the point of view of the producer. In fact the 
implementing provision in English Law adopts a greater degree of subjectivity and 
refers to the fact that the defence will be available if the knowledge was "not such that 
a producer of products of the same description as the product in question might be 
expected to have discovered the defect. -51 This led the Commission to instigate 
Article 169 (now 226) proceedings against the UK on the grounds that the provision 
did not comply with the Directive. However, the ECJ has elected to `wait and see' how 
the domestic courts interpret the provision52. 
5 mid., at p. 296. 46 See Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Div., Duff-Norton Co., 515 Pa. 334,528 A. 2d 590 (1987): "The injection 
of industry standards into a design defect case would be not only irrelevant and distracting, but also, 
because of the inherently self-serving nature of `industry standards', would be highly prejudicial to the 
consumer/plaintiff. By our determination today, we have made it clear that a manufacturer cannot avoid 
liability to its consumers that it injures or maims through its defective designs by showing that `the other 
guys do it too', per Larsen J., at p. 595. 
47 "Introducing evidence of industry and/or manufacturer's customs and practices shifts the jury's focus 
from what the consumer expects to what the manufacturers are doing. By focusing the jury's attention on 
the custom of the industry, implicitly the jury's attention is focused on the defendant's design choice and 
the reasonableness of that choice. In effect, such evidence incorporates negligence concepts and the seller 
orientated approach we [have] rejected. " Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Wash. 2d 208,683 P. 2d 1097, 
1098 (1984). 
48 Thus, in Lewis v. Coff ng Hoist Div, above, the court was not prepared to find that the absence of 
basic safety features in a control panel for a hoist was excusable on the basis of the development risk 
defence merely because the practice in the industry was not to incorporate such safety features. 49 OJ 1985 L 210/29. 
50 Ibid., Article 7(e). 
52 Consumer Protection Act 1987, s. 4(1)(e). 
See Case 300/95 Commission v. UK [1997] ECR 1-2649. The ECJ was not prepared to find that the 
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Newdick argues that the English formulation is more realistic than the Commission's 
version of the defence53. This is because the mere fact that knowledge exists does not 
necessarily mean that it is available to a particular industry. Scientific results have to 
be interpreted and assessed before the implications become known. Furthermore, the 
relevance of knowledge in an unrelated field may not be appreciated. Thus, Newdick 
suggests that the defence should admit evidence of the discoverability of the defect 
from the perspective of the relevant industry. Such an approach would require the 
defendant to establish that he operated an adequate system for keeping up to date with 
the latest developments. Where products are hazardous this would be an onerous 
requirement. 54 
A development risk defence in an environmental liability regime could provide an 
incentive to constantly review procedures and investigate new technology. However, 
this would have to be balanced against the underlying requirements of the polluter 
pays and precautionary principles. 
The version of the defence incorporated in the Consumer Protection Act 1987 is, as 
Newdick argues, supported by logic. However, the danger is that, in requiring the court 
to examine the matter from the perspective of the operator, the court may be 
encouraged to admit subjective evidence such as industry standards. As indicated 
above, in US products liability cases, the courts are suspicious of such evidence. A 
degree of objectivity could be retained by considering whether the knowledge of a 
defect was available to the industry as a whole as opposed to individual operators. This 
would entail an assessment of regulatory standards such as BATNEEC55; furthermore, 
information obtained by one operator should be imputed to others engaged in the same 
UK legislation constituted a prima facie breach of the Directive. Instead, it merely stated that there was 
no reason why the UK courts should not be able to interpret national law so as to comply with the 
Directive. Thus there is a possibility that a UK court may in future refer a case under Article 234 
ýformerly 177). 
3 Newdick, C., "Risk, Uncertainty and `Knowledge' in the Development Risk Defence", 20(3) 
Anglo-American Law Review" 309. 
54 In fact, even in cases where liability is fault based, it is difficult for an operator in a hazardous industry 
to persuade the court that knowledge of a risk was `undiscoverable'. See, for example, Vacwell 
Engineering Co. v. BDH Chemicals Ltd. [1971] 1 Q. B. 88, "... it was the duty of [the producer] to have 
established and maintained a system under which adequate investigation and research into established 
scientific literature took place in order to discover, inter alia, what hazards were known before a new, or 
little known, chemical was marketed. I am satisfied that this duty was never complied with. " 
In determining which technology should be employed UK regulators employ the `Best Available 
Technology Not Entailing Excessive Cost' (BATNEEC) test; see s. 7(2)(a) Environmental Protection 
Act 1990. The concept is a more transparent version of the Best Practicable Means (BPM) approach 
first 
applied by the Alkali Acts and brings it into line with the test adopted by EC Framework 
Directive 
84/360/EEC on combating air pollution from industrial plants, OJEC, L188,16 July 1984, Art 4.1. 
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activity56. Thus, as the ECJ has found in respect of the Consumer Protection Act, the 
scope of the defence would very much depend upon how it was interpreted by national 
courts. 
An additional consideration is that, in an environmental context, there would have to 
be a distinction between knowledge of harmful emissions and knowledge of a defect in 
process. The defence should only be available in respect of the former. The facts of 
Graham and Graham v. Re-Chem International57, which concerned emissions from a 
toxic waste incinerator, 58 can be used to illustrate the significance of this distinction. 
Let us assume that there had been a strict liability regime in place and the issue of 
liability rested on a development risk defence. If the defence was only available in 
respect of knowledge of harmful emissions the defendant would have failed in this 
case. The judge stated that, at the material time, it was well known that the burning of 
PCBs could cause the emission of dioxins and furans. 59 As the defendant was engaged 
in a hazardous activity, he would have had difficulty in refuting the presumptions of 
knowledge under both the EC and UK versions of the defence. However, if the 
defence was also available in respect of defects in process the outcome could be 
different. The process by which the pollutants were produced was not known until 
after the incinerator had been closed. Therefore, Re-Chem could have argued that the 
state of scientific knowledge was such that the emissions could not have been 
prevented. This would equate strict liability far too closely with negligence and 
undermine its distributional objectives. According to the polluter pays principle, once 
knowledge of the existence of harmful emissions becomes known, the onus must be on 
the polluter to find a solution60 
Taking the above considerations into account, a possible form of words, based upon 
the products liability defence, could be as follows: 
"The operator shall not be liable... if he proves that the state of scientific 
and technical knowledge during the time when he carried on the 
process was not such as to enable the existence of harmful emissions to 
be discovered. " 
56 See Newdick, op. cit., at p. 323. 
57 [1996] Env. L. R. 158. 
58 The full facts are set out in ch. 3. 
59 [1996] Env. L. R. 158, at p. 167. 
60 It is interesting to note that this mirrors the definition of strict liability which has now 
been established 
in nuisance. Once a nuisance has been discovered the defendant must abate 
it, irrespective of whether he 
was at fault in causing the nuisance in the first place. See ch. 3, above. 
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3. REDUCING THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON CAUSATION 
The difficulties faced by a plaintiff in establishing causation are formidable and were 
discussed at length in Chapter 3 with regard to examples drawn from recent English 
case law. The EC is contemplating means by which the burden of causation may be 
eased. However, the difficulty which must be overcome is how this objective can be 
achieved without holding operators liable for damage costs to which they did not 
contribute. Once again, this could give rise to open ended and hence unsustainable 
liability. 
3.1 General Considerations 
Causation is closely associated with the corrective functions of tort in that it seeks to 
hold the tortfeasor accountable for the loss flowing from his actions; thus the parties 
concerned are locked into a `normative embrace' 61. From an environmental 
perspective, causation fulfils a useful function in that it links the harm with the person 
who is in the best position to internalize costs, this is generally the polluter. Without a 
test of causation tort would be rendered a purely distributional device which is not 
linked to patterns of conduct. This would lead to collective responsibility, rather than 
individual accountability, and reduce incentives for risk management62. Furthermore, 
such an approach would cause insurers to withdraw cover in that, as has been 
explained in chapter 4, the viability of insurance is dependant upon the ability of the 
insured to limit the costs passed to the insurers. As Huber points out, "neither 
businesses or insurers can or will provide such assistance for very long if payments are 
not systematically and predictably linked to specific patterns of conduct"63. In the 
United States, a lax application of causality tests by the courts augmented the 
difficulties faced by insurers in assessing risk under CERCLA. 64 
Thus the difficulty which has to be overcome concerns the extent to which the burden 
of causation may be eased without giving rise to unsustainable liability of the nature 
62 Englard, I. (1993), The Philosophy of Tort Law, Dartmouth, at p. 45. 
Teubner, G. (1994), "The Invisible Cupola: From Causal to Collective Attribution in Ecological 
Liability", in G. Teubner, L. Farmer, and D. Murphy, (eds. ), Environmental Law and Ecological 
Responsibility - The Concept and Practice of Ecological Self-Organization, John Wiley & Sons, at p. 
29. 
63 Huber, P. (1988) , 
"Environmental Hazards and Liability Law", in Litan, R. E., and Winston, C., 
(eds. ), Liability Perspectives and Policy, The Brookings Institution, at pp. 147-148. 
4 This has largely been due to the fact that in many States cases are still decided by civil juries which are 
capricious by nature and more likely to be swayed by sympathy for the alleged victim than complex 
arguments relating to causation. For a review of the more outlandish decisions see Huber, P. (1991), 
Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Court Room, New York: Harper Collins/Basic Books. 
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described above. It is necessary to establish a framework which enables the court to 
draw common sense conclusions based upon the circumstances of the case without the 
need to show with scientific certainty that a substance, emanating from the defendant's 
facility, caused or contributed to the harm. Price65 notes that in certain English and 
American cases there has been an attempt to award damages on a proportionate basis 
calculated upon the increase in risk caused by the defendant's activity66. These are 
often referred to as `lost chance cases' in that the cause of action is the chance of 
avoiding the harm which was lost as a result of the defendant's actions. The problem 
with this approach is that in many cases it may be impossible to quantify the extent to 
which the defendant's conduct increased the risk thereby lessening the plaintiffs 
chances of escaping the harm. Furthermore, it may lead to a situation in which, 
although all plaintiffs receive some compensation, none receive damages which in any 
way reflect the true costs which they have endured and some may receive damages to 
which they are not entitled. For these reasons Huber is dismissive of solutions of this 
type and describes them as "an edifice of compromise"67. 
An alternative solution would be to set up a rebuttable presumption based upon the 
circumstances of the case. Thus, if circumstantial evidence, such as prevailing wind 
direction and breaches of duty pointed to the defendant's facility, there would be a 
presumption that the harm was attributable to the defendant's activity. It would, of 
course, be possible to rebut the presumption on the grounds that the cause of the harm 
emanated from elsewhere; however, the onus would be on the defendant to adduce 
evidence in support of this contention. As will be seen below, this is the approach 
which has been adopted in Germany. 
65 Price, D. P. T., `Causation - The Lords' Lost Chance', (1989) 38 International 
Comparative Law 
quarterly 73 5. 
6 In England this approach was adopted by the Court of Appeal in Hotson v. East Berkshire Health 
Authority [1987] 1 All E. R. 210 where it was stated: "The fundamental question is: what is the damage 
which the plaintiff suffered? Is it the onset of the avascular necrosis or is it the loss of chance of avoiding 
that condition? In my judgment it is the latter", per Dillon L. J., at p. 219. In the United States the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit defined the `lost chance' cause of action in the case of 
Waffen v. U. S. Department of Health and Human Services 799 F. 2d 911,919 as follows: "The confusion 
that has persisted is based upon confusing `causation' and `harm'... it is better to consider the loss of a 
substantial chance of survival as a different type of loss with a different measure of damages than the 
loss 
of life, instead of treating the former as a variation on the burden of proving causation 
in a claim for 
negligently causing the patient's death. The destroyed chance is itself the compensable 
loss. " 
n Huber, op. cit., p. 145. 
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3.2 Developments in Member States 
Most environmental liability regimes already introduced in Member States retain 
standard causation tests68. However, in Germany measures have been taken to ease the 
burden of causation, in certain cases involving environmental damage, under the 
Environmental Liability Act 1991 (Umwelthaftungsgetz (UmweltHG)). 69 
Section 6(1) of the Act sets up a rebuttable presumption that the damage in question 
was caused by the defendant if it can be shown that the defendant's facility is 
`inherently suited' to causing that type of harm70. Inherent suitedness is judged by 
reference to a range of factors relating to the nature of the production process and the 
circumstances surrounding the release such as meteorological conditions. However, 
the presumption can only be raised in limited circumstances. Section 6(2) provides 
that the presumption cannot be raised if the facility has been properly operated. This 
includes those facilities which have been managed in accordance with `special 
operational duties' 71 and where no disruption of the business has occurred72. 
Compliance with all conditions attached to a special operational duty such as a permit, 
at the time the damage occurred, establishes a presumption that the duty was complied 
with73. For example, in a case decided by the Upper Regional Court in Düsseldorf"4 
the plaintiff claimed that the paint-work and windows of her car had been damaged by 
iron oxide dust emitted from a facility operated by her husband's employers. It was 
68 See McKenna & Co (1996), Study of Civil Liability Systems for Remedying Environmental Damage, 
(study conducted for EC Commission), at pp. 318 et seq. 
69 For an overview of the Act see Hoffman, W. C., "Germany's New Environmental Liability Act: Strict 
Liability for Facilities Causing Pollution", (1991) 38 Netherlands International Law Review 27. 
70 § 6(1) ELA 1991, "If a facility is inherently suited, on the facts of the particular case, to cause the 
damage that occurred, then it shall be presumed that this facility caused the damage. Inherent suitedness 
in a particular case is determined on the basis of the course of business, the structures used, the nature 
and concentration of the materials used and released, the weather conditions, the time and place at which 
the damage occurred, the nature of the damage, as well as all other conditions which speak for or against 
causation of the damage in the particular case. " 71 § 6(3) ELA 1991, "Special operational duties are those duties imposed by administrative permits, 
requirements, and enforceable administrative orders and regulatory laws, insofar as their purpose is to 
r event environmental impacts that could be considered to be the course of the damage. " 2§ 6(2) ELA 1991, "Paragraph (1) shall not apply if the facility has been properly operated. A proper 7 
operation is present if the special operational duties have been complied with and no disruption of 
operations has occurred. " 73 § 6(4) ELA 1991, "If, for the purpose of supervision of a special operational duty, controls are 
prescribed in the permit, in requirements, in enforceable administrative orders and regulatory laws, then 
compliance with this operational duty shall be presumed, if 1. the controls were carried out during the 
period in which the environmental impact in question may have issued from the facility, and these 
controls give rise to no inference of a violation of the operational duty, or, 2. at the time the claim 
for 
compensation is made, more than ten years have passed since the environmental impact in question 
occurred. " 74 (365) OLG [upper regional court] Düsseldorf, Ruling of 10/12/1993 (22 U 17293). 
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alleged that the damage occurred over a two day period when the husband borrowed 
the car and left it in the company car park. The court held that, whilst there was no 
doubt that the defendant's plant was capable of producing emissions leading to the 
type of harm in question in theory (or `abstract' terms), there could be no presumption 
that there had been such an occurrence in this particular case (or in `concrete' terms). 
At the time the car was left in the car park the plant had been operated in accordance 
with regulations, regular measurements of emission levels had been taken, and there 
had been no malfunction which could have led to the emission of iron oxide dust. 
Operation of the presumption will also be precluded if more than ten years have 
elapsed since the damage occurred. 
However, compliance with regulatory standards will not preclude the presumption 
from being raised in circumstances where there has been an interruption of business75; 
although this term is not defined it would certainly include an incident such as a major 
accident. For example, in the case involving damage to the paint-work of a car referred 
to above, it was significant that there had been no malfunction which could have led to 
the escape of iron oxide. 
Section 7 sets out the grounds upon which the presumption of causation may be 
rebutted. It provides that, where either multiple or individual facilities are inherently 
suited to causing the type of damage in question, the presumption will be rebutted if it 
can be shown that `another circumstance' (Umstand) was also suited to causing the 
damage76. This would include pollution emanating from alternative sources. 
3.3 European Initiatives 
European initiatives have not been consistent on this issue although recent documents 
suggest there is now support for the view that there should be some means of easing 
the burden of causation, perhaps using the German system as a model. 
75 See note 72, above. 76 § 7(1) ELA 1991, "If multiple facilities are inherently suited to cause the damage, then the 
presumption shall not apply if another circumstance is, on the facts of the particular case, inherently 
suited to cause the damage. Inherent suitedness in a particular case is determined on the basis of the time 
and place at which the damage occurred, the nature of the damage, as well as all other conditions which 
speak for or against causation of the damage. (2) If only one facility is inherently suited to cause the 
damage, then the presumption shall not apply if another circumstance is, on the facts of the particular 
case, inherently suited to cause the damage. " 
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3.3.1 Lugano Convention 
The Council of Europe appears to have adopted, to a certain extent, the inherent 
suitedness test in its Convention; Article 10 provides: 
"When considering evidence of the causal link between the incident 
and the damage or, in the context of a dangerous activity as defined in 
Article 2, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph d, between the activity and the 
damage, the court shall take due account of the increased danger of 
causing such damage inherent in the dangerous activity. " 
This suggests, that, where the installation in question is particularly suited to causing 
the type of damage of which complaint is made, the court should be satisfied with a 
lesser standard of proof than would be the case if the damage in question was not 
typical of the operation in question. However, the provision is somewhat vague and 
does not appear to amount to a reversal of the burden of proof; inherent suitedness is 
merely expressed as one of the factors which the court should take into account. 
3.3.2 Draft Directives on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste 
Far from contemplating means of easing the burden of causation, the 1989 proposa177 
set out a more onerous test than that which normally applies in domestic jurisdictions; 
thus, Article 4(6) provides: 
"The plaintiff shall be required to prove the damage or injury to the 
environment, and show the overwhelming probability of the causal 
relationship between the producer's waste and the damage or, as the 
case may be, the injury to the environment suffered. " [emphasis added] 
This is a far more rigorous test than the more usual balance of probabilities test and 
appears to demand scientific proof of the link between the escape and the damage. 
Such an approach would not accord with the `precautionary principle' and, possibly as 
a result of such considerations, the causality test was altered by the 1991 proposal78. 
Thus Article 4(l)(c) of the amended proposal now provides that, 
"the burden of proof on the plaintiff, when affirming the causal link 
between the waste on the one hand and the damage or impairment of 
the environment suffered or likely to be suffered on the other hand; the 
burden of proof shall be no higher than the standard burden of proof in 
civil law. " 
77 OJ No C 251/3 (1989). 
78 OJ No C 192/6 (1991). 
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As a result, under this provision, the normal civil law rules subsisting in Member 
States relating to the establishment of causation would apply. 
3.3.3 Discussion Documents 
The Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage recognized that the 
imposition of a strict standard of liability does not dispense with the need to show that 
the defendant caused the harm: 
"Compared with fault-based liability, strict liability eases the burden of 
attaching liability because fault need not be established. However, the 
injured party must still prove that the damage was caused by someone's 
act. "79 
However, the Green Paper also identifies the need to establish causation as a factor 
which increases transaction costs: 
"Special problems arise in the case of environmental 
damage... establishing a causal connection may not be possible if the 
damage is the result of activities of many different parties. Difficulties 
also arise if the damage does not manifest itself until after a lapse of 
time. Finally the state of science regarding the causal link between 
exposure to pollution and damage is highly uncertain. The liable party 
may try to refute the injured party's evidence of causality with alternate 
scientific explanations for the damage. "8° 
Each of these problems has been clearly demonstrated by the English cases reviewed 
in Chapter 3, thus, a further important issue concerns whether it is possible to reduce 
the transaction costs, created by the need to establish causation, without undermining 
the potential risk management incentives of strict liability. The Green Paper suggests 
that this is possible and cites as an example the German Environmental Liability 
Act. 81 The 1997 Working Paper is also in favour of the introduction of a rebuttable 
presumption of causation82. 
79 COM(93) 47 final, at 4.1.2. 
80 Ibid., at 2.1.8. 81 Ibid., at 2.2.1. 82 Commission of the European Communities, 
November 1997, at p. 4. 
"Working Paper in Environmental Liability", Brussels 17 
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3.4 Main Considerations 
As noted above, the EC Commission now appears to be of the opinion that provision 
should be made for reversing the burden of proof on causation in certain 
circumstances, although, it has yet to make any detailed recommendations regarding 
how this should be achieved. The German example under the ELA provides a useful 
model for the EC to follow subject to the following considerations. 
3.4.1 Cases Where There is Only One Known Causal Agent 
The plaintiff would clearly benefit from the presumption where the pollution in 
question is only associated with the industry in which the operator is involved or where 
there are no other sources in the area. This is because section 7(l) UmweltHG refers to 
the fact that, wherever there are multiple facilities, all of which are inherently suited to 
causing the type of damage in question, the presumption can only be rebutted where 
there is another circumstance. 
However, the mere fact that an operator is engaged in the industry which is at the 
source of the pollution is not sufficient to raise the presumption. Section 6(1) narrows 
down potentially liable parties to those operators whose facilities are `inherently 
suited' to causing the type of harm in question. This entails establishing far more than 
the fact that an operator handled the substance which is known to be the causal agent. 
For example, it is necessary to take into account all relevant factors such as prevailing 
weather conditions, whether there had been an incident at a plant and so forth. Where 
more than one facility meets these criteria paragraph 7(1) provides a second filter by 
focusing attention on the time and place at which the damage occurred. Thus, 
Teubner's83 fears that such an approach fails to identify the specific polluter and 
results in collective responsibility are not entirely justified. The system retains 
incentives for risk management. 
Article 11 of the Lugano Convention appears to follow this approach in that it restricts 
joint liability to those installations where there have been `incidents'. However, in 
comparison with the German approach, this restriction is not sufficiently specific in 
that it makes no provision for consideration of geographic proximity of the plants to 
the place where the damage occurred and other relevant considerations such as the 
nature of the incident and the concentrations of harmful substances released. 
83 Op, cit., at p. 27. 
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3.4.2 Cases Where There is More than One Possible Causal Agent 
The extent to which such a provision would be of assistance to a plaintiff in cases 
where there is more than one possible causal agent very much depends upon the 
interpretation of the `alternative cause' ground for rebuttal. In Chapter 2 it was noted 
that Holder84 is of the opinion that, where substances are capable of acting 
synergistically, the court should be prepared to extend the `common sense' approach 
which it already adopts where the nature of the causal agent is known. This accords 
with the reasoning of Hager85 who argues that, when rebutting the presumption under 
the UmweltHG, the onus should be on the defendant to establish that the alternative 
causal agent was capable of causing the harm in isolation; otherwise, the defendant 
could ascribe the harm to environmental pollution. 
However, if it transpires that another substance was capable of causing the harm on its 
own, this should not automatically rebut the presumption. In other words, the 
defendant should not be able to use the very uncertainty which the presumption is 
designed to overcome in order to rebut the presumption; this would defeat the object 
of the exercise and render the presumption of little benefit. As Price argues: 
"If the statistics raised by the plaintiff are sufficient to effect a transfer 
of the burden of proof it appears ludicrous to allow the defendant to 
rebut the presumption by using the identical evidence in rebuttal. What 
purpose does reversing the burden have in such a case? " 86 
The court should be afforded a discretion to consider all the facts of the case including 
other circumstances which point to the defendant. Thus, if there was a serious accident 
causing the release of a gas cloud which was borne by winds over a residential area, 
the court should be in a position to use its discretion to maintain the presumption. 
However, if there was no such incident and the plaintiff can show no more than a 
mathematical correlation between the alleged cause and the harm, the court may chose 
to allow the defence to rebut the presumption. 
According to this interpretation of the provision, in a case such as Reay and Hope v. 
BNFL87 the judge would have been in a position to infer that, given the fact that there 
was a breach(s) of statutory duty and given the 
fact that there was a strong 
84 Holder, J., `The Sellafield Litigation and Questions of Causation in Environmental 
Law', (1994) 47 
ý2) Current Law Problems 278, p. 302. 
5 Hager, G., "Umwelthaftungsgetz: The New German Environmental 
Liability Law" [1993] 
Environmental Liability 41, at p. 42. 
86 Op. cit., p. 749. 
87 [1994] Env. L. R. 320; see ch. 3, above. 
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mathematical association between the incidence of cancer amongst the offspring of 
Sellafield employees, common sense suggested that the parents' exposure to radiation 
contributed to the harm. This is not to say that the judge was wrong in this case as 
there were a number of methodological problems with the epidemiological study 
which cast doubt on its reliability. Nevertheless, as stated in Chapter 2, the current 
position at English common law unduly restricts the ability of the court to reach a 
common sense decision. 
Reversal of the burden of causation in this manner does not inevitably lead the court 
to the conclusion that the defendant was responsible; it merely affords the court the 
opportunity to depart from the need to establish causation with scientific certainty and 
enables it to reach a common sense decision based upon the facts of the case. 
3.4.3 Retention of Incentives to Abate Pollution 
As Hager88 argues, compliance with the bear minimum regulatory requirements is not 
always effective in reducing the risk of pollution. This was clearly demonstrated by the 
case of Cockerill Sambre S. A. v. Foundation Reinwater and others89. Thus, the fact 
that the presumption cannot be invoked where the operator has complied with 
administrative standards undermines incentives to review existing abatement 
technologies. Providing a specific ground for precluding the operation of the 
presumption in such circumstances is unduly restrictive; the issue of whether the plant 
has been properly operated should merely form one of the general considerations 
which the court may take into account when considering whether a particular facility 
was responsible for causing the harm in question. Hence, when there is only one 
facility in the vicinity which appears inherently suited to causing the harm according to 
the criteria set out in section 6(1) of the German ELA, it would seem reasonable to 
infer that the facility was to blame notwithstanding the fact that it was properly 
operated. Where more than one facility meets the general inherent suitedness criteria, 
the fact that one of them was not `properly operated' would focus attention on that 
particular plant as being the most likely source of the pollution. 
89 Op. cit., at p. 42. 
[19951 TMA/Environmental Liability Law Review. 
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4. LIBERAL CONFERAL OF STANDING 
4.1 General Issues 
As noted in Chapter 2, a major limitation of tort is that liability is contingent upon 
personal loss. Thus, in many cases of pollution, there may not be an individual or other 
legal person who is in a position to institute civil proceedings. Even in circumstances 
where environmental damage does coincide with personal loss or interference with 
property rights, the individual concerned may choose not to pursue the matter. This 
precludes the operation of civil liability as a means of protecting the so called 
`un-owned environment', as the Commission has stated: 
"[A]n important characteristic of environmental law is the frequent lack 
of a private interest as an enforcement driving force. The environment 
is often characterised as our `common heritage'. This also implies that 
more often than not there is no private appropriation of many parts of 
it, such as air, seas, wild flora and fauna. Therefore, it is often the case 
that deterioration of the environment does not cause immediate 
reaction, and that even if a problem does arise, there is no means by 
which individuals can use the law to remedy the problem, or there are 
no appropriate legal remedies available. Even for Community 
environmental law, it can be the case that important general principles 
cannot be enforced by individuals (e. g. polluter pays, preventative and 
precautionary principles). "90 
It is, however, these very principles which the EC wishes to use civil liability to 
enforce by linking the definition of damage with environmental standards. Thus, 
increased standing in civil proceedings for non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
such as environmental pressure groups, would be an essential ingredient of any civil 
liability regime designed to afford protection to the environment, in the widest sense 
of the term, and not merely the private interests which vest in it. 
4.2 Developments in EU Member States 
A number of continental jurisdictions have already begun to erode the distinction 
between the public interest and the interests of the individual so as to afford standing 
to NGOs in environmental matters. For the most part, it is not possible for NGOs to 
bring claims in respect of the environment as a separate entity from any private 
90 Communication from the Commission, Implementing Community Environmental Law, COM(96) 500 
final, p. 12 at 38. 
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interests which vest in it. In cases where private interests have in fact been affected, in 
certain jurisdictions, standing may be afforded to associations comprising members 
who have suffered direct loss as a result of the pollution91 
A far more radical approach has been adopted in the Netherlands where NGOs now 
enjoy standing rights in civil proceedings which are on a par with those enjoyed by 
interest groups in judicial review proceedings. Any future European initiatives on civil 
liability for environmental damage should, therefore, consider the position in the 
Netherlands carefully92. 
At one time the position under Dutch Law as regards standing was similar to that 
under English Law in that there was a clear distinction between the realms of public 
and private law. Thus, whilst an interest group would be afforded standing in judicial 
review proceedings, it would not be afforded standing in tort actions. However, in 
1986 the Dutch Supreme Court ruled in the case of De Nieuwe Meer93 that the Civil 
Code's tort law provision94 was capable of affording protection to general 
environmental interests and that organisations who represented those interests 
(according to their articles of association) should be entitled to seek injunctive relief in 
order to safeguard them. This decision was affirmed in the Kuunders95 case in which 
various environmental foundations sought an injunction against a farmer who was 
operating a pigsty in breach of licensing requirements. The Supreme Court based its 
decision on the argument that environmental interests are `collective interests' which 
cannot be adequately protected through isolated private actions. 
The approach adopted by the Dutch Supreme Court on the issue of standing in tort 
actions has now been codified by the Dutch legislature; to this end the Collective 
Actions Act 1994 inserted two new Articles into Book 3, Title 11, of the Civil Code on 
Rights of Action which now provides: 
91 In Denmark section 34(3) of the Freshwater Fisheries Act provides that the Danish Angling 
Association and the Association of Commercial Fisheries may claim compensation in respect of the cost 
of restocking polluted lakes and rivers. In France similar groups were awarded compensation 
in the 
Protex Case following pollution of the Loire. See McKenna & Co, op. cit., at pp. 276 et seq. 
92 For an overview of developments in the Netherlands see Betlem, G., "Standing for Ecosystems - 
Going Dutch" [1995] Cambridge Law Journal 153; Bierbooms, P., and de Vries, L., "Collective Action 
and Environmental Interests: The Situation in the Netherlands" [1994] Environmental Liability 111. 
93 Supreme Court 27 June 1986, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1987,743, note by Heemskeerk. 
94 Article 162 of Book 6. 
95 Supreme Court 18 December 1992, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1994,139 note by Scheltema and 
Brunner. 
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"An association or foundation with full legal capacity is entitled to 
entertain an action for the purposes of protecting interests of other 
persons that are similar in kind, inasmuch as it promotes these interests 
according to its articles of association. "96 
This is subject to a number of limitations which include the need for the NGO to 
establish that it has made sufficient attempts to settle the matter out of court 97. 
Furthermore, an NGO would not be able to insist upon pursuing an action against the 
will of the landowners affected98. In addition, as a general principle of Dutch law, 
vexatious claims are prohibited by Article 3.13 of the Civil Code on abuse of rights. 
In addition to injunctive relief, NGOs may recover damages in respect of clean up 
costs incurred as a result of a polluting incident99. In the Kuunders case the court 
stated that ecological damage could be regarded as "unlawfulness" towards those 
organizations who have as their object the protection of such interests. In the 
Borcealoo case the Dutch Society for the Protection of Animals sought to recover the 
costs it had incurred in cleaning and nursing sea birds which had been caught by an oil 
spill. It was held that, although sea birds could not be regarded as anyone's property, 
their conservation must be regarded as a public interest deserving of protection in the 
Netherlands. Furthermore, this public interest could be viewed as the "individual 
interest" of the Society as its very purpose was to undertake the conservation of such 
animals. Accordingly, the court could see no reason why the Society should not be 
able to recover damages "in so far as the Society's claim relates to the damage which 
it itself has suffered. "101 
The logic applied by the court in this case was ingenious in that, by regarding the 
general interest in bird protection as the Society's own interest, a link was provided 
between ecological damage and a private interest which could provide the basis of an 
action in tort. Thus, as Betlem states, once this step has been taken: 
96 Article 3: 305a(1). 
Article 3: 305a(2): "A legal person within the meaning of section 1 shall not have standing if and when 
it has insufficiently attempted, in the circumstances of the case, to reach the result sought be the action by 
way of consultation with the defendant". 98 Article 3: 305a(4): "An act cannot form the basis of an action within the meaning of section 1 to the 
extent that the person affected by it objects to the action". 99 See Betlem, op. cit., at pp. 164-167. 
100 District Court Rotterdam 15 March 1991, (1992) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 
( 
lY 
) 513. 
101 Ibid. 
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"A public interest group can... 'play the legal game' like any other 
player and claim compensation for harm done to its own interest. -102 
It is interesting to note that this reasoning accords with the philosophical arguments, 
explored in chapter 4, which suggest that a form of public equitable proprietary 
interest in the environment should be recognized. The Dutch approach represents a 
practical application of this principle in that environmental harm is regarded as a loss 
to the NGO in its capacity as a representative of the public interest 
4.3 European Initiatives 
4.3.1 Lugano Convention 
Article 18 of the Council of Europe Convention affords standing to "[a]ny association 
or foundation which according to its statutes aims at the protection of the 
environment" provided that it complies with "any further conditions of internal law. " 
This enables such organizations to seek injunctive relief in order to; prohibit 
dangerous and unlawful activities which pose a threat to the environment; require that 
the operator takes measures to prevent an incident or damage from occurring (similar 
to a quia timet injunction); require that the operator takes measures to prevent damage 
after an incident has occurred; require that the operator takes reinstatement measures 
where the damage has already occurred. 
However, the Convention leaves domestic jurisdictions free to decide the 
circumstances in which such a request should be denied and the court or tribunal 
before which such requests should be made. 
4.3.2 Draft Directives on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste 
The 1989 proposal'03 referred to affording `common interest groups' 104 standing to 
pursue civil claims, however, this would only be in circumstances "[w]here the law in 
Member States gives.. . groups the right 
to bring an action as plaintiff... "los As we have 
seen above, in the civil jurisdictions of most Member States, interest groups are only 
afforded standing in very limited circumstances with the result that the provision 
would make little practical difference to the role of such interest groups. 
102 Op. cit., at p. 166. 103 OJ No C 251/3 (1989). 
104 Arts 4(3), 4(4). 
105 Art. 4(4). 
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The amended 1991106 proposal goes considerably further than the 1989 proposal and 
requires Member States to guarantee the standing of interest groups. Article 4(1)(a) 
provides that Member States "shall determine... the person who may bring a legal 
action. " However, in making this determination Member States are not afforded any 
discretion to exclude interest groups. Article 4(3) provides, 
"[c]ommon interest groups or associations, which have as their object 
the protection of nature and the environment, shall have the right... to 
seek any remedy... or to join in legal proceedings... brought. " 
Such an approach would certainly increase the potential role of pressure groups 
although the proposal leaves the precise detail of determining the circumstances in 
which an interest group would be able to bring an action to the Member States. 107 
4.3.3 Discussion Documents 
The Commission Green Paper retreated from affording standing to environmental 
pressure groups. The Draft Green Paper108 which preceded the final version stated "it 
is difficult to see the role of environmental associations in a civil liability system for 
damage to the environment" and emphasised that civil liability depends on there being 
"a party with legal interest who can bring an action. " This suggests that the 
Commission found that it would be conceptually difficult to allow a right of action to 
those who have not suffered direct loss. However, the draft paper accepted that interest 
groups could have a role in securing the cessation of an activity which would 
presumably entail allowing them to apply for injunctive relief. This is the approach 
adopted in the Netherlands109 and under the Lugano Convention although the Lugano 
convention goes further in that, as has been described above, it allows interest groups 
to apply for mandatory in addition to prohibitive injunctions. 
However, the final version of the Commission Green Paper entirely rejected the notion 
that interest groups should be afforded any form of standing: 
"Where damage occurs to property that is not owned, no injured party 
with the right to bring a legal action can be identified. With no legal or 
natural person to sue on behalf of the environment, the costs of 
106 OJ No C 192/6 (1991). 
107 1989 Proposal art. 4(3), "[t]he conditions under which interest groups... may bring an action before 
the competent authorities shall be laid down by national legislation. " 
108 COM(92) 52. 
109 See below. 
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restoring environmental damage cannot be recovered via civil liability. " 110 
The fact that the Commission elected not to explore this issue in the Green Paper is 
curious in that the issue of the right to bring a legal action is closely associated with 
the main theme of the paper which concerns restoration of the natural environment. 
However, the Commission now appears to have returned to the view that standing 
should be afforded to NGOs in civil proceedings. The 1997 Working Paper 
recommends that public interest groups should be in a position to seek injunctive relief 
or damages in respect of natural resource damage 111. It will be recalled that the 
Commission is of the opinion that natural resource damage should be defined by 
reference to EC standards. The fact that the Paper recommends that standing for 
public interest groups should be restricted to cases involving natural resource damage 
is significant in that, as stated in the previous chapter, it is likely that natural resource 
damage will be defined by reference to EC standards. This demonstrates that the 
Commission considers that such groups would play an integral role in its strategy to 
use civil liability as a means of enforcing these standards. 
4.4 Main Considerations 
Increased standing for NGOs would be a vital component of any civil liability regime 
designed to reduce the risk of ecological damage. As the Dutch Supreme Court 
reasoned in the Kuunders case, unless there is some mechanism for aggregating the 
diffuse costs of this form of pollution, tortious liability cannot play any useful role in 
this context. One method of aggregating these costs is to allow NGOs to undertake 
representative actions on behalf of the public interest. This view now appears to be 
shared by the Commission in that, although the 1993 Green Paper rejected the notion 
that standing should be extended to NGOs112, the latest working paper113 suggests 
that this is an issue which should be considered. Furthermore, both the Proposed 
Directive on Civil liability for Damage Caused by Waste114 and the Lugano 
Conventions 15 require the adoption of measures designed to increase the standing of 
NGOs. However, the comparative study, above, focuses attention on certain issues 
which will require careful consideration 
110 Com(93) 47 final, p. 11 at 2.1.9. 
111 Op. cit., p. 5. 
112 Com(93) 47 final, p. 11 at 2.1.9. 
Loc. cit., p. 5. 
114 Loc. cit., Article 4. 
115 Loc. cit., Article 18. 
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4.4.1 Usurpation of Private Bargaining Rights 
A particularly difficult issue concerns the need to balance the objective of 
environmental protection against the freedom of a private individual to reach his own 
settlement with a polluter. The Dutch system prohibits NGOs from taking action 
where this would be contrary to the wishes of individuals directly affected. This gives 
rise to a dilemma in that, whilst such agreements may be in the short term interests of 
the landowners concerned, they may not be in the best interests of the environment. If 
public interest issues demand that pollution should, notwithstanding any such private 
agreements, still be halted by means of injunctive relief, it could be argued that only a 
governmental organization with statutory powers should be in a position to override 
the landowners freedom to contract. This is the approach adopted in Italy where public 
authorities, as trustees for the community, are afforded sole responsibility for bringing 
civil claims for environmental damage 116. However, the increased standing afforded 
to public authorities has been at the expense of the standing rights afforded to NGOs 
which have been entirely precluded from instigating proceedings 117. The problem with 
this approach is that it prevents any other organisation from acting in default of the 
public authority which may be fettered by, for example, policy considerations or lack 
of resources. As argued in the previous chapter, the EU wishes to increase the role of 
civil liability in order reduce reliance upon public authorities. The solution to this 
problem may be to adopt elements of both the Dutch and Italian systems; thus whilst 
an NGO would be prevented from instigating proceedings where the individuals 
concerned object, it would nevertheless remain open to a public authority to instigate 
its own proceedings in the public interest. This would augment the regulatory powers 
which enable certain authorities to carry out preventative or remedial measures in 
default and to recover the costs from the polluter. 118 
4.4.2 Remedies 
The other main issue which deserves careful consideration concerns which remedies 
should be available to an NGO. Injunctions are most commonly sought to prevent the 
continuance of, for example, harmful emissions, or to prevent an activity from 
proceeding which constitutes an immediate threat. Where damage has already 
occurred the issue is rather more complicated in that it must be ensured that any 
payments made benefit the environment as opposed to the NGO. An award of 
compensatory damages is clearly appropriate where an organization 
has incurred 
116 Law 349/1986. For an overview of the Italian system see, Bianchi, A., "The Harmonization of Laws 
on Liability for Environmental Damage in Europe: An Italian Perspective", 
(1994) 6(1) Journal of 
Environmental Law 21. 
117 Thid, Article 13. 
118 See, for example, section 161 Water Resources Act 1991. 
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expenses as a result of carrying out remediation works. This is the approach followed 
in Holland; the 1991 Draft Directive on Civil liability for Damage Caused by Waste 
also allows interest groups to recover expenses which they have incurred as a result of 
clean-up operationsi 19 A further consideration is that costs which have actually been 
incurred by interest groups may only represent part of the full costs of the pollution in 
that the organisation may not have had the expertise or resources to effect a full 
clean-up; further measures may be necessary in future. The European Environmental 
Law Association has suggested that the most obvious solution would be to pay 
damages, calculated upon the basis of the full cost to the environment, into a trust 
fund120. This would ensure that the money could only be used for the purpose of 
on-going remediation works resulting from the original escape. In England such an 
approach is already common place in personal injuries cases where a person has been 
left with a long term disability. Periodic payments are made into a trust fund from 
which the trustees may, from time to time, authorise payments in order to pay for 
nursing or further treatment121 
An alternative solution would be to enable NGOs to seek mandatory injunctions 
requiring the polluter to effect clean-up measures. In response to the Commission 
Green Paper the European Environmental Law Association argued: 
"Given the inclusion in the Green Paper of discussion on the restoration 
of the environment, we see no reason why it should be beyond the 
scope of a system of civil liability to allow persons to bring proceedings 
to seek an order from a court requiring a defendant to repair 
environmental damage, or to pay the cost incurred by others in so 
doing. "122 
Article 4(3) of the 1991 draft Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste 
provides that interest groups should be in a position to obtain any remedy; this would 
include mandatory injunctions in those jurisdictions where they are available. It will be 
119 Article 4(3): "Common interest groups or associations, which have as their object the protection of 
nature and the environment, shall have the right either to seek any remedy under paragraph 
1(b)... " 
Paragraph 1(b) provides for: "... the reimbursement of costs lawfully 
incurred in reinstating the 
environment and in taking preventative measures (including costs of 
damage caused by preventative 
measures)". 
120 European Environmental Law Association, Repairing Damage to the Environment -A community 
System of Civil Liability (submission to the Joint Public Hearing of the 
European Parliament and the 
Commission of the European Communities on Preventing and Remedying 
Environmental Damage), 
Brussels 3/4 November 1993, at para. 11.13. 
121 See The Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 125, Structural Settlements and Interim and 
Provisional Damages. 
122 Op. cit., at para. 11.3. 
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recalled that Article 18 of the Lugano Convention identifies the different forms of 
injunctive relief which should be available to an interest group. Article 18(1)(d) 
provides that an interest group should be able to request "that the operator be ordered 
to take measures of reinstatement. " In order to ensure that steps are taken to remedy 
environmental damage which has already taken place, any EC instrument should 
include such a provision. 
5. CLASS ACTIONS 
5.1 Justifications for the Class Action 
Class actions constitute an alternative means of aggregating diffuse environmental 
costs to the representative action. Transaction costs are high where a single polluting 
incident affects a great number of parties with the result that many claims may be 
brought in connection with the same incident. This gives rise to transaction costs in the 
form of aggregation costs; these represent the costs of aggregating all the claims so 
that the damages payable represent the true overall cost of the damage caused. Where 
many separate actions are brought aggregation costs are high due to the fact that 
proceedings are duplicated. This is an inefficient solution which benefits the polluter 
since, due to the expense of legal proceedings, only those who have been most 
severely affected are likely to bring civil claims. As a result the polluter is not required 
to internalise the full aggregate costs of the pollution. 
5.2 Developments in Member States 
In the UK, aggregation costs can be reduced to a certain extent by the use of group 
actions in cases where there is a commonality of interests or issues. By allowing all 
affected parties to join in the same proceedings the number of lawyers involved can be 
reduced and the facts of the case can be heard at a single trial and any subsequent 
appeal hearings123. The group action procedure has been used in two well known 
environmental cases, namely, A. B. & others v. South West Water Services Ltd124 
which, it will be recalled, concerned personal injuries claims following the release of 
aluminium sulphate into the public drinking water supply. The other notable example 
is the case of Hunter v. London Docklands Development Corporation125 which, as we 
123 There is no formal procedure for group actions, however, the Supreme Court Procedural Committee 
issued guidance in a `Guide for use in Group Actions', May 1991. In order to increase the efficiency of 
the procedure in future it is proposed that a single High Court judge such preside over proceedings. 124 [1993] 2 W. L. R. 507. 
125 [1996] 2 W. L. R. 348. 
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have seen, concerned public and private nuisance claims brought by local residents 
during the main phase of the redevelopment of the London Docklands area. However, 
group actions are still relatively costly in that they are often more time consuming than 
individual actions. This is due to the fact that, although the facts of the case can be 
heard at a single trial, there must be an individual assessment of each damages claim. 
In the United States, this problem may be avoided by the use of class actions in which 
a single case is taken to be representative of all those with similar claims. A single 
award is made which is applicable to all those within the class. However, in Europe, 
class actions are largely unknown although the matter is under consideration in 
Finland. The main objection to the procedure is that damage claims normally vary 
considerably in each individual case and it would be arbitrary and artificial to impose a 
uniform award on all parties. In the United States, some provision is made for such 
variances in that classes are defined according to the nature of the loss they have 
suffered; thus, those suffering personal injury would be grouped into a separate class 
126 from those who have suffered property damage 
In France, limited provision for class actions for environmental damage has recently 
been introduced by law 95/101 of 2nd February 1995 which allows recognised 
environmental pressure groups to pursue civil claims on behalf of an affected class of 
individuals. Article 5 IV inserts a new law into the Rural Code which provides as 
follows: 
"Where several identified individuals have suffered personal damage by 
the same person (individual or legal entity) and had a common origin, 
in the fields mentioned in L252-3, any interest group which is 
authorised (agree) in accordance with Article L- 252 -1 may, if it has 
been commissioned by at least two of the affected individuals, bring an 
action before any jurisdiction in the name of those individuals. " 
The fields referred to by Article L- 252 -3 constitute those, 
"acts concerning a direct or indirect damage to the collective interests 
that the authorised interest groups have to protect and constituting a 
violation of the laws relating to the protection of nature and the 
126 For example, plaintiffs who took part in litigation following the accident at the Three 
Mile Island 
Nuclear Power Station were divided into three classes. The first two classes concerned individuals and 
businesses within 25 miles of the plant who had suffered ordinary economic loss as a result of the turmoil 
and mass evacuation which occurred following the accident. The third class 
included all those who had 
"suffered personal injury, incurred medical expenses, [or]... suffered emotional distress. " See 
In re Three 
Mile Island Litigation, 557 F. Supp. 96 (M. D. Pa. 1982). 
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environment, the improvement of standards of living, the protection of 
water, air, soils, sites and landscapes, town planning or the purpose of 
which is the prevention of pollution and nuisances, as well as of the 
texts enacted for the application of such laws. " 
Accordingly, aggregation costs are substantially reduced by allowing an interest group 
to pursue a single claim in respect of the collective costs of the damage as opposed to 
separate claims in respect of the damage suffered by each individual. At present, there 
are no examples of how this provision might work in practice. However, in order to 
avoid disputes a common interest group would probably only agree to undertake a 
class action if the members of the class agreed in advance to accept an equal pro - rata 
share of any damages awarded. Any individual claiming to have incurred substantially 
greater loss would probably be advised to pursue a separate claim. 
5.3 European Initiatives 
Despite the above developments, as a general rule, class actions remain an unpopular 
concept in Europe. This is reflected in the fact that none of the European initiatives on 
civil liability recommend their use in an environmental context. The Lugano 
Convention does, however, expressly permit the use of class actions subject to the 
proviso that such actions would ordinarily be permitted within the jurisdiction of the 
signatory; to this end Article 22 provides: 
"A court other than the court first seised may also, on the application of 
one of the parties, decline jurisdiction if the law of that court permits 
the consolidation of related actions and the court first seised has 
jurisdiction over both actions... [F]or the purposes of this Article, actions 
are deemed to be related where they are so closely connected that it is 
expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of 
irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings. " 
5.4 Main Considerations 
From the point of view of individual victims the class action has certain advantages 
over the representative action in that it allows for the compensation of individuals. 
However, the primary focus of such actions is on personal loss which, as has been 
discussed above, does not always coincide with environmental harm; thus, whilst 
damages awarded may provide a more accurate reflection of the true costs of the 
activity than isolated actions, it may still be the case that such damages are insufficient 
to effect environmental remediation. 
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6. REMEDIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 
6.1 General Considerations 
One of the main limitations of tort as a means of environmental protection concerns 
the fact that remedies usually reflect private loss as opposed to environmental damage. 
An environmental liability regime would also need to make provision for damages in 
respect of environmental impairment. This raises two complex issues, namely the 
definition of environmental damage and the extent to which damages should reflect 
the costs of restoring the environment to its former state 
As regards injunctive relief, it has been argued that injunctions provide an extremely 
effective remedy in an environmental context. However, their efficacy as a means of 
environmental protection may be severely undermined if courts exercise their 
discretion to award damages in lieu too freely. These issues have been highlighted by 
developments in Member States and EC initiatives. 
6.2 Developments in Member States 
6.2.1 Recoverable Damages 
As regards the position in the UK it has been explained how it is possible to recover 
restoration costs provided that they are foreseeable. The prime object of damages is to 
restore the plaintiff to the position he was in prior to the occurrence of the harm. This 
may entail awarding damages which enable him to restore his land to the state it was 
in prior to the incident. However, where such costs would be out of proportion to the 
value of land damages are calculated on the basis of the diminution in the market 
value of the land caused by the pollution. A similar rule occurs under the German Civil 
Code (BGB). Paragraph 251(2)BGB 127 provides that the defendant will be liable for 
the full costs of remediation unless such costs are unreasonable in relation to the value 
of the object impaired. An unreasonable relation between restoration costs and the 
value of the land is considered to exist where restoration costs exceed the value of the 
land by approximately 30%. 
Calculating damages on the basis of the diminution in market value of the property 
may not provide sufficient funds to undertake restoration work. Thus, it is necessary to 
consider whether there is some alternative basis upon which damages for 
127 This provision is applied under s. 16 of the Environmental Protection Act 1991 
(UmweltHG). 
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environmental impairment may be calculated. An alternative solution would be to 
calculate damages on the basis of the amount it would cost to restore the 
environmental media to a level which would enable it to be used for a certain purpose. 
This approach allows for considerably more flexibility than calculating damages on 
the basis of loss of market value alone. However, this in turn raises the issue of 
whether property should be restored to a standard which enables it to be used for a 
specific or limited number of end uses as opposed to all possible end use. The former 
approach is adopted in the UK where informal trigger values128, set by the 
Inter-Departmental Committee on the Redevelopment of Contaminated Land, are used 
to determine whether land is clean enough to be used for certain purposes129. A 
similar approach is adopted in Sweden when applying section 5 of the Environmental 
Liability Act (1969: 387). This provides that anyone performing, or intending to 
perform, an environmentally hazardous activity has a duty to remedy detrimental 
environmental effects after the activity has ceased. However, it is always borne in 
mind that the character of, for example, a plot of land may have changed irreversibly 
as a result of the contamination. In these circumstances it may be necessary to restore 
the land to a lesser standard which may render it suitable for an alternate use which is 
not adversely affected by the residual contamination. 
In contrast, the Netherlands has adopted a `polished earth' approach under its Soil 
Protection Act 1994 which demands that land should be restored to a standard which 
renders it suitable to accommodate all, or at least as many as possible, potential end 
uses. Article 38(1) introduces the concept of multifunctionality which means that the 
functional properties of the soil for man, plant or animal are maintained or restored. 
However, there are exceptions which considerably ease this burden. The 
multifunctionality requirement may be abandoned if there are special environmental, 
technical or financial circumstances which render this approach infeasible or 
unrealistic. Special environmental circumstances would exist if, for example, the clean 
up operations would result in the escape of hazardous substances. Technical and 
financial circumstances exist if the cost of restoration is out of proportion to the cost of 
128 They are divided into three groups: Group A (contaminants which are harmful to human health) 
comprising arsenic, cadmium, chromium, lead, mercury, selenium: Group B (phytoxic contaminants 
which are not normally harmful to human health) comprising boron, copper, nickel, zinc: Group C 
(contaminants from former coal carbonisation plants) comprising cyanide, thiocyanate sulphate, sulphide, 
sulphur, phenols, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons. 
129 Certain developments can be undertaken in a manner which does not require the land to be cleaned at 
all. For example, paragraph 41 of I. C. R. C. L. Guidance Note 59/83 provides that developments should be 
planned "so that the most badly contaminated areas are located beneath permanent hard cover (roads, 
pavements, parking areas) leaving the less contaminated parts of the site for the main buildings or 
for 
gardens and amenity areas. " 
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cheaper yet effective alternatives such as isolation, control and monitoring of the 
substances. Formulas exist for calculating when these alternatives should be employed 
in place of multifunctionality130 
Another difficult issue concerns the extent to which pure economic loss should be 
recoverable. In chapter 3 it was explained that, under English Law, liability for 
economic loss is restricted to damage which flows directly from damage to property. 
Thus businesses which have lost trade as a result of environmental damage may not 
claim in respect of lost proflts. 131 In contrast, certain liability regimes introduced in 
other Member States have made provision for economic loss. This is the case under 
the new systems in both Spain132 and Finland. 133 However, in order to avoid opening 
the `floodgates' it has been recommended that only those with a direct commercial 
interest in the resource affected should be able to recover economic loss. 134 Thus, if, 
for example, chemicals leaked from a plant situated on the coast and washed ashore 
near a resort, fishermen would be able to claim in respect of lost profits. However, 
tourists would be precluded from claiming damages in respect of the impairment of 
their holidays. 
6.2.2 Injunctive Relief 
In chapter 2 it was argued that injunctions are the most effective remedy in an 
environmental context in that they compel the polluter to investigate cleaner 
technologies. However, the English courts have a wide discretion to award damages in 
lieu. This contrasts with the position in the Netherlands in which there is a general 
presumption in favour of injunctive relief and the power to grant damages in lieu is 
more strictly controlled135. In short, the plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief as of 
right136 unless societal interests would be harmed137 
130 For example, for clean up costs up to 10,000 Dutch Guilders, costs are deemed excessive if they are 
nine times greater than the alternative measures. Where clean up costs amount to up to 100 million Dutch 
Guilders, these costs will be considered excessive if the alternative measures would be one and a half 
times cheaper. 131 See, for example, Weller & Co. Ltd. v. Foot and Mouth Disease Research Institute [1966] 1 Q. B. 
560. 
132 See Barrenetxea, J, M., "The Spanish Draft Act on Liability for Environmental Damage" [1997] 
Environmental Liability 115. 
133 See Wetterstein, P., "The Finnish Environmental Damage Compensation Act - and some 
Comparisons with Norwegian and Swedish Law" [1995] Environmental Liability 41. 134 See Barrenetxea, op. cit., at pp. 117-118; Wetterstein, op. cit., at p 45. Wetterstein points out that 
this is the approach adopted in Norway. 135 See Betlem, G. (1993), Civil Liability for Transfrontier Pollution - Dutch Environmental Tort Law 
in International Cases in the Light of Community Law, Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff: Betlem, G. 
(1995) "Transboundary Enforcement: Free Movement of Injunctions", in S. Deimann and B. Dyssli 
(eds. ), Environmental Rights - Law, Litigation and Access to Justice, 
Cameron May. 
136 Art. 3: 296 Civil Code. 
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6.3 European initiatives 
6.3.1 Lugano Convention 
Article 7 of the Convention allows for the recovery of damages in respect of death, 
physical injury, damage to property or environmental impairment. Environmental 
impairment is defined as: 
"loss or damage by impairment of the environment in so far as this is 
not considered to be damage within the meanings of sub-paragraphs a 
or b above provided that compensation for impairment of the 
environment, other than for loss of profit from such impairment, shall 
be limited to the costs of measures of reinstatement actually undertaken 
or to be undertaken; the costs of preventive measures and any loss or 
damage caused by preventive measures. " 
The term `environmental impairment' is nebulous, however, it seems that it relates to 
damage which is capable of being rectified by means of an injunction to prevent the 
continuation of the offending activity or damages amounting to the costs of restoring 
the property affected to its former state. However, according to Article 2(7)(c) this 
does not encompass economic loss resulting from such impairment. 
As noted above, Article 18 of the Convention also makes specific provision for 
environmental interest groups to seek injunctive relief in order to prevent damage or to 
compel operators to "take measures of reinstatement" . 
6.3.2 Waste Proposals 
In common with the Lugano Convention, both the 1989 and 1991 proposals for a 
directive on civil liability for damage caused by waste include death, personal injury 
and damage to property within the definition of damage under Article 2(1)(c). As 
regards wider types of environmental harm, the 1989 proposal referred to `injury to the 
environment' which was defined as, 
"a significant and persistent interference in the environment caused by 
a modification of the physical, chemical or biological conditions of 
water, soil and/or air in so far as these are not considered to be damage 
within the meaning of subparagraph (c)(ii). " 
The 1991 proposal replaced this complex notion of environmental injury with one of 
`environmental impairment' in common with the Lugano Convention. However, 
137 Art. 6: 168 Civil Code. 
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unlike the Lugano Convention, the 1991 Waste Proposal also contains a definition of 
environmental impairment: 
" `Impairment of the environment' means any significant physical, 
chemical or biological deterioration of the environment insofar as this 
is not considered to be damage within the meaning of sub-paragraph 
(c)(ii). " 
The key part of this definition refers to significant deterioration which means that, in 
order to be actionable, harm would have to be tangible and capable of being rectified. 
Article 4(1)(d) leaves the recoverability of economic loss to the jurisdiction of 
Member States. 
Article 4(1)(b) of the 1991 proposal makes provision for the granting of both 
prohibitory and mandatory injunctions. 
6.3.3 Discussion Documents 
The Green Paper recognizes that it is difficult to place a monetary value on certain 
environmental attributes; it is however, possible to quantify the cost of remedying 
tangible environmental damage which is capable of being rectified. The Green Paper 
states: 
"[I]f there is an obligation to maintain those elements of the 
environment in a healthy state, a concurrent obligation arises to restore 
these elements to that state whenever they are damaged. This obligation 
carries with it the right to claim the costs of restoration from the party 
who caused the damage. The amount of compensation the liable party is 
obliged to pay is computed in terms of the actual cost of environmental 
restoration. " 138 [emphasis added] 
The Green Paper did, however, point out that in certain cases it may be difficult to 
identify the threshold of damage in cases of environmental impairment. In other 
words, the point at which the environment becomes sufficiently degraded by pollution 
to warrant remediation: 
"Actual physical destruction or gross contamination is generally 
considered damage, but what about lesser impacts? All human activities 
result in emissions, but the point at which these emissions are to be 
138 Ibid. 
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considered "pollution" is not clear. Nor is it clear at which point "pollution" causes actual damage. "139 
As the subsequent Working Paper indicates, this is where it may be possible to refer to 
environmental standards. It will be recalled from chapter 5 that the Paper suggests 
linking the definition of damage with existing environmental standards set by 
Directives. 
Neither document deals with the issue of economic loss or the circumstances in which 
injunctive relief should be available. 
6.4 Main Considerations 
6.4.1 The Threshold of Damage 
Most environmental liability proposals cover standard heads of damage including 
personal injury and property damage. However, defining the point at which general 
environmental impairment should become actionable is rather more difficult. For the 
sake of certainty, this is where a civil liability regime could be linked with the other 
elements of the EC's environmental programme. Thus damage would be deemed to 
have occurred where levels of specified elements exceed levels set by the EC. In 
chapter 5 it was suggested that there is evidence to suggest that the Commission may 
be in favour of such an integrated approach. As Carnwath J. noted in Blue Circle 
Industries Plc v. Ministry of Defence, in cases of doubt, regulatory standards can be 
useful in determining whether a change is significant: 
"Given the sophistication of the regulatory systems now covering most 
areas of human activity, the views of the regulatory authorities are often 
critical... in the Cambridge Water case [1994] 2 A. C. 264 the damage 
was caused because the contamination rendered the water unusable in 
accordance with the standards prescribed pursuant to the relevant EEC 
directive, not because it was in fact dangerous to health (see per Lord 
Goff, p. 249G). Thus, although the existence of a statutory regulatory 
system cannot alter the requirement that there should be some physical 
change, it may be relevant in considering whether the physical change 
is of any practical significance. - 140 [emphasis added] 
However, the problems of linking the definition of damage with quality objectives or 
emission limits have also been highlighted; it will be recalled that standards have only 
13 9 COM(93) 47 final, p. 10 at 2.1.7. 
140 [1997] Env. L. R. 341, at pp. 347-348. 
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been set in respect of a limited number of substances. As a result, such limits should 
operate as minimum requirements in cases or doubt and not preclude those who can 
show that they have been adversely affected by lesser concentrations from seeking 
redress. 
6.4.2 Restoration Standards 
It seems that the courts would be left to determine the quantum of damages according 
to existing domestic legal principles. As explained in chapter 4 this entails balancing 
the right to full compensation against the technical feasibility and cost of 
environmental remediation. In many cases this involves assessing damages on the 
basis of the lost use of a natural resource and the costs of restoring that use. Thus in 
Cambridge Water v. Eastern Counties Leather141, had the damage been foreseeable, 
Cambridge Water would have been able to recover the costs of re-locating the 
pumping station so as to enable it to continue abstracting drinking water. If the water 
had been abstracted for another purpose, for use in the manufacture of paper for 
example, then clearly the contamination would not have affected the use of the 
resource. 
However, Steele 142 is concerned that the linking of damages to the use of a natural 
resource risks partitioning the environment into tradable assets in which the value of a 
natural resource resides in its commercial use. Once natural resources are priced in 
this way they become vulnerable to becoming the subject of market transactions. This 
is because the market exerts a pressure to trade resources so that they eventually vest 
in the person who values them most highly (the `transformative economy' )143, as 
Steele explains: 
"[T]he market approach to private law clearly treats property as having 
value because of its role in a human, not a natural economy. More than 
this, it derives the value of land from human preferences, which can be 
maximized only through exchange and use". 144 
Thus, where the polluter's use appears to be more profitable, according to economic 
criteria, the court may, for example, be persuaded to grant damages in lieu of an 
injunction calculated upon the basis of the plaintiffs use of the resource. Such an 
141 [1994] 2 W. L. R. 53. 
142 Steele, J., "Remedies and Remediation: Foundation Issues in Environmental Liability", (1995) 58(5) 
Modern Law Review 615. 
143 See Sax, J., "Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. 
South Carolina 
Coastal Council, (1992) 45 Stanford Law Review 1433. 
144 Ibid., at p. 630. 
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approach leaves "little space for the concept of environmental protection and would 
essentially tend to enhance the risk of environmental damage". 145 
As a result, when considering the quantum of damages under an environmental 
liability system, it would be necessary for the courts to take a broad view of `use' 
which takes account of the role of the resource in the eco-system. The Dutch 
multifunctionality approach invites the court to take this view. In contrast, English 
Government policy focuses on restoring land for a specific purpose. 146 However, this 
narrow view is not necessarily shared by the courts when considering clean up costs in 
the context of liability in tort. In Blue Circle Industries Plc v. Ministry of Defence, the 
radiation contaminated a small area of marshland near the boundary of the site where 
no one generally had cause to go. Furthermore, although levels of contamination 
exceeded statutory limits, they were insufficient to constitute a health risk. 
Nevertheless, in the High Court, Carnwath J. was prepared to take a broad view of use 
which encompassed impairment of the enjoyment of property: 
"That the contamination rendered the property less useful or less 
valuable is... to my mind self evident. The matter can be looked at 
narrowly, simply on the basis that, from the time the contamination was 
made known until it had been dealt with by removing the earth, that 
part of the estate could not be used as freely as it had been. Indeed, 
during the course of the works it could not be used at all. "147 
Such an approach would be consistent with a liability regime which has at its heart the 
objective of environmental protection. 
6.4.3 Economic Loss 
European proposals have declined to include an express provision allowing for the 
recovery of damages in respect of pure economic loss; this is understandable. The 
extent to which the net of liability can be cast beyond those directly affected by the 
damage is bound with policy considerations; such as the classic `floodgates 
argument'. 148 Accordingly it is difficult to set a rigid legal test. To this end the courts 
have traditionally enjoyed a discretion to widen and draw back the net in accordance 
145 Ibid., at p. 631. 
146 See Department of the Environment and Welsh Office (1994), Framework 
for Contaminated Land, 
HMSO, at p. 4. This advocates the "suitable for use" approach in that it permits 
"contaminated land to be 
kept in, or returned to, beneficial use wherever practicable". 147 [1996] Env. L. R. 341, at p. 346. 
148 As Cardozo C. J. stated in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche 174 N. E. 441,444 
(1931) the defendant 
should not be held liable "in an indeterminate amount for an 
indeterminate time to an indeterminate 
class. " 
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with such considerations. In English common law the test of remoteness of damage has been used as the control mechanism which regulates the extent to which economic 
loss may be recovered. 149 The courts should not be precluded from exercising this 
discretion by an express statutory provision for economic loss for the following 
reasons. 
Even if the recoverability of economic loss was prescribed by a requirement that only 
those with a commercial interest in the matter may claim damages, the `floodgates' 
could still be opened. Let us return to the above example in which an area of coastline 
has been polluted by chemicals released from a coastal plant. In addition to 
commercial fishermen, those who operate pleasure cruises could equally claim a 
commercial interest in the matter. Once claims are admitted by those who rely on 
tourism the floodgates are thrown wide. Shops, restaurants, hotels, bus companies, taxi 
firms etc. could all argue that their businesses have been affected. Liability of this type 
would make it extremely difficult to calculate risk and could have an adverse effect on 
the availability of insurance. ' 50 
There is also a more fundamental objection to such an approach. One should not lose 
sight of the fact that the primary objective of a civil liability regime should be the 
protection of the environment rather than the commercial interests which vest in it. 
Economic loss reflects the economic analysis of law in which the value of a natural 
resource vests in its commercial usage rather than its role in the ecosystem. 
It may, however, be advisable to make specific provision for the recovery of clean up 
costs incurred by organizations afforded standing under any regime. Given the fact that 
the object of the exercise in environmental remediation, it seems entirely reasonable to 
allow for the recovery of such Costs. 151 
149 See Dias, R. W. M., "Remoteness of Liability and Legal Policy" [ 1962] Cambridge Law Journal 178. 
150 There is some suggestion (Cane 1996) that the courts have restricted recovery of damages in respect 
of economic loss for negligent mis-statement, the `high water mark' of which was Antis v. Merton 
London Borough Council [ 1978] A. C. 728, partly in response to the insurance implications. In Caparo v. 
Dickman [1989] Q. B. 653, in which the class of persons to whom one may be liable for negligent 
mis-statement was limited, Bingham and Taylor LJJ, at pp. 688-9 and 703 respectively, referred to the 
fact that their decision should not affect the availability of insurance for company auditors. In Smith v. 
Bush [1990] 1 AC 831, at pp. 858-9 Lord Griffiths considered that the availability of insurance was 
relevant to the issue of whether a valuer should be liable to the purchaser of a property. See Cane, P. 
1996), Tort Law and Economic Interests (2nd edn. ), Clarendon Press, at pp. 423-424. 
151 Recall that, whereas in the Netherlands such costs would be regarded as losses 
flowing from harm to 
the interests of an environmental pressure group, in the UK they would probably 
be regarded as 
economic loss; see Betlem, G., "Standing for Ecosystems - Going Dutch" 
[1995] Cambridge Law 
Journal 153, at p. 166-67. This is also the position adopted under the 
International Convention on Civil 
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1969) Article 1(7). 
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6.4.4 The Availability of Injunctive Relief 
An issue which has yet to be addressed, in the context of environmental protection, 
concerns the fact that the rationale for granting injunctive relief differs from when it is 
granted to protect private interests. As regards the protection of private interests, it will 
be recalled that an increasingly popular view of the role of injunctions stems from the 
economic analysis of law outlined in Chapter 4. To recap, the theory provides that 
injunctions should not be viewed as a once and for all prohibition against the 
continuance of an activity, rather, they should be regarded as an instruction to the 
parties to bargain152. Thus, according to this view, the injunction serves to prevent a 
polluter from interfering with a persons use and enjoyment of his property without first 
attempting to negotiate an easement. This analysis appeals to economists in that the 
injunction serves to channel the land use decision to the market153 which they regard 
as being a more accurate indicator of land use preferences than the courts154 
However, it is also recognized that, in certain circumstances, the granting of an 
injunction may not have the effect of inducing the parties to bargain155. In such 
circumstances it is argued that the court should award damages in lieu thus 
1 s6 compulsorily purchasing the right to pollute 
This analysis of the purpose of injunctive relief would clearly not apply where the 
power to grant injunctive relief forms part of a system which has at its core the 
objective of environmental protection. Awarding damages in lieu, whether to an 
environmental pressure group or a private individual, would eviscerate the purpose of 
the environmental liability regime. As stated in chapter 2, the main problem with 
awarding damages in lieu of an injunction is that, although they may compensate the 
individual for the interference with his private rights, they do not benefit the 
environment. Thus, when seeking injunctive relief under any instrument designed to 
implement an environmental liability regime (such as an Environmental Liability Act 
intended to implement an EC Directive) it would be important for the court to 
understand that the primary purpose of the action would be environmental protection 
152 See, for example, Cooter and Ulen, op. cit., at p. 176: Veljanovski, op. cit., at pp. 229-230: Cane, P, 
o cit., at pp. 54-55. 
13 See Landes and Posner, op. cit., at p. 31. 
1554 Ibid. See also Ogus, A. I., and Richardson, G. M., "Economics and the Environment", (1977) 36 
Cambridge Law Journal 284, p. 321, "[O]ne important respect in which the court may fail to achieve 
efficiency is in its jealous preference for an injunction over damages. " 
155 This may occur in circumstances where there are many parties involved in that 
it would be 
impractical for the polluter to reach a different settlement with each individual; see Cooter and Ulen, op. 
cit. at p. 171. 
156 Landes and Posner, op. cit., p. 31: Cooter and Ulen, op. cit., p. 176: Calabresi, 
G., and Melamed, 
D. A., "Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: Our view of the Cathedral", (1972) 85 
Harvard 
Law Review 1089. 
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and not the protection of the private property rights of the plaintiff. Thus it would be 
necessary for the courts to take a restrictive view of their discretion to award damages 
in lieu. As noted above, this is the approach which has been adopted in the 
Netherlands. 
7. FINANCIAL PROVISION FOR EXTENDED CIVIL LIABILITY 
7.1 General Considerations 
As stated in chapter 4, it is not realistic to consider the role of tort in isolation from 
insurance. Thus, the insurance implications of extended civil liability for 
environmental damage have featured both in Member State initiatives and European 
Proposals. 
In addition certain proposals contemplate the use of complementary compensation 
funds to finance environmental clean up where costs cannot be recovered through tort 
and insurance. 
7.2 Developments in Member States 
The German Environmental Liability Act (UmweltHG) makes provision for 
compulsory insurance under section 19, however, this part of the Act has yet to be 
activated. This is because the German insurance industry has been slow to develop 
policies capable of meeting the additional liabilities imposed by the Act157 
Nevertheless, the market has now begun to develop. After some hesitation158, the 
industry has decided to exclude pollution cover from general liability policies whilst 
simultaneously offering new Environmental Impairment Liability (EIL) policies. 159 
These policies differ somewhat from their counterparts in the UK. Whereas UK EIL 
policies contain `claims made' triggers to avoid the problem of `long tail' risks 160, the 
German version comprises `manifestation' triggers: "The insurance case is the first 
discovery of bodily injury or material damage by the injured party or a third party or by 
157 See Hoffman, W. C., "Germany's New Environmental Liability Act: Strict Liability for Facilities 
Causing Pollution", (1991) 38 Netherlands International Law Review 27, at p. 39. 
158 Ibid., at p. 40-41. For a time the industry was unsure whether to adapt existing general liability 
policies or to entirely exclude cover and offer new stand alone EIL policies. 159 See Woltereck, R., "New Environmental Impairment Liability Policy Introduced into the German 
Insurance Market" [ 1994] 5 International Insurance Law Review 202, at p. 203. The industry has stated 
that cover will only be offered to the 100,000 plants subject to the UmweltHG under new conditions. 
160 See ch. 4, above. 
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the policyholder. - 161 This does not preclude the possibility of exposure to long tail 
risks; thus, it seems that the industry is confident that detailed site surveys can reduce 
this risk to manageable proportions. This corresponds with the findings of Holmes and 
Broughton who, it will be recalled162, argue that, those UK insurers who chose to 
continue providing pollution cover under public liability policies, can reduce exposure 
to long tail risks by introducing EIL type site surveys. In addition, the German EIL 
policies provide limited indemnity in respect of gradual pollution arising from 
incidents other than sudden and accidental escapes. This would include, for example, 
pollution caused by oil drips from a broken down machine but not emissions resulting 
from the normal operation of a plant. However, this type of indemnity has been capped 
at DM20 million. 163 
Insurance companies in certain states have endeavoured to increase capacity by 
forming insurance pools such as Assurpol in France164 By pooling resources and 
expertise in this manner the industry is better able to absorb unexpectedly large claims 
resulting from, for example, long tail risks. 165 
Certain states have adopted a horizontal approach to liability whereby costs which 
cannot be recovered through tort rules and insurance may be drawn from a 
compensation fund financed by, for example, a tax or premium on industry. In 
Sweden, recourse may be had to such funds where the identity of the polluter is 
unknown, where civil action is statute barred or where the polluter is insolvent. 
166 
161 See Woltereck, op. cit., at p. 204. 
162 See ch 4., above. 163 See Woltereck, op. cit., at p. 204. 
164 This has proved necessary in France due to the fact that `claims made' triggers 
have been ruled 
illegal by the Cour de Cassation in the case of Commercial Union v. La Mutuelle 
des Architectes 
Francais (Unreported, 1990). This makes it difficult to insure against long tail risks. Assurpol 
has started 
introducing `manifestation triggers' of the type introduced in Germany, however, it remains to 
be seen 
whether these will be acceptable to the courts. See Lee, R. G., and 
Tupper, S., "Claims-made Policies: 
European Occurrences" [1996] Environmental Liability 25; Hagopian, M., "France: Supreme 
Court 
Rules that `Claims Made' Coverage is a Nullity" [ 1994] International Journal of 
Insurance Law 52. 
165 Including Italy, Spain and the Netherlands. See ERM Economics (1996), 
"The Insurance Sector", in, 
Economic Aspects of Liability and Joint Compensation Systems 
for Remedying Environmental Damage, 
European Commission DGXII. 
166 Environment Protection Act (1969: 387), sections 65-68; Ordinance (1989: 365) on 
Environmental 
Damage Insurance. Contributions to the fund are calculated upon the basis of the size of the enterprise 
(in 
terms of numbers of employees) and the nature of its activity. 
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7.3 European Initiatives 
7.3.1 Lugano Convention 
Article 12 of the Convention requires operators to take part in a compulsory financial 
security scheme to cover the costs of liability incurred under the Convention. This 
does not amount to compulsory insurance in that it allows for alternative mechanisms. 
The Article is rather vague as to the proportion of the damage costs which should be 
covered. It merely refers to the fact that a financial guarantee should be agreed up to a 
certain limit in accordance with internal law. 
7.3.2 Waste Proposals 
Article 11(1) of the 1991 proposal provides that the producer shall be covered by 
insurance or "any other financial security". Article 11(2) provides that the Commission 
shall study the feasibility of establishing a European compensation fund for financing 
clean up where it is not possible to recover costs through civil liability. 
7.3.3 Discussion Documents 
The 1992 Commission Green Paper recites the familiar arguments relating to the 
difficulties of quantifying risk and lack of capacity in the insurance market. However, 
as the developments reviewed above indicate, since this time the insurance industry 
has begun gearing up for increased environmental liability. One additional concern 
which the Green Paper raises is that a compulsory insurance scheme may result in 
insurers becoming the licensers of industrial activities167. This is because it would be 
illegal for an industry to operate in the absence of insurance. The Green Paper also 
proposes that there should be a simultaneous introduction of clean up funds for use 
where it is not possible to recover costs through liability and insurance. 168 Thus civil 
liability and compensation funds are envisaged as constituting two components of a 
unified system (a `horizontal' approach). 
The 1996 Working Paper does not refer to insurance as a component of a civil liability 
regime. 
167 COM(93) 47 final, at p. 13. 
168 Ibid., p. 23, at para. 4.1. 
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7.4 Main Issues 
The above developments give rise to two main issues, namely, whether a liability 
regime should introduce compulsory insurance and how liability rules, backed by 
insurance, should interrelate with alternative compensation mechanisms. 
7.4.1 Compulsory Insurance 
One of the main objections put forward against including a compulsory insurance 
component in a civil liability regime is that insurance companies would become 
licensers of industry. 169 This argument is somewhat overstated in that operators are 
already subject to certain forms of compulsory insurance. For example, in the UK, a 
chemical plant must obtain compulsory employers' liability insurance 17° and, if it 
wishes to deliver its products by road, compulsory motor insurance. 171 Thus, to a 
certain extent, the ability of an operator to trade is already dependant upon the 
availability of insurance. 
A more convincing argument is that insurance does not always provide the best 
solution to the problem of financial responsibility. Faure and Hartleif172 argue that in 
highly specialized and technical areas, such as nuclear power, the industry itself is best 
placed to assess risk and finance its own compensation fund. 173 In the shipping 
industry this approach has been adopted by tanker owners who have formed Protection 
and Indemnity Clubs to meet liabilities resulting from pollution. 174 
A further difficulty is that a compulsory insurance provision would need to specify the 
proportion of the damage costs which must be met by insurance. It is impossible to 
generalize on this issue in that it depends upon factors such as the size of the company, 
the nature of its business and so forth. The Lugano Convention recognizes this 
169 Roy Marshall of the Swiss Reinsurance Company argues: "The unavailability of compulsory 
insurance would in principle mean businesses must be closed. This would unacceptably shift the 
responsibility to police the enterprise from the public authorities to the insurance industry, 
" See Marshall, 
R., "Environmental Impairment - Insurance Perspectives", (1994) 
3(2/3) Review of European Community 
and International Environmental Law 153, at p. 158. 
170 Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969. 
Road Traffic Act 1988 (sections 143 and 145). 
172 Faure, M. G., and Hartleif, T., "Compensation Funds versus Liability and 
Insurance for Remedying 
Environmental Damage", (1996) 5(4) Review of European Community and International Environmental 
Law 321, at p. 323. 
173 See Faure, M., "Economic Models of Compensation for Damage caused by Nuclear 
Accidents: some 
Lessons for the Revision of the Paris and Vienna Conventions", (1995) European 
Journal of Law and 
Economics 21. 
174 See Coghlin, "Protection and Indemnity Clubs", (1994) LLoyds Maritime and 
Commercial Law 
Court 403. 
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problem and states that the matter should be left to internal law. It is because of 
similar difficulties that Germany has yet to activate the compulsory insurance 
component of the UmweltHG. Given the number of plants covered by the Act and the 
technical differences between them the Bunderstag considered that it would not be 
reasonable to require all costs to be met through insurance. However, it is because of 
these very differences that the German Government has been unable to set mandatory 
insurance limits. 175 Due to the range of variable factors involved, the scope of the 
policy is a matter which should be negotiated between the insurer and the insured. In 
other words, insurers need flexibility to adapt policies to the circumstances of a 
particular site. 
Provided liability is not imposed in a manner which gives rise to open ended costs, 
industry and insurance companies are capable of devising financial security 
mechanisms without compulsory insurance. 
7.4.2 Relationship Between Liability Insurance and Compensation Funds 
As noted in chapter 4, the insurance industry has made it clear that it would not be 
prepared to provide cover in respect of retroactive liability for historic pollution. Those 
Member States which have already introduced liability regimes have precluded 
retroactive liability and the EC has now dismissed the possibility unequivocally. This 
form of damage is beyond the reach of tort and must be dealt with by alternative 
solutions such as a compensation fund financed by, for example, a tax on industry. 
However, the Green Paper also contemplates the use of such funds prospectively to 
fund clean up where it is not possible to establish liability in tort. It envisages a single 
regime comprising both systems in a single package (horizontal liability). 
It is misleading to link tort with compensation funds in this manner. They are entirely 
separate mechanisms in that tort maintains corrective functions, whereas, 
compensation funds constitute a purely distributional device. 176 Furthermore, it is by 
no means certain that compensation funds would overcome the difficulties which 
impede the plaintiff from establishing liability in tort. As regards contemporary 
damage, it could be argued that the main advantage of a compensation fund is that it 
would overcome the problem of causal uncertainty. However, as Faure177 points out, 
this would not necessarily be the case. For example, it may prove difficult to establish 
175 See Woltereck, op. cit., at p. 203. 
176 It will be recalled that Weinrib makes this distinction. See ch. 4, above. 177 See Faure and Hartleif, op. cit., and Faure, M. (1996), "Economic Aspects of 
Environmental 
Liability: an Introduction", (1996) 4 European Review of Private Law 85, at pp. 
102-104. 
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that the harm was caused by the particular activity which the fund was designed to 
cover. This problem would be particularly acute in the case of radiation where it may 
be impossible to ascertain whether harm was caused by the nuclear industry or 
naturally occurring radon gas. 
A further possible argument in favour of the use of compensation funds in place of 
liability rules is that they would allow for interim payments to be made to effect 
immediate clean up whereas civil litigation is a lengthy process. This does not take 
into account the fact that litigation normally occurs after the clean up has already been 
completed. Thus, in Middleton v. Wiggins, l 78 for example, in which a house was 
destroyed by an explosion caused by a build up of methane gas which leached from a 
landfill, the property owner was indemnified under the terms of his household 
insurance, his insurers then pursued the insurers of the waste company through 
subrogation. 179 
Thus, clean up funds should only be introduced as part of a separate system for use in 
circumstances where there is no prospect of the polluter being successfully pursued 
through civil proceedings. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
The proposals discussed above are consistent with the aims of the EC identified in the 
previous Chapter. For example, strict liability, relaxation of the burden of proof on 
causality and the concept of channelling liability facilitate the application of the 
polluter pays principle. This also demands the provision of adequate remedies which 
focus on the environmental cost rather than the loss suffered by the individual. 
However, the objective of the polluter pays principle must be balanced against the 
need to ensure that liability remains sustainable; imposing liabilities which cannot be 
met is counter-productive. Polluters must be in a position to limit the costs which are 
passed to their insurers, otherwise, insurers will withdraw cover for environmental 
damage as demonstrated by the experience in the United States. Although strict 
liability increases the insurance component of liability, it does not lead to 
unsustainable liability in that it affords operators an opportunity to limit the costs 
178 [1996] Env. L. R. 17. 
179 Most indemnity policies contain an indemnity clause which entitles the insurer to enforce the 
legal 
rights of the insured in the name of the insured. Thus an insurer who has indemnified an 
insured may seek 
to recover the amount from the insurers of the party considered to be responsible 
for the loss. For a 
statement of the general principle see, for example, Morris v. Ford Motor 
Co. [1973] Q. B. 792, per Lord 
Blackburn. 
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passed to their insurers by the introduction of abatement technology. In contrast, costs 
resulting from historic pollution cannot be internalised by modifications in production 
processes with the result that the entire costs must be met by the insurers. Similarly, 
the need to establish a causal link between the activity and the harm must be retained; 
if this is removed, the polluter becomes liable to a potentially open-ended class of 
persons which again gives rise to unsustainable liability. The system adopted in 
Germany avoids this outcome in that it does not dispense with the need to establish a 
strong possibility of a causal link, it merely provides a framework for drawing a 
common sense conclusion without the need to establish a causal link with scientific 
certainty. 
The proposals are also consistent with the view that the EC considers that civil liability 
may provide an additional means of enforcing its overall environmental objectives. Of 
particular note in this respect is the fact that there is increasing support for affording 
standing to NGOs, such as environmental pressure groups and conservation 
organisations, to seek injunctive relief. Given the fact that the primary concern of such 
organizations is the prevention of ecological damage and given that EC standards 
would be relevant in determining when such damage has occurred, the effect of such a 
proposal would be to provide an important role for private individuals and especially 
NGOs in the enforcement of Community policy. 
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1. IINTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this research has been to establish the role of tort as a component in a 
system of environmental protection. Much of the current debate regarding the 
European initiatives has failed to address this basic issue and has merely focused on 
the detail of specific proposals. However, unless one understands the fundamental 
nature of tort and the wider arguments concerning its proper function in a modern 
society, it is impossible to fully appreciate how it should operate in an environmental 
context. By setting the European initiatives and developments in Member States 
against the background of these wider issues, it has been possible to shed light on this 
issue. This enables one to draw certain conclusions regarding the philosophical basis 
of tort had how this might define its use in environmental protection. 
2. THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF TORT 
One of the main objections to the use of tort as a means of environmental protection 
has been the assertion that, as a private dispute resolution mechanism, it is 
conceptually difficult to harness tort in pursuit of public interest objectives such as 
environmental protection. I However, when one examines the philosophical basis of 
tort and its historical development it soon becomes apparent that this is an over 
simplification. 
To recap, the early development of common law was firmly rooted in the protection of 
private interests in land. Its function was entirely corrective in that it served to restore 
an interest of which the plaintiff had been wrongfully disseised. 2 A nuisance was 
regarded as a misappropriation of an inalienable property right rather than an 
annoyance or irritation. However, during the course of the nineteenth century the 
courts began to impute distributional functions into the common law. The view 
emerged that it was no longer realistic to consider property rights in isolation from 
social preferences regarding land use. 3 Thus, from this time tort has been concerned 
1 This view is encapsulated by the Union of Industrial and Employers Confederations of Europe: "Civil 
liability law protects individuals and, for that reason, civil liability is not suited to compensate damage 
resulting from activities harmful to the environment as a common good. Only public law can determine 
what measures the public authorities should take in order to restore the environment as a common good, 
" 
See UNICE, Position paper on the fundamental options in the Green Paper on remedying 
environmental damage, 20 July 1993, Brussels, (written submissions presented to joint EC Commission 
and European Public Hearing on `Preventing and Remedying Environmental Damage, Brussels 
3-4 
November 1993) 20 July 1993, Brussels. 
2 Maitland, F. W. The Forms of Action at Common Law: A Course of Lectures. Edited by A. H. Clayton 
and W. J. Whittaker (1936 edn. ) Cambridge University Press. 
3 Mclaren, J. P. S., "Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution: Some Lessons from Social History", 
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with whether a particular land use is reasonable. To this end liability under English 
common law has been made contingent upon certain additional considerations 
including the character of the neighbourhood4 and whether an activity constitutes an 
unnatural use of land. 5 
Thus, it is clear that from the nineteenth century onwards the law of tort has sought to 
balance private interests against public interests. Esser explained this duality upon the 
basis of the Aristotelian distinction between corrective and distributive justice. 6 
Whereas corrective justice focuses on the wrong suffered by the plaintiff and the need 
to restore the status quo ante, distributional justice aims to allocate the loss to the 
party which is in the best position to internalize it. This has given rise to conceptual 
difficulties in that the two concepts at first seem incompatible. In the twentieth century 
academics have been exercised by the problems of how to ground tort in a 
philosophical basis which enables it to fulfil both functions simultaneously. Englard's 
application of the theory of complementarity to the problem provides an elegant 
explanation of how two seemingly contradictory functions can form part of a 
harmonious totality.? In his view it is possible for a single legal rule to embody both 
objectives. 
The attraction of Englard's approach is that it is possible to apply it to existing tort 
rules which are relevant in an environmental context. The character of the 
neighbourhood test, for example, serves distributional functions in that it adjusts the 
threshold of damage in accordance with the predominant land use in an area. However, 
it retains corrective functions in that harm which exceeds this threshold remains 
actionable. 
It is therefore, possible to identify a conceptual basis which would justify adapting tort 
rules in pursuit of a public interest objective such as environmental protection. 
However, the issue of whether there is a need to develop tort in this way is, of course, 
another matter. 
1983) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 155 
St. Helens Smelting v. Tipping (1865) H. L. C. 642. 5 Rylands v. Fletcher (1866) L. R. 1 Ex. 265. 6 Esser, J., (1941) Grundlagen und Entwicklung der Gefährdungshaftung, Manchen/Berlin. 
Englard, I. (1995), "The Idea of Complementarity as a Philosophical Basis for Pluralism in Tort Law", 
in D. G. Owen (ed. ), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law, Clarendon/Oxford; and (1993), The 
Philosophy of Tort Law, Blackstone, ch. 5. 
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3. THE ROLE OF TORT IN AN ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT 
The major potential benefit of tort in an environmental context is that it would afford 
private individuals and bodies the opportunity to take part in the policing of the 
environment. If private interests were assimilated more closely with environmental 
interests, a polluting incident could give rise to substantial civil liability in addition to 
regulatory penalties. 8 This may have the added advantage of requiring the polluter to 
internalize a greater proportion of the total damage costs. 9 A paradigmatic case study 
is provided by the Anglers Co-operative Association's success in pursuing the polluters 
of rivers. 10 This potential application of tort is becoming the focus of EC initiatives on 
the subject. 
At first there was no clear rationale for EC intervention in the field of civil liability for 
environmental damage. The proposal for a Directive on Civil Liability for Damage 
Caused by Waste was presented as an internal market measure11. It has since become 
apparent that there is insufficient evidence to suggest that divergent civil liability 
regimes would lead to distortion of competition in the internal market12. Thus, in 
recent years, taking into account the need to satisfy the requirement of subsidiarityl3, 
the Commission has sought to firmly root civil liability initiatives in EC environmental 
policy. To this end recent statements and policy documents have sought to closely 
assimilate civil liability with existing legislation. It seems that civil liability is viewed 
as a means of providing an additional enforcement mechanism which would underpin 
regulatory standards. 14 This is consistent with the Commission's desire to involve 
private individuals and bodies in the policing of environmental standards. 15 
8 This is already the case where a regulation also make provision for civil in addition to criminal liability. 
See, for example, Nuclear Installations Act 1965, section 12. 9 Recall that, following the Shell Mersey Estuary Oil spill of 1989, Shell was fined Lim which, up to that 
point, was the largest penalty ever imposed for environmental impairment. However, clean up costs 
amounted to £1.4m and property damage amounted to £2.1m. See Holmes, R., and Broughton, 
M., 
"Insurance Cover for Damage to the Environment", (1995) 9513 Estates Gazette 123. 
10 Bate, R, "Water Pollution Prevention: a Nuisance Approach", (1994) 14(3) Economic Affairs 13. 
(1991) OJ No. C 192/6. 
12 See Ulph, A., (1996), "Impacts of Environmental Liability Systems on the Competitiveness of 
Industry", in ERM Economics Report, Economic Aspects of Liability and Joint Compensation Systems 
for Remedying Environmental Damage, European Commission DGXI, Brussels. 
1 Article 5 EC (formerly Article 3b). 
14 See in particular Working Paper on Environmental Liability (17 November 1997), 
Commission of the 
European Communities DGXI, Brussels. 
15 Communication from the Commission of the European Communities, Implementing 
Community 
Environmental Policy, COM(96) 500 final, Brussels, 22.10.1996. 
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However, it is important for tort to retain a degree of independence from regulation. 
As the case of Blue Circle Industries Plc v. Ministry of Defence16 demonstrates, 
regulatory standards can provide a useful guide as to whether damage has occurred in 
cases of doubt. In this case it will be recalled that contaminated soil had to be removed 
because radiation levels exceeded statutory limits, not because there was necessarily a 
threat to health. Nevertheless, compliance with such standards should not be regarded 
as conclusive evidence of harm. The court should retain some discretion to protect 
private interests in cases where standards set by authorities are inadequate17. Whilst 
tort should be considered as a means of increasing general private participation in 
environmental protection it should not be inextricably linked with regulatory 
standards. Compliance with regulatory standards should continue to be regarded as 
being of evidential importance. 
A potential drawback of tort as a means of environmental protection is that insufficient 
numbers of actions would be instigated to have any major deterrent effect. However, 
individual judgments in high profile matters can attract a great deal of publicity which 
may result in exemplary deterrence. 18 Furthermore, a test case can open the way for a 
multitude of similar claims. This frequently occurs in industrial diseases cases 
whereby, following a successful representative action, the defendant may agree to 
settle similar claims out of court. 19 Thus had Elizabeth Reay and Vivien Hope been 
successful their action against British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL)20 it is likely that 
BNFL would have been compelled to settle other claims brought by the offspring of 
Sellafield employees. 
16 [1997] 1 Env. L. R. 341. 
17 Cane points out that the common law can supplement regulatory standards set by, for example, the 
planning system: "Although it [the tort of nuisance]cannot overturn the work of the planning system, it 
can be used to control the detailed use of permitted developments which the planning system does not, on 
the whole regulate; and it may provide some remedy for the results of planning mistakes, " See Cane, 
P., 
(1996), Tort Law and Economic Interests, Clarendon Press/Oxford, at p. 392. However, the ability of 
nuisance to fulfil this function has been seriously undermined by the decision in Gillingham Borough 
Council v. Medway (Chatham) Dock Ltd [ 1993 ] QB 343 in which a single planning consent was 
found to 
be capable of altering the character of the neighbourhood. 18 Schwarz points out that liability following the Exxon Valdez oil spill was settled according to the 
common law of negligence. This amounted to an astonishing US$ 9 billion; the second 
largest claim in 
US legal history. See Schwarze, R., "The role of common law in environmental policy: Comment", 
1996) 89 Public Choice 201. 
9A recent example includes litigation arising out of a condition known as 
`whitefinger' arising from the 
prolonged use of pneumatic drills in mines. See Armstrong v. British 
Coal, The Times, December 6, 
1996. 
20 Reay and Hope v. British Nuclear Fuels Plc [1994] Env. L. R. 320. 
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4. THE LIMITS OF TORT 
Clearly no system of environmental regulation can rely entirely upon one mechanism. 
The environmental problem comprises a multitude of issues which range from 
localized problems to matters of global importance. Liability in tort mainly operates at 
a local or regional level as it is triggered by specific incidents. Thus tort is suited to 
dealing with the consequences of accidental escapes or spillages of noxious 
substances. This type of harm accounts for a significant proportion of total 
environmental damage costs. 21 However, tort cannot provide a solution to wider 
environmental problems which result from the manner in which economies have been 
managed in the past. A case in point concerns the saga of historic pollution. 
It is unfortunate that tort has become embroiled in the debate regarding contaminated 
land. If one accepts the pluralistic view of tort advocated by Englard, 22 it is clear that 
tort rules constantly have to balance corrective and distributional functions. In the case 
of contaminated land it is impossible to achieve a balance. Where pollution has 
already occurred, in circumstances where it would not have given rise to tortious 
liability at the time, tort cannot have any deterrent effect. In such circumstances it 
must serve as a purely distributional device which allocates responsibility; as Atkinson 
argues, in the context of contaminated land, there is "a fundamental inconsistency of 
the goals of deterrence and compensation which the two seek to achieve". 23 Tort has 
historically governed conduct in accordance with the social values and expectations of 
the time. It is inappropriate to use it in respect of problems from the past when 
different standards applied. In this respect tort should not be confused with a system 
such as CERCLA in the United States which is an arbitrary means of loss allocation. 
The mere fact that CERCLA includes a mechanism for recovering costs through civil 
liability does not mean that it can be equated with tort. 
The insurance implications of increased environmental liability cannot be excluded 
from consideration of the limits of tort. Although few judges have attached as much 
weight as Lord Denning to the existence of insurance when attributing liability24, 
insurance has undoubtedly affected the development of tort. Thus, the availability of 
insurance must have a bearing on the decision to proceed with an environmental 
21 Estimates supplied by German Insurance brokers show that accidental escapes account 
for 8-12% of 
total environmental damage costs. See ERM Economics, op. cit., at p. 41. 22 Op. cit. 
Atkinson, N., "The Regulatory Lacuna: Waste Disposal and the Clean up of Contaminated Sites, " 
(1991) 3 Journal of Environmental Law 265, at p. 277. 
4 See, for example, Nettleship v. Weston [ 1971] 2 Q. B. 691. 
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liability regime. Insurers have made it clear that, following the experience in the 
United States, they would not be prepared to provide cover in respect of historic 
pollution. However, provided they are permitted to draft policies which do not leave 
them exposed to open ended costs, they are prepared to insure against current and 
future pollution. The availability of insurance will very much depend upon the 
domestic insurance laws of Member States. The legality of `claims made' triggers in 
the UK25 and `manifestation triggers' in Germany26 has been instrumental in the 
development of Environmental Impairment (EIL) liability. 27 In those countries where 
such terms have been ruled illegal insurers have spread the burden by pooling 
resources. Furthermore, as Holmes and Broughton point out, there is no reason why 
insurers should not continue to provide pollution cover under standard occurrence 
based public liability policies subject to more detailed risk assessments and increased 
premiums. 28 
It should be noted that these developments have occurred without the introduction of 
compulsory insurance. In fact compulsory insurance is likely to prove a hindrance to 
the development of insurance in this field due to its inflexibility. It is impossible to set 
blanket limits on the percentage of damage costs which should be met by insurers due 
to the range of variable factors involved. 29 The parties must be left free to determine 
their own insurance arrangements according to considerations such as the nature of the 
activity, the size of the enterprise and so forth. 
5. PROPOSALS FOR INCREASING THE ROLE OF TORT 
Although tort has the potential to fulfil a useful role as a component in a system of 
environmental protection, as the analysis in chapter 3 demonstrates, at present its use 
is limited by obstacles to establishing liability (transaction costs). These include the 
need to establish fault in certain cases, causation, limited standing and limited 
remedies. Such difficulties face any plaintiff wishing to pursue an action in tort, 
however, they are particularly acute where environmental damage is concerned. The 
technical nature of many polluting processes means that it may be difficult to establish 
25 See Lee, R. G., and Tupper, S., "Claims-made Policies: European Occurrences" 
[1996] Environmental 
Liability 25. 
26 See Woltereck, R., "New Environmental Impairment Policy Introduced into the German Insurance 
Market" [ 1994] 5 International Insurance Law Review 203. 
27 It will be recalled that these triggers enable the insurer to fix the period of cover more precisely 
than 
the usual occurrence triggers. 28 See Holmes, R., and Broughton, M., "Insurance Cover for Damage to the 
Environment", (1995) 9513 
Estates Gazette 123. 
29 See Woltereck, R., op. cit. 
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fault. The disperse nature of certain forms of pollution and the complex manner in 
which it inter-acts with the environment creates difficulties in establishing causation. 
Furthermore, standing is limited to those whose private interests have been directly 
affected and remedies reflect private loss as opposed to environmental impairment. 
These problems demonstrate that, at present, the English law of tort is characterized by 
corrective functions. Before tort can fulfil a useful role the focus must be moved from 
the protection of private interests to the protection of the environment. In other words, 
if the concepts of corrective and distributive justice are envisaged at two extremes of a 
sliding scale, there is a need to move tort closer to the distributive end of the spectrum. 
Of course, if tort is moved to the extreme distributional end of the scale it loses all 
correctional functions and is converted into an arbitrary means of loss allocation. 
Therefore, in drafting proposals designed to harness tort in pursuit of environmental 
objectives, it is necessary to balance distributive and corrective functions in the 
manner advocated by Englard in his theory of complementarity. 30 The principle means 
of reducing transaction costs in tort, which were discussed in chapter 6, have the 
capacity to accommodate both objectives. 
Strict liability increases the proportion of the damage costs which must be met by the 
polluter. However, it retains corrective functions in that it allows for defences; this 
preserves an element of individual accountability and affords the polluter the 
opportunity to internalize costs. This is where strict liability differs from absolute 
liability which is a purely distributional device. Thus it is entirely reasonable to 
include defences in respect of phenomena which were entirely beyond the control of 
the plaintiff such as force majeure. As stated in chapter 6, the development risk 
defence raises more complex issues in that it relates to the manner in which the 
defendant conducted his activities. The defence could provide an incentive to review 
procedures in accordance with the state of the art. This is provided that the onus 
remains on the defendant to show that the knowledge was not discoverable by the 
industrial sector in which he operates. 
As regards causation, as the experience in the United States demonstrates31, an 
unduly lax application of causality tests leads to collective responsibility32. The 
30 Op. cit. 
Huber, P., "Environmental Hazards and Liability Lain', in Litan, R. E., and Winston, C., (eds. 
), 
Liability Perspectives and Policy (1988) The Brookings Institution, at pp. 147-148. 
Teubner, G, `The Invisible Cupola: From Causal to Collective Attribution in Ecological Liability', 
in 
Teubner, G., Farmer, L., and Murphy, D., (eds. ), Environmental Law and Ecological 
Responsibility - 
The Concept and Practice of Ecological Self-Organization (1994) John Wiley 
& Sons, at p. 29. 
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approach adopted under the German Environmental Liability Act 1991 (UmweltHG) 
demonstrates how it is possible to increase the distributional effect of tort whilst 
retaining corrective functions. A provision of this type could enable the court to reach 
a common sense decision, based upon the circumstances of the case, without the need 
to establish a causal link with scientific certainty. 33 This accords more closely with the 
requirements of the precautionary principle34 than the rigorous causality tests applied 
under English common law. Furthermore it increases the proportion of the damage 
costs which must be borne by the polluter in accordance with the polluter pays 
principle. 35 In this sense relieving the burden of causality in this way embraces the 
distributional aspects of EC environmental policy; however, the fact that there must be 
circumstantial evidence pointing to a particular plant before the presumption can be 
invoked retains a strong element of corrective justice. 
Increased standing for environmental interest groups would also be an essential 
ingredient of any civil liability regime. The fact that liability in tort is contingent upon 
harm to private interests which vest in natural resources fetters the use of tort as a 
means of protecting the so-called `un-owned environment'. This raises certain 
conceptual and philosophical difficulties. Stone argued that the environment should be 
regarded as having a form of legal personality which environmental interest groups 
should be capable of representing as a form of guardian ad litem. 36 This approach 
seemed to receive some support from the dissenting judgment of Douglas J. in the US 
case of Sierra Club v. Morton37. An alternative approach, which may be easier to 
justify according to existing legal principles, has been adopted by the Dutch Courts in 
the cases of Kuunders38 and Borcea. 39 In these decisions, it will be recalled, the courts 
viewed environmental interest groups as representing the public interest in the 
protection of natural resources. 
Closely associated with this idea is the concept that the remedies awarded by the court, 
under an environmental liability regime, should reflect the need to protect the 
33 It will be recalled that this is provided that the presumption is not automatically rebutted 
by the 
existence of an alternative substance which is capable of causing the harm in synergy with the alleged 
cause. See Hager, G., "Umwelthaftungsgetz: The New German Environmental 
Liability Law" [1993] 
Environmental Liability 41, at p. 42. 
34 See Article 174 EC (formerly 130r). 
35 Ibid. 
36 Stone, C., "Should Trees Have Standing? - Towards Legal Rights 
for Natural Objects", (1972) 
Southern California Law Review 450. 
38 405 US 727,31 L. Ed 2d 636 (1972). 
Supreme Court 18 December 1992, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1994,139. See Chapter 6 at 
4.2. 
38 District Court Rotterdam 15 March 1991, (1992) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 
(NYIL) 
513. See Chapter 6 at 4.2. 
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environment as a separate entity from the private interests which vest in it. This would 
necessitate a general presumption in favour of injunctive relief. In chapter 4 it was 
argued that injunctions are more effective than damages in requiring the polluter to 
internalize a greater proportion of the pollution costs associated with an activity. 
Whereas there is no guarantee that damages will be applied to remedying 
environmental damage, the court may attach conditions to injunctions which stipulate 
abatement or remediation measures. These may be adjusted to take account of 
technical feasibility; as McLaren40 states, it is only in extreme circumstances that an 
enterprise would be forced to close as a result of an injunction. Thus, by allowing 
activities to continue whilst simultaneously reducing pollution levels, the remedy 
embodies both corrective and distributive functions in accordance with the pluralistic 
view of tort. An approach which favours an award of damages in lieu of an injunction 
invites an economic approach in which the polluter is allowed to compulsorily 
purchase the right to pollute. 
Where it is necessary to make an award of damages, the quantum should be calculated 
upon the basis of the cost of restoring the environment as close as possible to its 
former state. An approach which places undue emphasis upon restoring a natural 
resource for a specific use prices the resource according to narrow economic criteria. 
This renders the resource vulnerable to becoming the subject of market transactions. 41 
Proposals of this type develop two important ideas. Firstly, strict liability and easing 
the burden of proof on causation increase the accountability of polluters and give rise 
to duties to protect the environment. Secondly, increased standing and the application 
of remedies which reflect environmental damage, as opposed to private loss, allow 
these duties to be enforced by private individuals and bodies. In this sense an 
environmental liability regime could be instrumental in bringing about a re-evaluation 
of the relationship between property rights and the environment. 
6. CONCLUSION - TOWARDS AN IDEA OF ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS? 
As Macpherson42 explains, ownership of a resource once carried with it duties to use 
the resource in a certain manner. The dominance of the market has distilled the 
concept of property to those rights which are tradable, namely the tangible resource 
40 McLaren, J. P. S., "Nuisance Actions and the Environmental Battle", (1972) 10(3) Osgoode Hall 
Law 
Journal 505, at p. 557. 41 See Steele, J., "Remedies and Remediation: Foundation Issues in Environmental Liability", 
(1995) 
58(5) Modern Law Review 615. 
42 Macpherson, "Human Rights as Property Rights" (1977) 24 Dissent 72. 
214 
Conclusion 
itself and the right to exclude others from it. Thus the view of property which has 
predominated since the eighteenth century confers rights on the owners and duties on 
all others, namely the obligation to respect the owner's right to exclusive possession. 
According to this narrow view of property ownership confers rights on the owner but 
no duties; such a system is open to abuse in that it enables the owner to transfer the 
costs of his activity to third parties. This gives rise to the externality problem of which 
pollution is a classic example. As Bromley argues: 
"[T]he concentration of rights in the hands of a few individuals is not of immediate concern in a political sense. What matters is the fear that 
economic power deriving from this concentration may be put to 
antisocial uses. "43 
However, Bromley also points out that the lawyer's typical "bundle of sticks" 
conception of ownership, in which rights include the right to possess, manage, benefit, 
secure and alienate in varying degrees, does not denote absolute control. 44 Control 
vanes according to the extent to which the state permits the owner to disregard the 
space of others in exercising those rights. This aspect of ownership can be regarded as 
a privilege rather than an absolute right. As the state maintains the system of property 
it is in a position to alter the structure so as to restrict the use of such privileges. 
"For the state to do nothing is to protect those who currently have rights 
and privileges; to enter the fray in some form of collective action to 
modify institutional arrangements is to act in the interest of those 
currently bearing unwanted costs. "45 
He continues that such a reappraisal of the function of property is inevitable as 
resources are depleted and new scientific knowledge on causality reveals the extent to 
which the unfettered right to exclusive possession imposes costs on others: 
"As technology advances, and as population pressure continues to 
increase densities of urbanized areas, we will find new ways to impose 
unwanted costs on others. New knowledge also contributes in that its 
allows us to establish cause and effect with more certainty. In the 
absence of sophisticated scientific evidence many phenomena were 
simply accepted as part of life. Once we possess the ability to establish 
definite causality, the matter is thrown into the legislative or judicial 
43 Bromley, D. W. (1991), Environment and Economy, Blackwell, at p. 160. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., at p. 163. 
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arenas. The ultimate outcome of that process is surely a further 
redefinition of the rights and duties that go with land. "46 
A civil liability regime for environmental damage may contribute to such a 
redefinition by linking property rights with duties enforceable by others. This would be 
the next logical step in a process upon which the EC has already embarked. 
It will be recalled that the ECJ has begun to develop the idea that environmental 
Directives may confer rights on individuals. In Commission of the European 
Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany47, Germany was brought before the ECJ 
for failing to transpose certain directives designed to limit sulphur dioxide emissions. 
The German Government argued that it was already in compliance with the Directives 
in that levels of sulphur dioxide emissions were not in excess of the limits set by the 
Directives. The ECJ rejected this argument on the grounds that de facto compliance 
would not suffice; each Member State must put in place a legal framework which is 
sufficiently clear, precise and transparent to enable individuals to ascertain their rights 
and obligations48. However, it was not clear how such a right could be enforced. As 
Macrory argued: 
"Lawyers traditionally characterize trade freedom as a classical 
individual right, which should be equivalent to familiar rights of 
property, and capable of legal protection as such. In contrast, 
environmental concerns are viewed in law not so much as an aspect of 
individual freedom or entitlement but rather as an interest which 
restricts the freedom of what people may or may not do. As such it is an 
area appropriate for intervention by government but cannot readily be 
conceived of as a right directly enforceable before the courts in the 
same way as the freedom to trade. "49 
Gray50 considers that Francovich51 can provide one avenue for enforcing an 
environmental right against a Member State: 
"The European Court has come close to conceding the existence of an 
individual right to the effective and structured management of the 
eco-system on behalf of all citizens. Taken in conjunction with the 
Francovich ruling, the stance of the Court in Commission of the 
46 Ibid., at p. 167-168. 
Joint Cases C-361/88, [1991] ECR 1-2567 and C-59/89, [1991] ECR 1-2607. 
48 [199 1] ECR 1-2567,2601. 
48 Macrory, R., "Environmental Citizenship and the Law: Repairing the European 
Road" (1996) 8 
Journal of Environmental Law 219, at p. 232. 50Gray, K., "Equitable Property", (1994) Current Legal Problems 157 
Francovich v. Italian Republic, Cases C-6/90 and 9/90 [1993] 
2 C. M. L. R. 66. 
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European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany seems to 
recognize something which looks awfully like a right in the citizen to demand the proper and conscientious administration of a public trust in 
which he is regarded as having enforceable rights of a beneficial 
character. 
However, as pointed out in chapter 5, the Francovich decision is very limited in scope. 
The introduction of a civil liability regime for environmental damage would facilitate 
a more far-reaching system of enforceable environmental rights. The effect of such a 
regime would be to confer a form of equitable property in ecological resources upon 
each member of society in the manner advocated by Gray. Clearly, many of these 
interests may be diffuse and impossible to quantify; for example, if every passer by 
who was irritated by fumes from a factory were to be afforded standing to pursue the 
matter before the courts the floodgates would be opened and liability would become 
unsustainable53. However, in such circumstances, the collective interests of the 
community would be aggregated by means of affording standing to non-governmental 
organizations. Such representative actions would amount to an assertion of the 
collective proprietary interests of society in safeguarding the environmental media 
concerned. This approach reflects the reasoning of Douglas J. in the Sierra Club v. 
Morton54 and the Dutch Courts in Kuunders55 and Borcea56 
Thus in conclusion, development of a more effective system of civil liability for 
environmental damage is significant. It recognises that each member of society has a 
stake in the environment. Landowners will increasingly be forced to the view that 
possessory title to land is not merely a matter of what they may do with their property 
but also what they may not do with it. Thus an environmental liability regime, of the 
type envisaged by the EC, may bring us full circle and restore the idea that ownership 
of land carries with it both rights and responsibilities. 
52 Op. cit., at p. 206. 5 Lord Goff was clearly aware of this problem in Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] 2 W. L. R. 684. 
where he objected extending standing to those without a proprietary interest 
in property: "[T]he 
extension of the tort in this way would transform it from a tort to land into a tort to the person, 
in which 
damages could be recovered in respect of something less serious than personal 
injury and the criteria for 
liability were founded not upon negligence but upon striking a balance 
between the interests of 
neighbours in the use of their land. This is, in my opinion, not an acceptable way 
in which to develop the 
law, " per Lord Goff at p. 696F-G. 54 
55 
405 US 727,31 L. Ed 2d 636 (1972). 
Supreme Court 18 December 1992, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1994,139. See Chapter 6 at 4.2. 
56 District Court Rotterdam 15 March 1991, (1992) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 
(NYIL) 
513. See Chapter 6 at 4.2. 
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